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14	SUPERIOR COURT OF TI	HE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
15		SANTA CLARA
16		
17	TACINUM DIC. D.1	l c N
18	TACHYUM INC., a Delaware company,	Case No.
19	Plaintiff,	VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY PLAINTIFF
20	V.	TACHYUM INC.
21	CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware company, and DOES 1-25,	DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
22	inclusive,	
23	Defendants.	
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VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

These elements were supposed to be off-the-shelf technology that could be delivered quickly to meet Tachyum's critical product development timeline so as to be first-to-market with its Universal Processor. However, catastrophic failures plagued each component, in some cases leading Cadence to advise Tachyum not to use the components and/or to obtain them from other vendors.

- 5. For nearly two years, Tachyum tried to work with Cadence to find solutions to these problems despite the persistent and widespread project delays and frustrations. Tachyum's heavy investment in the Cadence relationship, both monetarily and technologically, meant it would not be a simple matter to switch to different vendors and service providers. Ultimately, however, Tachyum determined it had no choice. Cadence could not provide technology meeting contractual requirements. Moreover, after Tachyum asked for a refund of the amounts paid for the non-working components,

 Accordingly,
 Tachyum contracted with other companies that were able to deliver what Cadence had not but only at a cost to Tachyum of millions of dollars more, as well as months of additional delay.
- 6. The fact that Cadence—a well-established leader in its field—failed on so many fronts involving industry-standard components that its competitors were able to provide and that were merely the most current generations of technology that Cadence itself had implemented in the past, led Tachyum to suspect that the failures were not the result of incompetence but of a deliberate attempt by Cadence to sabotage Tachyum's effort to be first-to-market with a Universal Processor. Tachyum's suspicions grew deeper when it learned that Cadence's then-CEO, Lip-Bu Tan, was on the board of directors of two of Tachyum's competitors and was heavily involved in two investment funds that had invested in other competitors—a clear conflict of interest. Another Cadence board member, Young Sohn, is also a principal in one of those investment funds.
- 7. Cadence's fraudulent conduct and breaches of contract have caused massive harm to Tachyum, resulting in millions of dollars lost and threatening Tachyum's very existence at one point. Although Tachyum found a way to continue its product development by turning to other vendors, it still incurred project delays of at least a year that have increased Tachyum's operating expenses, delayed its ability to earn revenue, created additional market challenges, and placed at

risk specific business opportunities. To compensate Tachyum for these losses, Tachyum seeks to recover monetary damages in this action of at least in restitution of amounts paid by Tachyum to Cadence under the contracts plus at least another \$206,000,000 in increased expenses and lost profits caused by Cadence's wrongful conduct. Tachyum also seeks an award of punitive damages based on Cadence's acts of fraud.

THE PARTIES

- 8. Tachyum is a Delaware corporation with places of business at 2520 Mission College Blvd., Suite 201, Santa Clara, California 95054, located in Santa Clara County, and 8275 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 233, Las Vegas, Nevada 89123.
- 9. On information and belief, Cadence is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at 2655 Seely Ave., San Jose, California 95134, located in Santa Clara County.
- 10. Tachyum does not know the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as Does 1 through 25, inclusive ("Doe Defendants"), and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names. Tachyum will seek leave to amend this Complaint to allege the true names and capacities of said Defendants when they are ascertained. Tachyum is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that each of the Doe Defendants is responsible in some manner for some or all of the occurrences alleged herein.
 - 11. Hereafter, "Defendants" refers collectively to Cadence and the Doe Defendants.
- 12. Tachyum is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Cadence and each of the Doe defendants was the agent, employee, and/or partner of each of the other Defendants and/or was otherwise acting in concert with the other Defendants in performing the acts alleged herein; in so doing, was acting collectively with such other Defendants, for a common purpose, and within the scope of such agency, employment, and/or partnership; and thus is jointly liable to Tachyum for the harms and damages suffered by Tachyum as alleged herein.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. This Court has general subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the relief sought by Tachyum exceeds the monetary limits associated with limited jurisdiction cases.

14. Venue is proper in this County because Cadence is a corporation with its principal place of business in this County; the contracts between the parties on which this action is based were entered into in this County; and Tachyum has suffered harm in this County as a result of Cadence's complained-of conduct. Further, said contracts provide that related disputes "shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts in and for Santa Clara County, California" and "the parties hereby irrevocably agree to submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction and venue of such courts."

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

I. The Parties


- Danilak and three co-founders. Tachyum is developing the Prodigy® Universal Processor, the world's first processor that unifies the functionality of a central processor (CPU), a general-purpose graphics processor (GPGPU), and a tensor processor for AI applications (TPU) in a single architecture. Tachyum's proprietary design will deliver cutting-edge performance, low energy consumption, and space efficiency at low cost. The processor is intended for such uses as data centers, artificial intelligence, and supercomputing. It also has important applications related to national security, including unmanned aircraft and underwater systems, cybersecurity, analytics, communications, and more. Tachyum expects to release Prodigy® to fabrication later this year in several sizes and configurations to address different markets, applications, and workloads. The government of Slovakia loaned Tachyum money for Prodigy® development and holds an interest in, among other things, any Cadence IPs acquired by Tachyum. Tachyum is required to report to the government of Slovakia periodically on its progress.
- 16. On information and belief, Cadence is a multinational, publicly traded technology company founded in 1988 and based in San Jose, California. Cadence develops software and hardware for computer chips, computer systems, printed circuit boards, and related technologies. Cadence is a leader in this field, competing with other major companies like Synopsys, Inc. ("Synopsys"), Rambus Inc. ("Rambus"), and Alphawave IP Inc. ("Alphawave"). As of January

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3	21. The IP types described in the preceding paragraph are not specific to Cadence, but
4	rather are widely available in the industry and subject to industry standards and specifications.
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12	22. After the Parties entered into the Contracts in December 2019, they signed two
13	amendments to the eDAcard Agreement and several Change Orders pursuant to the IP Agreement
14	and the SOW. The Parties also signed and/or exchanged other documents affecting the scope of
15	their respective obligations under the IP Agreement and SOW, such as configuration parameters
16	and design specifications.
17	III. <u>Cadence's Fraudulent Misrepresentations</u>
18	23. Given the magnitude of the project in terms of both price and significance to
19	Tachyum's business, Tachyum considered several potential vendors for various aspects of the
20	project including Cadence, Synopsys, Rambus, and AlphaWave. Tachyum initially considered
21	Cadence primarily for the
22	
23	Tachyum and Cadence engaged in pre-contractual discussions for months before they
24	signed the Contracts, during which Tachyum disclosed its needs and requirements to Cadence,
25	Cadence described its IP offerings and capabilities to Tachyum, and the Parties communicated
26	extensively by telephone, by email, and in person.
27	24. Cadence pressured Tachyum to sign the Contracts before the end of December
28	2019. On information and belief, Cadence, as a publicly-traded company, wanted to be able to be


1	able to recognize revenue from the Contracts in its reported financial results for 2019 and 202	20.
2	Cadence was previously sued for securities fraud associated with improper revenue recognition	on,
3	resulting in Cadence paying a substantial settlement. In re Cadence Design Sys., Inc. Sec. an	d
4	Deriv. Litig., Case No. C-08-4966 SC (N.D. Cal.).	
5	25. As Tachyum eventually learned long after the Contracts were signed, the Parti	es'
6	pre-contractual discussions included multiple false and deceptive statements by Cadence rega	arding
7	its technology capabilities and development plans that induced Tachyum to sign the Contract	s and
8	IPA Selection Forms. The false statements are detailed below.	
9	A. False Representations About	
0	26. In the fall of 2019, Cadence represented to Tachyum that its	
1	would be silicon ready in Q4 2020. Tachyum was considering se	veral
2	vendors, and the was a key component that led Tachyum to	o
3	select Cadence. In fact, Tachyum later learned that Cadence's R&D team did not even have to	he
4	on its internal development schedule. Thus, Cader	ıce
5	knew that the would not be silicon ready in Q4 20	20
6	and that its factual representations on this point were false, and/or it had no reasonable ground	d to
7	believe they were true. Further details about these allegations are provided below.	
8	27. On October 10, 2019, Cadence hosted a meeting with Tachyum at which the p	arties
9	discussed Tachyum's needs and Cadence's capabilities. The same day, after the meeting, Art	min
20	Khalili of Cadence sent a follow-up email to Tachyum with "notes from today's meeting." C	ther
21	Cadence employees who were cc'ed on the email and, on information and belief, were present	ıt at
22	the meeting included Dave Kulansky, Tony Tran, Nupur Kandalkar, Kos Gitchev, and Duc L	e.
23	28. The Khalili email noted Tachyum's need for a	
24	The email stated Tachyum's reas	on
25	for requiring a For this purpose,	
26	Tachyum "[n]eed[s] "	
27		The
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1	email then repeatedly represented that the IP required by Tachyum would be ready by the end of
2	2020:
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11	On information and belief, these email excerpts summarized statements made by Dave Kulansky
12	of Cadence at the meeting earlier that day.
13	29. The email further stated that incorporating
14	was a "low risk to be added." These
15	statements implied that (1) Cadence had a firm, good faith plan in place to develop a
16	targeting silicon availability by Q4 2020 and
17	(2) development of this IP was already in progress (absent which Cadence could not reasonably
18	have expected to meet the stated timeline).
19	30. These representations by Cadence were false. Months later, after the Contracts
20	were signed, Tachyum learned from Cadence R&D that in fact it was not on their internal timeline
21	to develop the contracted-for
22	Indeed, there was a shouting match between Cadence engineers and Cadence management during
23	a meeting with Tachyum in mid-2020, during which a Cadence engineer said that this IP was not
24	in their development plan. Cadence also informed Tachyum in or about June 2020 that it would
25	not even release its specification for by an August 2020 milestone.
26	31. Cadence's pre-contractual representations that the
27	silicon availability in Q4 2020 cannot be reconciled with the fact that, months later, Cadence R&D
28	did not even have development of the IP on its internal schedule.

1	Addendum I	to the first IPA Selection Form to a project schedule that included
2		ovember 30, 2020 and "on February 14, 2021. Tachyum thus
3	had every reas	son to believe Cadence's representations were sincere, feasible, and supported by an
4	existing R&D	plan.
5	В.	False Representations About
6	35.	Another inducement to enter the contracts was Cadence's representation to
7	Tachyum that	its , a key metric affecting
8	performance.	After the agreements were signed, Cadence admitted that the
9	achieve	but would have to have its performance "boosted," and even then
10	would not sati	sfy contractual requirements under all conditions. In addition, it could only be
11	"boosted" to a	as presented in pre-sale slides. Cadence knew
12	that its	and that its factual representations on
13	this point wer	e false and/or it had no reasonable ground to believe its representations were true.
14	Further details	s about these allegations are provided below.
15	36.	On October 23, 2019, Cadence hosted a meeting with Tachyum at which it
16	presented a se	t of slides about the . The same day, after the meeting, Sanjay
17	Dave of Cade	nce sent the slides to Tachyum via email. Other Cadence employees who were cc'ed
18	on the email a	and, on information and belief, were present at the meeting included Dave Kulansky,
19	Tony Tran, A	rmin Khalili, Nupur Kandalkar, Kos Gitchev, and Duc Le. In the slide deck, the
20	section related	d to the begins on slide 5. The next slide states: "
21		":
22		
23		
24	37.	This statement is immediately below a statement that the
25		version, was a
26		
27		
28	38.	The slide depicts an image of a chip to reinforce these points:



1	43. Mr. Dave, Mr. Kulansky, and/or one or more other Cadence employees must have
2	known that the representations regarding were false because the slides indicate
3	that had been confirmed through testing of actual test chips. At a minimum,
4	those Cadence employees had no reasonable ground to believe that the representations were true,
5	as Cadence's testing (or lack thereof) was easily knowable to them. Tachyum lacks sufficient
6	knowledge to identify each Cadence employee who knew of the fraudulent statements identified
7	above and their falsity before the Contracts and IPA Selection Forms were signed. Such persons
8	include, on information and belief, one or more persons who were copied on Mr. Dave's email,
9	who presented slides at or otherwise attended the October 23, 2019 meeting, or who provided
10	information, review, or approval in connection with the slides, the email, and/or the meeting.
11	44. Cadence presented and sent the slides to Tachyum on October 23, 2019 as part of a
12	sales pitch intended to induce Tachyum to contract with Cadence for the
13	Tachyum signed the Contracts approximately two
14	months later on December 12, 2019.
15	45. is a critically important characteristic of a because it directly
16	affects system performance and the length of the transmission lines required for system level
17	implementation. Tachyum would not have contracted with Cadence had it not believed Cadence's
18	claims that the and that this was silicon-proven.
19	Tachyum's reliance on the slides was justifiable given that (a) the slides were designed to create
20	the impression that Cadence's claims were backed by actual testing of physical test chips, and (b)
21	Tachyum had no means of testing Cadence's claims independently prior to signing the contracts.
22	Moreover, Cadence is one of the known leaders in the field and Mr. Danilak had had a positive
23	prior experience working with Cadence.
24	C. False Representations About
25	46. Further misrepresentations by Cadence were in relation to its
26	, which are also key system components. These IPs support both the
27	Cadence represented to
28	Tachyum in the fall of 2019 that its



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5	50.	Consistent with that discussion, Addendum J to the January 10, 2020 IPA Selection
6	Form identif	that Cadence agreed to provide. Addendum J, item C8
7	stated the	
8		Likewise, Addendum K, item C2 stated that the
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10	51.	Also in Addendum J, § 3, line AN3, Cadence made a representation of fact about
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12		
13		
14	52.	In sum, in the contract it presented to Tachyum for signature, Cadence represented
15	that it had	
16		
17	53.	These representations by Cadence were false. On information and belief, Cadence
18	either	
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20		but instead was chosen to ensure a falsified
21	"successful"	outcome.
22	54.	Months after the Contracts and IPA Selection Forms were signed, Tachyum
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VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT


1	55. In October 2020, Cadence proposed switching to a
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5	56. As for Cadence's Tachyum was informed by Cadence in late 2021
6	—long after Addendum K was signed—that it
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8	57. On information and belief, Ms. Kandalkar and/or one or more other Cadence
9	employees must have known that Cadence's representations regarding the
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14 15	
16	On information and belief, such persons include
17	one or more persons who were copied on Ms. Kandalkar's emails, or who participated on the
18	R&D team that supposedly approved the, or who prepared the
19	, or who provided information, review, or approval in connection with
20	those materials.
21	58. Cadence communicated the
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24	Tachyum signed the Contracts
25	approximately two months later on December 12, 2019.
26	59. The ability of the
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
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7	D. False Representation About Availability of
8	60. Cadence represented to Tachyum in the fall of 2019 that it had a development
9	roadmap for a
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13	Further
14	details about these allegations are provided below.
15	61. On October 29, 2019, Dave Kulansky of Cadence sent an email to the "Tachyum
16	team" asking, Kiran
17	Malwankar of Tachyum responded,
18	Mr. Kulansky then commented, "
19	Cadence employees copied on this email string included Nupur Kandalkar, Sanjay Dave, Armin
20	Khalili, Kos Gitchev, Tony Tran, and Duc Le. This exchange appears as follows in the email string:
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25	62. Mr. Kulansky's statement about the implied
26	that
27	and (2) development of this IP was already well underway (otherwise, Cadence could not
28	reasonably have expected to meet the stated timeline).
- 1	

1	63. This statement by Cadence was false. After the Contracts and an Addendum for a
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5	Tachyum spoke to
6	the other vendor, but it did not have IP at that time that would meet Tachyum's requirements.
7	Cadence then tried to persuade Tachyum to accept earlier-generation as a solution, but
8	that was not acceptable to Tachyum. These facts belie Cadence's pre-contractual representation
9	that it had a roadmap providing for its
0	64. Mr. Kulansky and/or one or more other Cadence employees must have known that
1	the representation that Cadence's would be generally available by Q3
2	2020 was false because the representation related to Cadence's own activities. At a minimum,
3	those Cadence employees had no reasonable ground to believe their representation was true, as
4	Cadence's R&D development plans were easily knowable to them. Tachyum lacks sufficient
5	knowledge to identify each Cadence employee who knew of the fraudulent statements and their
6	falsity before the Contracts and IPA Selection Forms were signed. On information and belief,
7	such persons include one or more persons who were cc'ed on Mr. Kulansky's October 29, 2019
8	emails or who provided information, review, or approval in connection with the emails.
9	65. Mr. Kulansky sent his October 29, 2019 emails to Tachyum as part of a sales pitch
20	intended to persuade Tachyum to enter into the Contracts with Cadence, in response to Tachyum's
21	statement that was "preferred" and "is a must have." Tachyum
22	signed the Contracts approximately two months later on December 12, 2019.
23	66. Tachyum relied on Cadence's representation about its roadmap for development of
24	a . In particular, Tachyum agreed to the overall pricing associated with the
25	Platinum Project, signed an Addendum for , and devoted time and
26	resources to Cadence's instead of identifying an alternative vendor from the start.
27	67. Tachyum's reliance was justifiable because Cadence is one of the known leaders in
,,	the field that clearly knew its own development plans and capabilities and with whom Tachyum's

1	CEO had had a positive prior experience. It was also reasonable for Tachyum to believe and rely
2	on Cadence's representations because Cadence had successfully created for
3	earlier generations of . Further, Cadence reinforced its representations by offering
4	an IPA Selection Form that listed the
5	
6	would be released by June 30, 2020 and a " would
7	be released by September 20, 2020. Tachyum therefore had every reason to believe Cadence's
8	representation was sincere, feasible, and supported by an actual R&D development plan.
9	IV. <u>Cadence's Breaches of Contract</u>
0	68. Cadence's fraudulent statements described above presage several related breaches
1	of contract. Not only did Cadence not have a
2	in its R&D team's development plan when the Contracts were signed, it was
3	never able to deliver those IPs in working condition. Not only did Cadence not confirm the speed
4	of its with a fair and true synthesis, it was never able to deliver a
5	However, Cadence's breaches of contract extended much
6	further than these examples, infecting all of the Contracts either directly or indirectly.
7	A. Cadence Failed to Deliver a
8	69. In Addendum L to the first IPA Selection Form, the Parties contracted for Cadence
9	to deliver a
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24	70. Early in the Parties' discussions, Tachyum informed Cadence that it needed a
25	. Shortly before the Contracts were
26	signed, Cadence told Tachyum that it would deliver
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1	, and it made
2	related representations about this IP's expected availability as described above.
3	71. Cadence breached Addendum L to the first IPA Selection Form, and thus the IP
4	Agreement, by failing to deliver the contracted-for
5	
6	
7	Second, Cadence ultimately proved unable to deliver a that complied with certain key
8	aspects of the . The following sections provide details
9	about these separate breaches of contract related to the
10	1. Cadence Refused to Deliver a
11	72. During the Parties' pre-contractual discussions, they discussed Tachyum's intended
12	use cases for the
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16	73. In this regard, item C13 in Addendum L to the first IPA Selection Form specifies
17	that the
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23	Other
24	documents exchanged between the Parties before and after the Contracts were signed confirmed
25	that this was the intended configuration. Cadence never communicated a different understanding
26	to Tachyum before the Contracts or IPA Selection Forms were signed.
27	74. In Tachyum's Prodigy® processor design, the
28	and a state of the
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3	and Cadence had no solution for the issue.
4	Moreover, Cadence did not inform Tachyum of that fact until on or about September 1, 2021,
5	nearly 20 months into the project. Cadence's inability to meet the link up time requirements was
6	the failure that finally convinced Tachyum it needed an alternative to Cadence as an IP vendor.
7	82. In addition to the above issues, Cadence also failed to meet the
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12	was due under Addendum L to the first IPA Selection Form, as amended.
13	83. As the delivery deadlines set forth in Addendum L passed long ago, Cadence's
14	failure to deliver a compliant breached the IP Agreement.
15	B. Cadence Failed to Deliver a
16	84. As discussed above in connection with Tachyum's fraud claim, Tachyum explained
17	to Cadence that it needed a
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21	85. Tachyum contracted for the
22	the IPA Selection Form dated January 10, 2020. Addendum J and Addendum K identify the
23	, respectively, as selected IPs.
24	86. For the
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VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

delivered. Cadence employees later stated to Tachyum that before the Contracts were signed. 88. Cadence's own testing and analysis confirmed the speed shortfall. In this regard, Cadence announced that it had obtained and tested two in or about the fall
Contracts were signed. 88. Cadence's own testing and analysis confirmed the speed shortfall. In this regard,
88. Cadence's own testing and analysis confirmed the speed shortfall. In this regard,
Cadence announced that it had obtained and tested two
of 2021. Materials provided by Cadence revealed that the test chips achieved silicon validation of
only , respectively. (In this context, .)
, but Cadence employee Hassan Refaee sent Tachyum
an email
Another Cadence employee (Tom Wilson) informed Tachyum that,
89. With regard to the
90. To address the speed issue, Cadence proposed to switch from
91. Finally, Cadence proposed to redesign its , but that would have taken an
additional 14 months and the new design would not be silicon-proven. The additional lengthy
delay and performance uncertainty were not feasible given Tachyum's schedule for completing its
Prodigy® processor and getting it to market.
92. Cadence's failure to deliver a compliant breached the
IP Agreement.

1	C. Cadence Breached Its Contractual Obligations Related to the	
2	1. Cadence Failed to Document the	
3	93. Cadence failed to fulfill its contractual obligation, arising from the IP Agreement	
4	and the second IPA Selection Form, to provide documentation defining the many signals that the	;
5	. T	he
6	specification defines the	
7		
8	94. Attachment C to the IP Agreement includes a list of design materials that Tachyun	m
9	could choose to license, including ""	
10	95. In Addendum B to the Parties' second IPA Selection Form, signed on April 30,	
11	2020, Tachyum selected the and related options. Section 4 of the form	
12	identifies the related Deliverables Cadence was supposed to provide. Item D4 identifies "Users	
13	Guide" as a Deliverable, defined as a	
14		
15	by 6 weeks after	
16	project start and was to provide an updated Users Guide 12 weeks later for a	
17	96. Cadence never delivered documentation describing in detail the "	
18	In a mid-	-
19	October 2020 meeting with Amlendu Choubey of Cadence (also attended, on information and	
20	belief, by other Cadence personnel who work on, Tachyum notified Cadence that it had	1
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24	In emails from Tachyum to Mr. Choubey over the next several	
25	days, Tachyum . Meetings	
26	between the Parties on this issue continued for almost six months, but Cadence never provided the	1e
27	documentation.	
28		

1	97.	Because Cadence did not deliver a complete description of the controller signals,	
2	Tachyum coul	d not integrate the with its proprietary processor design.	
3	Cadence's failure was in breach of the IP Agreement.		
4		2. Cadence Failed to Deliver an Operational	
5	98.	Addendum B to the Parties' second IPA Selection Form specifies, in item C2, that	
6	Cadence agree	ed to deliver to Tachyum a	
7			
8			
9	device to inter	operate with other such devices. On or about September 1, 2021, Cadence informed	
10	Tachyum that	link up time	
11	requirements.	That failure is a breach of the IP Agreement.	
12	D.	Cadence Failed to Deliver a Compliant	
13	99.	Attachment C to the IP Agreement lists "Design IP Design Materials Available for	
14	Selection" and	l provides that "	
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17	100.	In fact, after the Contracts were signed, Cadence did <i>not</i> make the	
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25		available to Tachyum breached the IP Agreement.	
26	101.	Before Cadence informed Tachyum that it would not be able to deliver a	
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		VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT	

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5	These failures also represent breaches of the IP Agreement.
6	102. As a result of Cadence's failure to make available or deliver the required
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8	thereby negatively affecting the cost of Tachyum's solution.
9	V. <u>Tachyum's Complaints and Cadence's Responses</u>
10	103. Cadence's multiple failures to deliver the contracted-for technology, as described
11	above, or to meet the schedules for doing the same led to complaints by Tachyum and, eventually,
12	to disputes over Cadence's right to further payments and Tachyum's right to a refund of amounts
13	already paid.
14	104. At least as early as June 22, 2020, Elena Zokhidova of Tachyum raised a laundry
15	list of Cadence failures via email with Cadence, including, but not limited to, failures related to the
16	In that email, Tachyum informed Cadence that its
17	funding from the government of Slovakia and the European Union for Prodigy® development
18	meant that "[b]ased on the EU and SK procurement rules we can't release payments in light of
19	purchased IP not being delivered, not meeting contractual requirements."
20	105. After ongoing discussions during the next several months, Tachyum provided a
21	"Status Summary" to Cadence on or about December 7, 2020. In the summary and Tachyum's
22	related discussions with Cadence, Tachyum pointed out that Cadence was unable to deliver a
23	. Tachyum
24	therefore requested that those items and the related payments be removed from the IP Agreement.
25	
26	still had not
27	been provided. Tachyum said that related payments would have to be delayed due to Cadence's
28	failures, which breached the IP Agreement.

1	110. By late 2021, Tachyum determined that Cadence's technology failures and delays
2	meant that Tachyum would need to source several major IPs (including the
3) from other
4	suppliers. Tachyum made preliminary arrangements with three other vendors to provide various
5	IPs and requested a full refund of amounts paid by Tachyum under the IP Agreement.
6	111. Because it would have been highly disruptive for Tachyum to switch to different
7	software or bring a new engineering support team up to speed, Tachyum intended to continue
8	using Cadence software under the eDAcard Agreement and Cadence support services under the
9	SOW. However, Cadence presented roadblocks on each front.
10	112. With respect to the SOW, Tachyum sought to have Cadence continue providing
11	services under the SOW in connection with the Platinum Project, including integration of the
12	third-party IPs into Tachyum's processor design. Under Section 12 of the SOW,
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18	. Sections 1.1 and 2.1-2.3 of the SOW listed tasks that
19	Cadence might perform under the SOW, including, but not limited to,
20	
21	113. Despite its obligations under the SOW, Cadence took the position that performing
22	services with respect to third-party IPs would present confidentiality issues. Cadence's claimed
23	concerns were specious, as Section 2.5 of the applicable Terms & Conditions contemplates that
24	Cadence's support services might comprise use of third-party IP, providing that
25	
26	
27	" None of the other vendors—

1	disclosure agreement (NDA) with Cadence and the other vendors that would have addressed any
2	possible confidentiality concerns. In the end, however, Cadence declined to sign the NDA or
3	provide services (which Tachyum was paying for under the SOW) to integrate third-party IPs into
4	Tachyum's processor design. A Cadence executive told Tachyum's CEO that Cadence simply
5	didn't want to do the work. This refusal was a breach of the SOW.
6	114. Cadence also stopped providing support, including
7	for parts of the Platinum Project that did not require access to third-party IP—again, despite the
8	fact that Cadence was charging Tachyum for the time. On information and belief, Cadence
9	reassigned some of its engineering resources to other projects and refused to let a
10	perform support services for Tachyum despite being idle.
11	115. With respect to the eDAcard Agreement, Cadence refused to extend its term except
12	upon conditions that were unreasonable and unacceptable to Tachyum, including that (1) the
13	eDAcard extension would be part of a global settlement that would not adequately compensate
14	Tachyum for Cadence's breaches; (2) Tachyum would have to pay for an extended license in full
15	and up front rather than over time; (3) Cadence would
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16	rather than the
	existing eDAcard pricing,
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17 18	existing eDAcard pricing,
17 18 19	existing eDAcard pricing, ; and (4) Tachyum had to select the license term in advance despite the uncertain
17 18 19 20	existing eDAcard pricing, ; and (4) Tachyum had to select the license term in advance despite the uncertain timing of the project completion due to Cadence's breaches.
17 18 19 20 21	existing eDAcard pricing, ; and (4) Tachyum had to select the license term in advance despite the uncertain timing of the project completion due to Cadence's breaches. 116. Given that Cadence had engineering resources available for the Tachyum project,
116 117 118 119 220 221 222 233	existing eDAcard pricing, ; and (4) Tachyum had to select the license term in advance despite the uncertain timing of the project completion due to Cadence's breaches. 116. Given that Cadence had engineering resources available for the Tachyum project, that Cadence could give Tachyum , and that Tachyum was
117 118 119 220 221 222	existing eDAcard pricing, ; and (4) Tachyum had to select the license term in advance despite the uncertain timing of the project completion due to Cadence's breaches. 116. Given that Cadence had engineering resources available for the Tachyum project, that Cadence could give Tachyum , and that Tachyum was willing to pay for ongoing support services and eDAcard access, Cadence's freezing of support
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	existing eDAcard pricing, ; and (4) Tachyum had to select the license term in advance despite the uncertain timing of the project completion due to Cadence's breaches. 116. Given that Cadence had engineering resources available for the Tachyum project, that Cadence could give Tachyum , and that Tachyum was willing to pay for ongoing support services and eDAcard access, Cadence's freezing of support services and refusal to extend the eDAcard Agreement on reasonable terms led Tachyum to
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	existing eDAcard pricing, ; and (4) Tachyum had to select the license term in advance despite the uncertain timing of the project completion due to Cadence's breaches. 116. Given that Cadence had engineering resources available for the Tachyum project, that Cadence could give Tachyum, and that Tachyum was willing to pay for ongoing support services and eDAcard access, Cadence's freezing of support services and refusal to extend the eDAcard Agreement on reasonable terms led Tachyum to believe that Cadence was retaliating against Tachyum for requesting a refund under the IP
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	existing eDAcard pricing, ; and (4) Tachyum had to select the license term in advance despite the uncertain timing of the project completion due to Cadence's breaches. 116. Given that Cadence had engineering resources available for the Tachyum project, that Cadence could give Tachyum, and that Tachyum was willing to pay for ongoing support services and eDAcard access, Cadence's freezing of support services and refusal to extend the eDAcard Agreement on reasonable terms led Tachyum to believe that Cadence was retaliating against Tachyum for requesting a refund under the IP

117. Tachyum became suspicious about another possible motive for Cadence's refusal to continue providing support services or to extend Tachyum's software access—and, indeed, for Cadence's failure to successfully implement a wide range of different IPs that should have been within its capabilities—when Tachyum learned that Cadence's then-CEO, Lip-Bu Tan held positions of responsibility that gave him a professional and financial interest in competitors of Tachyum. These include his position as a member of the board of directors of two of Tachyum's competitors, SambaNova (where he is chairman of the board) and Nuvia (acquired by Qualcomm in mid-2021), as well as his leadership role at two venture capital firms (Walden International and Walden Catalyst) that invest in companies that include Tachyum competitors. These positions held by Mr. Tan presented clear conflicts of interest, and Tachyum intends to investigate the extent to which he directly or indirectly affected Cadence's conduct vis-à-vis Tachyum.

VI. Cadence's Termination of Tachyum's Access to eDAcard Software

- 118. As explained above, Tachyum attempted to negotiate an extension of the eDAcard Agreement in late 2021, but Cadence refused to agree to an extension on reasonable terms.
- 119. On or about June 13, 2022, after the eDAcard Agreement's existing term expired, without notice to Tachyum, Cadence terminated Tachyum's access to the software that previously had been made available under the eDAcard Agreement. At that time, Tachyum had under the eDAcard Agreement for which Cadence has invoiced

Tachyum and demanded payment.

- 120. Although Tachyum was unable to use most of the Cadence IPs and most of the work product produced by Cadence under the SOW, Tachyum had made use of the eDAcard software to design parts of the Prodigy® processor core. Tachyum intended to continue using the eDAcard software for other standard processes such as simulation and synthesis that are used to test a processor design and translate it into a format that can be used for manufacturing.
- 121. Tachyum would not have needed continued access to the eDAcard software after the expiration of the eDAcard Agreement but for the Cadence's fraudulent acts and breaches of contract, which enticed Tachyum to enter into the Contracts and delayed completing the Prodigy® processor design.

- 122. Although other vendors provide software tools akin to the Cadence tools used by Tachyum under the eDAcard Agreement, the other vendors' tools are not compatible with the design files created by Tachyum using Cadence's tools. As a result, switching to another vendor will require scrapping the designs created by Tachyum with Cadence's tools and recreating the designs using a new vendor's tools. Tachyum estimates that process will further delay the tapeout and release of the Prodigy® processor of six to nine months.
- 123. Switching to another vendor's software tools will also require that Tachyum's hardware engineers be trained on the new tools, causing additional delays and increasing the risk of errors due to the engineers' unfamiliarity with the new tools.
- 124. Negotiating a software license from another vendor on a standalone basis, rather than as part of the package as in the case of the Contracts, will result in much higher prices that Tachyum will have to pay for software access.

VII. Tachyum's Lost Business

- 125. Cadence's contract breaches and acts of fraud have caused many concrete business opportunities that are or were available to Tachyum being lost, delayed, or threatened, with actual or threatened money damages to Tachyum in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
- 126. As an example, the Barcelona Supercomputing Center (BSC) in Spain has been selected as the site for a cutting-edge pre-exascale supercomputer called MareNostrum 5. The project is being funded by the European Union's EuroHPC Joint Undertaking and several EU member states. Tachyum's wholly-owned Slovakian subsidiary, Tachyum s.r.o., signed a Memorandum of Understanding with BSC in December 2021 to pave the way for cooperation between them. Tachyum is informed and believes that had Cadence performed under the Contracts as promised or had Tachyum not been enticed to select Cadence as a vendor by Cadence's misrepresentations, Tachyum s.r.o. would have been able to bid on the MareNostrum 5project by the February 2022 deadline—either directly or as a supplier of Prodigy® processors to a Tachyum partner such as Atos SE or World Wide Technology, Inc. (WWT). Tachyum is informed and believes that Tachyum s.r.o. would have been selected in one role or the other due to the Prodigy® processors' superior ability to meet key selection criteria, including performance

and cost, as well as the advantage that Tachyum s.r.o. would have had as a European bidder in view of BSC's stated "commit[ment] to developing European hardware to be used in future generations of supercomputers and helping to achieve technological sovereignty for the EU's member states." Instead, Atos was announced as the winner on or about June 16, 2022. It was further reported that Atos will use processors supplied by NVIDIA, an American company, because, on information and belief, no European company could supply processors meeting the key selection criteria. The EuroHPC Joint Undertaking stated in its bid call that the estimated total value for the project is €151,410,000, equating to approximately \$159,000,000 at current exchange rates. Tachyum has been damaged by that amount or a substantial portion thereof.

- 127. As another example, Tachyum s.r.o. has received and expects to continue receiving pre-orders for Prodigy® processors and the Prodigy® Evaluation Platform, which Tachyum customers can use to evaluate and test Prodigy® processors in a high-performance server form factor. The pre-orders will be fulfilled by Tachyum s.r.o., Tachyum Inc., or both. The value of the pre-orders received to date exceeds \$20 million. The delays caused by Cadence's breaches of contract and fraudulent contact have delayed delivery of the pre-ordered Prodigy® Evaluation Platforms as well as Tachyum's receipt of the corresponding revenue.
- 128. On information and belief, Tachyum will lose additional business and revenue opportunities in the coming months due to Cadence's breaches of contract and fraudulent contract. The additional delays caused by Cadence's termination of Tachyum's eDAcard access and Tachyum's resulting need to switch to a new software vendor will likely exacerbate these damages.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (AGAINST CADENCE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT)

- 129. Tachyum repeats and realleges each allegation in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 130. The Contracts (the IP Agreement, SOW, and eDAcard Agreement) and the IPA Selection Forms were valid contracts entered into by Cadence and Tachyum.

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perform required services.

131. Tachy	rum performed its obligations under the Contracts and the IPA Selection
Forms, such as by m	aking the contractually required payments, at least until Cadence breached its
contractual obligation	ns by failing to deliver the IPs and services it had agreed to provide. To the
extent Tachyum with	sheld payments specified by the Contracts and the IPA Selection Forms, its
payment obligations	were excused by Cadence's failure to deliver the promised IPs and services.

- In particular, as alleged in more detail above and incorporated into this cause of action by reference, Cadence failed to deliver any of the following items it contractually promised to provide to Tachyum: Each of these failures was a separate and independent breach of the Contract(s) and/or IPA Selection Form(s) in which the promise(s) to deliver the particular IP was made. Cadence also breached the SOW by refusing to
- Cadence's breaches damaged Tachyum. Tachyum obtained no value from Cadence's IPs promised under the IP Agreement and IPA Selection Forms but not delivered, and thus was damaged to the extent of the payments it made under those contracts. Tachyum also spent money on related services and software access under the SOW and the eDAcard Agreement for which it obtained only very limited value as a result of Cadence's breaches, and thus it was damaged to the extent of payments made under the SOW and the eDAcard Agreement. Tachyum claims monetary damages of at least in connection with these harms, representing amounts that Tachyum paid Cadence under the Contracts.
- 134. Tachyum has suffered additional expense due to having to license replacement IPs from other vendors to replace the Cadence IPs and having to modify its own designs to integrate with the replacement IPs. Tachyum lost approximately two years of engineering cost and other operating expenses attempting to work with Cadence technology in connection with the Platinum

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Project. Cadence's failure to deliver the promised IPs also delayed Tachyum's development and
commercialization of its Prodigy® processor, causing lost profits and increasing Tachyum's cost
of access to capital. Cadence compounded the harm by ending Tachyum's access to eDAcard
software, thereby causing Tachyum to incur expense from licensing replacement software,
retraining Tachyum engineers to use the replacement software, and using the replacement software
to recreate processor components. The delays caused by Cadence's termination of access to
eDAcard software will also cause Tachyum to lose customers, revenues, and profits. Tachyum
claims monetary damages of at least \$206 million in connection with these harms, which continue
to accrue to Tachyum. The amount of Tachyum's damages cannot be determined with precision at
this time and will be proven at trial.

135. Insofar as any of the foregoing items of damages are deemed special damages because they are found not to arise directly and inevitably from any similar breach of any similar agreement, but rather are found to be secondary and derivative losses arising from circumstances that are particular to the contract or to the parties, Tachyum is entitled to recover them. Special damages are warranted because Tachyum communicated the special or particular circumstances from which the damages arise to Cadence and Cadence knew of them. Tachyum explained in great detail, and Cadence understood and knew or should have known at the time of contracting, that Tachyum needed the contracted-for IPs for its Prodigy® processor. Although the Contracts contain provisions limiting or barring special or consequential damages, they are unenforceable due to Cadence's intentional, grossly negligent, and/or fraudulent conduct in connection with the breaches on which this cause of action is based.

WHEREFORE, judgment is prayed as hereinafter set forth.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (AGAINST CADENCE FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING)

- Tachyum repeats and realleges each allegation in the foregoing paragraphs of this 136. Complaint.
- 137. The Contracts (the IP Agreement, SOW, and eDAcard Agreement) and the IPA Selection Forms were valid contracts entered into by Cadence and Tachyum. Each of these

under the IP Agreement and IPA Selection Forms but not delivered, and thus was damaged to the extent of the payments it made under those contracts. Tachyum also spent money on related services and software access under the SOW and the eDAcard Agreement for which it obtained only very limited value as a result of Cadence's breaches, and thus it was damaged to the extent of payments made under the SOW and the eDAcard Agreement. Tachyum claims monetary damages of at least in connection with these harms, representing amounts that Tachyum paid Cadence under the Contracts.

- 142. Tachyum has suffered additional expense due to having to license replacement IPs from other vendors to replace the Cadence IPs and having to modify its own designs to integrate with the replacement IPs. Tachyum lost approximately two years of engineering cost and other operating expenses attempting to work with Cadence technology in connection with the Platinum Project. Cadence's failure to deliver the promised IPs also delayed Tachyum's development and commercialization of its Prodigy® processor, causing lost profits and increasing Tachyum's cost of Tachyum's access to capital. Cadence compounded the harm by ending Tachyum's access to eDAcard software, thereby causing Tachyum to incur expense from licensing replacement software, retraining Tachyum engineers to use the replacement software, and using the replacement software to recreate processor components. The delays caused by Cadence's termination of access to eDAcard software will also cause Tachyum to lose customers, revenues, and profits. Tachyum claims monetary damages of at least \$206 million in connection with these harms, which continue to accrue to Tachyum. The amount of Tachyum's damages cannot be determined with precision at this time and will be proven at trial.
- 143. Insofar as any of the foregoing items of damages are deemed special damages because they are found not to arise directly and inevitably from any similar breach of any similar agreement, but rather are found to be secondary and derivative losses arising from circumstances that are particular to the contract or to the parties, Tachyum is entitled to recover them. Special damages are warranted because Tachyum communicated the special or particular circumstances from which the damages arise to Cadence and Cadence knew of them. Tachyum explained in great detail, and Cadence understood and knew or should have known at the time of contracting,

1	that Tachyum needed the contracted-for IPs to develop its Prodigy® processor. Although the		
2	Contracts contain provisions limiting or barring special or consequential damages, they are		
3	unenforceable due to Cadence's intentional, grossly negligent, and/or fraudulent conduct in		
4	connection with the breaches on which this cause of action is based.		
5	WHEREFORE, judgment is prayed as hereinafter set forth.		
6	THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR FRAUD)		
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9	Complaint.		
10	145. As set forth above, Cadence represented to Tachyum before the Contracts were		
11	signed that		
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19	146. On information and belief, each of these express and implied representations was		
20	false. Cadence did not have a development plan for a		
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23 24	And Cadence		
	did not have a development plan for a in place when the representation		
25	was made and had not begun development of that IP.		
26	147. On information and belief, the Cadence employees who made the false statements		
27	(identified above) and/or other Cadence employees who were informed of the statements (whose		
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	37		

identities are unknown to Tachyum and will be learned through discovery from Cadence, which is in a better position to know their identities) knew of their falsity at or near the time the statements were made and failed to inform Tachyum or cause Tachyum to be informed of the true facts.

- 148. Cadence made the false representations, which occurred in the course of precontractual discussions between Cadence and Tachyum, with the intent to induce Tachyum's reliance thereon. Specifically, Cadence intended to induce Tachyum to choose Cadence over competing vendors and enter into the Contracts and/or the IPA Selection Forms. Tachyum had informed Cadence of its needs and requirements, and each of Cadence's misrepresentations was tailored to convince Tachyum that Cadence could and would meet those needs and requirements.
- 149. Tachyum relied on Cadence's misrepresentations in deciding to sign the Contracts and IPA Selection Forms and devoting extensive time and resources to their implementation. Had Tachyum known that the representations were false, it would not have signed the Contracts or IPA Selection Forms and would instead have selected a different vendor.
- 150. Tachyum's reliance on Cadence's misrepresentations was justifiable because (i) Cadence had a leading reputation in the industry, Tachyum's CEO had had a prior positive experience with Cadence, and Cadence had successfully designed early-generation versions of the IPs ordered by Tachyum; (ii) Cadence's misrepresentations were specific and detailed, they were provided by and communicated to multiple Cadence employees, and they were originally stated or confirmed in writing; and (iii) in some instances, Cadence repeated the misrepresentations directly in the Contracts and/or made contractual promises to deliver IPs conforming to the statements.
- 151. Tachyum was harmed by Cadence's statements in that it spent money under the Contracts and the IPA Selection Forms for which it received no value; it devoted extensive personnel hours and other resources trying to work with Cadence's IP, which resources were lost; it was forced to spend money on more expensive third-party substitutes for Cadence's IP and on integrating those substitutes with its own technology; and its Prodigy® processor tape-out and release were delayed, resulting in delayed and/or lost profits and increasing Tachyum's cost of access to capital. Cadence compounded the harm by ending Tachyum's access to eDAcard software, thereby causing Tachyum to incur expense from licensing replacement software,

in place when the representation

was made and had not begun development of that IP.

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(identified above) and/or other Cadence employees who were informed of the statements (whose identities are unknown to Tachyum and will be learned through discovery from Cadence, which is in a better position to know their identities) had no reasonable ground for believing that these false representations were true at the time they were made or thereafter because each misrepresentation related to Cadence's activities and its development of its products, and Cadence has knowledge of, and/or has access to information about, its own internal operations.

On information and belief, the Cadence employees who made the false statements

- 158. Cadence made the false representations, which occurred in the course of precontractual discussions between Cadence and Tachyum, with the intent to induce Tachyum's reliance thereon. Specifically, Cadence intended to induce Tachyum to choose Cadence over competing vendors and enter into the Contracts and/or the IPA Selection Forms. Tachyum had informed Cadence of its needs and requirements, and each of Cadence's misrepresentations was tailored to convince Tachyum that Cadence could and would meet those needs and requirements.
- 159. Tachyum relied on Cadence's misrepresentations in deciding to sign the Contracts and IPA Selection Forms and devoting extensive time and resources to their implementation. Had Tachyum known that the representations were false, it would not have signed the Contracts or IPA Selection Forms and would instead have selected a different vendor.
- Cadence had a leading reputation in the industry, Tachyum's CEO had had a prior positive experience with Cadence, and Cadence had successfully designed early-generation versions of the IPs ordered by Tachyum; (ii) Cadence's misrepresentations were specific and detailed, they were provided by and communicated to multiple Cadence employees, and they were originally stated or confirmed in writing; and (iii) in some instances, Cadence repeated the misrepresentations directly in the Contracts and/or made contractual promises to deliver IPs conforming to the statements.

- Contracts and IPA Selection Forms for which it received no value; it devoted extensive personnel hours and other resources trying to work with Cadence's IP, which resources were lost; it was forced to spend money on more expensive third-party substitutes for Cadence's IP and on integrating those substitutes with its own technology; and its Prodigy® processor tape-out and release were delayed, resulting in delayed and/or lost profits and increasing Tachyum's cost of access to capital. Cadence compounded the harm by ending Tachyum's access to eDAcard software, thereby causing Tachyum to incur expense from licensing replacement software, retraining Tachyum engineers to use the replacement software, and using the replacement software to recreate processor components. The delays caused by Cadence's termination of access to eDAcard software will also cause Tachyum to lose customers, revenues, and profits. Tachyum claims monetary damages of at least \$211 million in connection with these harms, which continue to accrue to Tachyum. The amount of Tachyum's damages cannot be determined with precision at this time and will be proven at trial.
- 162. Defendants, or some of them, are jointly and severally liable for any monetary remedy awarded to Tachyum based on their fraudulent acts.

WHEREFORE, judgment is prayed as hereinafter set forth.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (AGAINST CADENCE FOR VIOLATION OF CAL. B&P CODE §§ 17200 ET SEQ.)

- 163. Tachyum repeats and realleges each allegation in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 164. Cadence's deceitful and bad faith conduct described herein represents an unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business act or practice within the meaning of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.
- 165. Tachyum lacks an adequate remedy at law for Cadence's unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts and practices. Absent injunctive relief issued pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, Tachyum is informed and believes that Cadence is likely to continue its acts of unfair competition directed at Tachyum and other actual and potential customers.

1	Dated: July 11, 2022	RIMON, P.C.
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3 4	By:	Matthew H. Poppe
5		Gabriel G. Gregg
6		Kenneth J. Halpern STRIS & MAHER LLP
7		Attorneys for Plaintiff TACHYUM INC.
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VERIFICATION

I, Radoslav Danilak, am the Chief Executive Officer of Plaintiff Tachyum Inc. I have read the foregoing Verified First Amended Complaint; I am informed and believe that the matters stated therein are true; and on that ground, I allege that the matters stated therein are true. I make this statement under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California.

Radoslav Danilak

Signed this 11th day of July, 2022 in Las Vegas, Nevada.