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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

v.

COMPAL ELECTRONICS, INC., FIH MOBILE LTD., HON HAI PRECISION INDUSTRY CO., LTD., PEGATRON CORPORATION, and WISTRON CORPORATION,

Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES: COUNTERCLAIMS: DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Judge: Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel

PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD

1	COMPAL ELECTRONICS, INC., FIH MOBILE LTD HON HALPRECISION
2	COMPAL ELECTRONICS, INC., FIH MOBILE LTD., HON HAI PRECISION INDUSTRY CO., LTD., PEGATRON CORPORATION, and WISTRON CORPORATION,
3	CORPORATION,
4	Counterclaimants,
5	v.
6	QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
7	Counter Defendant.
8	COMPAL ELECTRONICS, INC., FIH
9	MOBILE LTD., HON HAI PRECISION INDUSTRY CO., LTD., PEGATRON
10	CORPORATION, and WISTRON CORPORATION,
11	Third-Party Plaintiffs,
12	V.
13	APPLE INC.
14	Third-Party Defendant.
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DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

ANSWER

Defendant contract manufacturers Compal Electronics, Inc. ("Compal"); FIH Mobile Ltd. and Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. (together, "Foxconn"); Pegatron Corporation ("Pegatron"); and Wistron Corporation ("Wistron") (collectively, "the CMs"), by their undersigned attorneys, hereby answer the Complaint of Plaintiff Qualcomm Inc. ("Qualcomm"). The numbered paragraphs below correspond to the numbered paragraphs in the Complaint and constitute the CMs' responsive admissions, denials, and allegations thereto. Except as otherwise expressly set forth below, each CM denies each and every allegation contained in the Counterclaims, including without limitation the Table of Contents, headings, subheadings, footnotes, diagrams and tables contained in the Complaint.

This lawsuit is yet another chapter of Qualcomm's anticompetitive scheme to dominate modem chip markets, extract supracompetitive royalties, and break its commitments to license its cellular technology on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory ("FRAND") terms. In the past two years alone, three separate foreign antitrust enforcers have declared Qualcomm a monopolist and collectively have fined the company over \$1 billion. In the United States, Qualcomm faces similar challenges from the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), antitrust class actions and civil litigation by Apple Inc. ("Apple"). Now, Qualcomm has defiantly doubled down by suing the CMs for gross royalties—an amount that vastly exceeds the already above-FRAND amounts that Qualcomm netted from each CM after rebates to Apple—rebates that Qualcomm has now unlawfully terminated. Qualcomm should not be rewarded for its continuing monopolistic practices which have caused significant harm to each CM.

Each CM specifically denies liability to Qualcomm, or that Qualcomm has suffered any legally cognizable damage for which it is responsible. Each CM expressly reserves the right to amend and/or supplement its answer and defenses.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD **COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Subject to the foregoing, each CM states as follows:

No response is required to the preamble and footnote 1 of Qualcomm's Complaint. To the extent a response is required, each CM admits that Qualcomm purports to bring the Complaint against it, but specifically denies that there are any valid bases for Qualcomm's purported claims. Each CM is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in the preamble and footnote 1, and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in the preamble and footnote 1.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

 Each CM admits that it has entered into certain licensing arrangements with Qualcomm and that these agreements grant each CM certain rights to Qualcomm's intellectual property in exchange for certain royalty payments. Each CM admits that its license agreement purports to require quarterly payments of royalties to Qualcomm.
 Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 1 of the Complaint, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 1.

2. The allegations in paragraph 2 contain legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm under the terms of its license agreement and admits that it is an "independent compan[y]." Each CM further admits that it has entered into an agreement with Apple in which, among other things, each party agreed to indemnify the other under certain circumstances, according to the terms and conditions of the contract. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 2.

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3. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 3.

4. Compal admits that it entered into a license agreement with Qualcomm in the year 2000, over "17 years ago." Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation and therefore deny it. Each CM admits that it has paid Qualcomm license royalties pursuant to its license agreement. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 4.

5. Each CM admits, on information and belief, that Qualcomm has participated in the development of cellular communications technology. Each CM further admits that paragraph 5 of the Complaint purports to define certain terms related to Qualcomm's cellular and non-cellular patent portfolio without admitting or denying the accuracy of those definitions. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 5.

6. Each CM admits that Qualcomm has licensed its patents to cellular device manufacturers. Each CM specifically denies that Qualcomm's license terms "reflect the established market value" of its patent portfolio. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 6 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 6.

Each CM admits that it manufactures certain consumer electronics 7. products, including "wireless products (phones and/or tablets) that comply with 3G and 4G LTE cellular standards." Each CM admits that it has entered into a certain licensing

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agreement with Qualcomm. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 7.

8. Compal admits that it entered into a "Subscriber Unit License Agreement" with Qualcomm on February 10, 2000 ("Compal License Agreement"). Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 8 as to Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 8.

Foxconn admits that FIH Mobile Ltd. (formerly, Foxconn International Holdings Ltd.) entered into a "Subscriber Unit License Agreement" with Qualcomm on October 18, 2005 ("Foxconn License Agreement"). Foxconn admits that Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. is also a signatory to certain aspects of the Foxconn License Agreement. Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 8 as to Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 8.

Pegatron admits that it entered into a "Subscriber Unit License Agreement" with Qualcomm on April 29, 2010 ("Pegatron License Agreement"). Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 8 as to Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 8.

Wistron admits that it entered into a "Subscriber Unit License Agreement" with Qualcomm on May 23, 2007 ("Wistron License Agreement"). Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 8 as to Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies

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them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 8.

9. Each CM admits that the allegations of paragraph 9 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in each of its licensing agreements with Qualcomm and refers to the contents of those agreements without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 9 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 9.

10. Compal admits that it manufactures products that are sold to consumers under the brands of other companies. Compal further admits that it has manufactured cellular devices for companies. Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 10 as to Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 10.

Foxconn admits that it manufactures products that are sold to consumers under the brands of other companies. Foxconn further admits that it has manufactured cellular devices for different companies. Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 10 as to Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 10.

Pegatron admits that it manufactures products that are sold to consumers under the brands of the other companies. Pegatron further admits that it has manufactured cellular devices for different companies. Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 10 as to Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as

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expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 10.

Wistron admits that it manufactures products that are sold to consumers under the brands of other companies. Wistron further admits that it has manufactured cellular devices for different companies. Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 10 as to Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 10.

11. Compal admits that it has manufactured cellular devices for Apple,
including iPads, since in or around 2014. Compal is without sufficient knowledge or
information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 11
regarding Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis.
Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining
allegations and characterizations in paragraph 11.

Foxconn admits that it has manufactured cellular devices for Apple, including iPhones, since in or around 2007. Foxconn is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 11 regarding Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 11.

Pegatron admits that it has manufactured cellular devices for Apple, including
iPhones, since in or around 2011. Pegatron is without sufficient knowledge or
information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 11
regarding Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis.
Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining
allegations and characterizations in paragraph 11.

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Wistron admits that it has manufactured cellular devices for Apple, including
iPhones, since in or around 2014. Wistron is without sufficient knowledge or
information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 11
regarding Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis.
Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining
allegations and characterizations in paragraph 11.

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12. Paragraph 12 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.

To the extent a response is required, each CM admits that the allegations of paragraph 12 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in each of the CM's licensing agreements with Qualcomm and refers to the contents of those agreements without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description.

Compal admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm under the Compal License Agreement related to the sale of Apple and non-Apple products. Compal is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 12 regarding Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 12.

Foxconn admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm under the Foxconn
License Agreement related to the sale of Apple and non-Apple products. Foxconn is
without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of
the allegations in paragraph 12 regarding Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore
denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and
specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 12.

Pegatron admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm under the Pegatron License Agreement related to the sale of Apple and non-Apple products. Pegatron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 12 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 12.

Wistron admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm under the Wistron License Agreement related to the sale of Apple and non-Apple products. Wistron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 12 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 12.

13. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 13.

14. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in paragraph 14. Each CM specifically denies that it breached its License Agreement with Qualcomm.

15. To the extent the allegations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2 of the Complaint are directed to Compal, Compal admits that it paid royalties to Qualcomm for Q4 2016. Compal is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2 regarding Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron admit that the allegations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2 purport to describe certain "royalty reports" and state that, if and to the extent the royalty reports are held to be admissible, they will speak for themselves.

Foxconn is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to

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the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2 regarding Compal, Pegatron and Wistron, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2.

Pegatron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Wistron, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2.

Wistron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 15 and footnote 2.

16. Each CM denies the allegations in paragraph 16 that it breached its licensing agreement with Qualcomm and denies that the alleged breach "continued and expanded with respect to [its] Q1 2017 royalty payments." Paragraph 16 contains legal conclusions to which no responsive pleading is required.

To the extent the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint are directed to Compal, Compal is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 16 regarding Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 16.

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Foxconn is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 16 regarding Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 16.

Pegatron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 16 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 16.

Wistron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 16 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 16.

17. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 17.

18. Each CM is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 18 regarding communications between Apple and Qualcomm and therefore denies them on that basis. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 18.

19. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 19.

20. Each CM admits that it has entered into a Master Software Agreement ("MSA") with Qualcomm. Each CM also admits that the allegations of paragraph 20 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in each of its MSAs with

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Qualcomm and refers to the contents of those agreements without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 20 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent further response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 20.

21. Each CM admits that Qualcomm is seeking injunctive relief, specific performance, declaratory relief, compensatory and consequential damages and attorneys' fees, but specifically denies that Qualcomm is entitled to any relief. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 21.

PARTIES

22. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation in paragraph 22.

23. Foxconn admits that HonHai Precision Industry Co., Ltd. ("Hon Hai") is a corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan, with its principal place of business at No. 66, Zhongshan Road, Tucheng Industrial Zone, Tucheng District, New Taipei City, Taiwan, R.O.C. Foxconn also admits that Hon Hai manufactures and sells products, including electronic products that have cellular capabilities. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 23.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 23.

24. Foxconn admits that FIH Mobile Ltd. ("FIH") is a corporation organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands, with its principal place of business at 18 Youyi

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Road, Langfang Economic and Technological Development Zone, Hebei Province, 2 People's Republic of China. Foxconn admits that FIH is a subsidiary of Hon Hai. 3 Foxconn also admits that FIH manufactures and sells products, including electronic products that have cellular capabilities. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, 4 generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 5 6 24.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 24.

25. Pegatron admits that it is a corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan. Pegatron further admits that its principal place of business is at 5F, No. 76, Ligong Street, Beitou District, Taipei City 112, Taiwan, R.O.C. Pegatron also admits that it manufactures and sells products, including electronic products that have cellular capabilities. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 25.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron, lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 25.

26. Wistron admits that it is a corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan, with its principal place of business at 158, Singshan Rd., Neihu, Taipei, 11469, Taiwan, R.O.C. Wistron also admits that it manufactures and sells products, including electronic products that have cellular capabilities. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 26.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to

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form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 26.

27. Compal admits that it is a corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan, with its principal place of business at Nos. 581 & 581-1, Ruiguang Road, Neihu District, Taipei City, 11492, Taiwan, R.O.C. Compal also admits that it manufactures and sells products, including electronic products that have cellular capabilities. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 27.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 27.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

28. Paragraph 28 is a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent any response is required, each CM admits that Qualcomm purports to bring an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and further admits that Qualcomm is seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201(a) and 2202, but specifically denies that Qualcomm is entitled to any relief. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 28.

29. Paragraph 29 is a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent any response is required, each CM admits that Qualcomm purports to base personal jurisdiction on specific provisions of its contract with Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, the cited document speaks for itself. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 29, including that each CM's actions could be expected to harm, and have caused harm to, Qualcomm in California.

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30. Paragraph 30 is a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent any response is required, each CM admits that Qualcomm purports to premise venue in this district on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Each CM further admits Qualcomm purports to base personal jurisdiction on specific provisions of its contract with Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, the cited document speaks for itself. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 30.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

ALLEGATIONS REGARDING QUALCOMM'S ALLEGED INNOVATION AND PATENT PORTFOLIO

31. Each CM admits, on information and belief, that Qualcomm has participated in the development of cellular communications technology. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 31 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 31.

32. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 32.

33. Each CM admits that it manufactures cellular devices and further admits that it has entered into a license agreement with Qualcomm. Each CM specifically denies that the terms of each of its license agreements reflect the established market value of Qualcomm's patent portfolio. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 33 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 33.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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34. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 34 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 34.

35. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 35.

36. Each CM admits that paragraph 36 purports to define the term standardessential patent ("SEP") without admitting or denying the accuracy of any definition Qualcomm ascribes to any particular term. Except as expressly admitted, Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 36.

37. Each CM admits that paragraph 37 purports to define the term nonstandard-essential patent without admitting or denying the accuracy of any definition Qualcomm ascribes to any particular term. Except as expressly admitted, Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 37.

38. On information and belief, each CM admits that Qualcomm has participated in cellular standard setting processes through the European Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI"); International Telecommunication Union ("ITU"); Telecommunications Industry Association ("TIA"); Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions ("ATIS"); Association of Radio Industries and Businesses ("ARIB"); and International Telecommunication Union ("ITU"). Each CM further admits, on information and belief, that, in connection with those cellular standard setting processes, Qualcomm agreed to license its relevant SEPs on FRAND terms, but each CM denies that Qualcomm has honored those commitments. Except as expressly admitted, each

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 38.

39. Compal admits that it has purchased modem chips from Qualcomm or its subsidiary for use in cellular products that it manufactures for Apple and other customers but denies that it has been purchasing Qualcomm chips for use in Apple's products since 2011. Compal is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 39 regarding Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 39.

Foxconn admits that it has purchased modem chips from Qualcomm or its subsidiary for use in cellular products that it manufactures for Apple and other customers. Foxconn is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 39 regarding Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 39.

Pegatron admits that it has purchased modem chips from Qualcomm or its subsidiary for use in cellular products that it manufactures for Apple and other customers. Pegatron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 39 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 39.

Wistron admits that it has purchased modem chips from Qualcomm or its subsidiary for use in cellular products that it manufactures for Apple and other customers. Wistron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as

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to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 39 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 39.

40. Compal admits that it signed a Master Software Agreement with Qualcomm
("Compal MSA"). Compal is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 40 regarding Foxconn,
Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly
admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and
characterizations in paragraph 40.

Foxconn admits that it signed a Master Software Agreement with Qualcomm
("Foxconn MSA"). Foxconn is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 40 regarding Compal,
Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly
admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and
characterizations in paragraph 40.

Pegatron admits that it signed a Master Software Agreement with Qualcomm ("Pegatron MSA"). Pegatron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 40 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 40.

Wistron admits that it signed a Master Software Agreement with Qualcomm ("Wistron MSA"). Wistron is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 40 regarding Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and

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characterizations in paragraph 40.

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ALLEGATIONS REGARDING QUALCOMM'S ALLEGED AGREEMENTS WITH EACH DEFENDANT

41. Paragraph 41 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 41.

A. Allegations Regarding Qualcomm's Alleged Agreement with Compal

42. Compal admits that it entered into the Compal License Agreement on February 10, 2000. Compal admits that paragraph 42 purports to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Compal License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 42 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 42.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 42.

43. Compal admits that paragraph 43 purports to describe and characterize certain terms of the Compal License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 43 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 43.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 43 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 43.

44. Compal admits that paragraph 44 purports to describe and characterize certain terms of the Compal License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 44 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal admits that its License Agreement purports to require quarterly payments of royalties to Qualcomm. Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 44.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 44.

45. Compal admits that it signed amendments to the Compal License Agreement on November 4, 2002; February 1, 2006; June 22, 2007; April 15, 2008; and February 27, 2014. Paragraph 45 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 45.

Foxconn, Wistron, and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 45 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 45.

B. Allegations Regarding Qualcomm's Alleged Agreement with Foxconn

46. Foxconn admits that it entered into the Foxconn License Agreement on October 18, 2005. Foxconn admits that paragraph 46 and footnote 3 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Foxconn License Agreement and "a separate agreement" and refers to their contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 46 and footnote 3 contain legal conclusions 19 DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 46 and footnote 3.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 46 and footnote 3 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 46 and footnote 3.

47. Foxconn admits that paragraph 47 purports to describe and characterize certain terms of the Foxconn License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 47 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Foxconn denies generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 47.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 47.

48. Foxconn admits that paragraph 48 purports to describe and characterize certain terms of the Foxconn License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 48 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Foxconn admits that the Foxconn License Agreement purports to require quarterly payments of royalties to Qualcomm. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 48.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and

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characterization in paragraph 48.

49. Foxconn admits that it signed amendments to the Foxconn License
Agreement on April 6, 2006; December 7, 2007; March 31, 2009; and September 24,
2012. Paragraph 49 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 49.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 49.

C. Allegations Regarding Qualcomm's Alleged Agreement with Wistron

50. Wistron admits that it entered into the Wistron License Agreement on May 23, 2007. Wistron admits that paragraph 50 purports to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Wistron License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 50 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 50.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 50.

51. Wistron admits that paragraph 51 purports to describe and characterize certain terms of the Wistron License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 51 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and 21

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characterizations in paragraph 51.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 51.

52. Wistron admits that paragraph 52 purports to describe and characterize certain terms of the Wistron License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 52 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Wistron admits that the Wistron License Agreement purports to require quarterly payments of royalties to Qualcomm. Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 52.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 52.

53. Paragraph 53 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 53.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 53.

D. Allegations Regarding Qualcomm's Alleged Agreement with Pegatron

54. Pegatron admits that it entered into the Pegatron License Agreement with Qualcomm on April 29, 2010. Pegatron admits that paragraph 54 purports to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Pegatron License Agreement and refers DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Counterclaims; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 54 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 54.

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Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 54.

55. Pegatron admits that paragraph 55 purports to describe and characterize certain terms of the Pegatron License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 55 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 55.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 55 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 55.

56. Pegatron admits that paragraph 56 purports to describe and characterize certain terms of the Pegatron License Agreement and refers to its contents without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 56 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Pegatron admits that the Pegatron License Agreement purports to require quarterly payments of royalties to Qualcomm. Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 56.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint and

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57. Pegatron admits that it signed amendments to the Pegatron License Agreement on June 1, 2010; June 30, 2010; and May 23, 2011. Paragraph 57 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 57.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 57.

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E. Allegations Regarding Alleged Master Software Agreements

58. Each CM admits that it has "purchased chips from Qualcomm" and admits that it entered into a "separate (non-patent) license agreement with Qualcomm in 2010." Each CM further admits that paragraph 58 purports to describe the terms of Qualcomm's MSA with each CM without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 58 referring to Apple and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the allegations and characterizations referring to Apple in paragraph 58. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 58.

III. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ALLEGED PAYMENT OF ROYALTIES

59. Each CM admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm related to the sale of both Apple and non-Apple products under the terms of its License Agreement but denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 59.

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A. Allegations Regarding Alleged Manufacture of Non-Apple Products

60. Each CM admits that it is among the leading manufacturers of an array of electronic products, including cellular products, and has manufactured certain products for Apple and other electronics companies. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 60.

61. Compal admits that it began manufacturing cellular products under the Compal License Agreement in or around 2002. Compal also admits that it has manufactured cellular products for companies other than Apple. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 61.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 61.

62. Foxconn admits that it began manufacturing cellular products under the Foxconn License Agreement in or around 2005. Foxconn also admits that it has manufactured cellular products for companies other than Apple. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 62.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 62 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 62.

63. Pegatron admits that it began manufacturing cellular products under the Pegatron License Agreement in or around 2010. Pegatron also admits that it has manufactured cellular products for companies other than Apple. Except as expressly

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admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 63.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 63.

64. Wistron admits that it was manufacturing cellular products under the Wistron License Agreement in 2013. Wistron also admits that it has manufactured cellular products for companies other than Apple. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 64.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 64 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 64.

B. Allegations Regarding Apple's Alleged Entry into the Cellular Market

65. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 65.

66. Compal admits that it began manufacturing products for Apple in or around mid-2014 and that it has remitted royalty payments to Qualcomm related to these products. Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Complaint related to Apple, Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 66.

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Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Complaint related to Apple, Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 66.

Pegatron admits that it began manufacturing products for Apple in or around 2011 and that it has remitted royalty payments to Qualcomm related to these products. Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Complaint related to Apple, Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 66.

Wistron admits that it began manufacturing products for Apple in or around 2014 and that it has remitted royalty payments to Qualcomm related to these products. Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Complaint related to Apple, Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 66.

67. Each CM admits that it has purchased Qualcomm modem chips at the direction of Apple for use in Apple cellular devices manufactured by it. Each CM further admits that Qualcomm has required entry into a software licensing agreement in connection with the sale of modem chips. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 67 and footnote 4 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 67 and footnote 4.

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C. Allegations Regarding Alleged Royalty Payments for Apple and Non-Apple Products

68. Each CM admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 68.

69. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 69 purport to recite from the Compal License Agreement and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 69 related to Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 69.

Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 69 purport to recite from the Foxconn License Agreement and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 69 related to Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 69.

Pegatron admits that the allegations in paragraph 69 purport to recite from the Pegatron License Agreement and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 69 related to Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 69.

Wistron admits that the allegations in paragraph 69 purport to recite from the

Wistron License Agreement and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 69 related to Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis.
Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 69.

70. Each CM admits that paragraph 70 purports to describe and characterize certain terms contained in its licensing agreement with Qualcomm without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 70.

71. Each CM admits that paragraph 71 purports to describe and characterize certain terms contained in each of the Defendant's licensing agreements with Qualcomm and refer to the contents of those agreements without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 71 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a further response is required, Compal admits that its customers include companies other than Apple. Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 71 related to Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 71.

Foxconn admits that its customers include companies other than Apple. Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 71 related to Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 71.

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Pegatron admits that its customers include companies other than Apple. Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 71 related to Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 71.

Wistron admits that its customers include companies other than Apple. Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 71 related to Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 71.

72. Each CM admits that paragraph 72 purports to describe and characterize certain terms contained in each of its licensing agreement with Qualcomm and refers to the contents of those agreements without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. To the extent a further response is required, each CM admits that its payment obligations under the licensing agreement do not depend on whether the manufactured product uses a Qualcomm chip or software. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 72.

73. Each CM admits that it has made payments to Qualcomm under its licensing agreement but denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 73.

74. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 74.

IV. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ALLEGED WITHHOLDING OF ROYALTIES

75. Each CM denies that it is a party to a scheme to coerce below-market

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP royalty rates from Qualcomm. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 75 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 75.

76. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 76 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 76.

77. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 77.

A.

Allegations Regarding Alleged Failure To Pay Royalties During Fourth Quarter of 2016

78. On information and belief, each CM admits that Apple has filed a lawsuit against Qualcomm in this Court. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 78 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 78.

79. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 79 of the Complaint, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 79.

80. Foxconn admits that paragraph 80 purports to recite from a document prepared by Foxconn and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 80.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 80.

81. Foxconn admits that paragraph 81 purports to recite from correspondence between Foxconn and Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the correspondence is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 81.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 81.

82. Pegatron admits that paragraph 82 purports to recite from correspondence between Pegatron and Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the correspondence is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 82.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 82.

83. Wistron admits that paragraph 83 purports to recite from correspondence between Wistron and Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the correspondence is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 83.

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Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 83 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 83.

84. Compal admits that paragraph 84 purports to recite from correspondence
between Compal and Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the correspondence
is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted,
Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and
characterizations in paragraph 84.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 84.

85. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Complaint, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 85.

B. Allegations Regarding Alleged Refusal to Pay Royalties for Apple Products

86. Paragraph 86 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 86. Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 86 related to Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies them on that basis.

Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and

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characterization in paragraph 86. Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 86 related to Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies, generally and specifically, them on that basis.

Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 86. Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 86 related to Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies, generally and specifically, them on that basis.

Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 86. Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 86 related to Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies, generally and specifically, them on that basis.

87. Paragraph 87 does not identify the "Certain [CMs]" to which the allegations are directed. Each CM therefore lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 87.

88. Each CM admits that the allegations in paragraph 88 purport to describe royalty reports purportedly submitted by each CM to Qualcomm and that, if and to the extent the reports are held to be admissible, they will speak for themselves. To the extent a further response is required, Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 88 related to Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies, generally and specifically, them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 88.

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Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 88 related to Compal, Pegatron and Wistron and therefore denies, generally and specifically, them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 88.

Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 88 related to Compal, Foxconn and Wistron and therefore denies, generally and specifically, them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 88.

Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 88 related to Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron and therefore denies, generally and specifically, them on that basis. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 88.

89. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 89.

90. Each CM admits that paragraph 90 purports to recite from and describe a statement issued by Apple and states that, if and to the extent the statement is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 90 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegation and characterization in paragraph 90.

91. Each CM admits that it has entered into an agreement with Apple in which, among other things, each party agreed to indemnify the other under certain

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circumstances, according to the terms and conditions of those contracts. Except as expressly admitted, Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 91.

92. Each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Complaint, including the total of any collective royalties that Qualcomm claims is due and owing, and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 92.

93. Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 93 purport to recite from an alleged email from Foxconn to Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 93.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 93 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 93.

94. Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 94 purport to describe and characterize alleged emails from Foxconn to Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent those documents are ever held to be admissible, they will speak for themselves. Foxconn further admits that it has made royalty payments to Qualcomm for Q1 2017. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 94.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 94.

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95. Pegatron admits that the allegations in paragraph 95 purport to describe and characterize alleged statements made by Pegatron and states that, if and to the extent those statements are ever held to be admissible, they will speak for themselves. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 95.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 95.

96. Pegatron admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm for Q1 2017 cellular products. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 96.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 96 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 96

97. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 97 purport to recite from an alleged email from Compal to Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 97.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 97 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 97.

98. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 98 purport to recite from an alleged email from Compal to Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the

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document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 98.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 98 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 98.

99. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 99 purport to describe and characterize an alleged email from Compal to Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Compal further admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm for Q1 2017 cellular products. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 99.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 99 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 99.

100. Wistron admits that the allegations in paragraph 100 purport to describe royalty reports submitted by Wistron to Qualcomm and that, if and to the extent the reports are held to be admissible, they will speak for themselves. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 100.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 100 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 100.

101. Wistron admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm for Q1 2017 cellular

products. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 101.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 101 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 101.

102. Paragraph 102 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 102.

103. Each CM admits that it has paid royalties to Qualcomm related to Q1 2017 cellular products. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 103.

V. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ALLEGED BREACH OF AGREEMENTS WITH QUALCOMM

104. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 104.

A. Allegations Regarding Alleged Breach for Failing to Pay Royalties

105. Each CM admits that its license agreement purports to require quarterly payment of royalties to Qualcomm and refers to the contents of those agreements. Paragraph 105 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a further response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 105.

106. Paragraph 106 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM admits that it paid royalties to Qualcomm related to sales of cellular products, including for Q4 2016 and Q1 2017. Paragraph 106 does not identify the CMs to which the allegations regarding "most of the [CMs]" are directed and therefore each CM lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a

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belief as to the truth of those allegations and denies them on that basis. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 106.

107. Each CM admits that it is an independent company and each further admits that it has entered into its own agreement with Apple in which, among other things, each party agreed to indemnify the other under certain circumstances, according to the terms and conditions of those contracts. Except as expressly admitted, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 107.

108. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 108.

109. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 109.

110. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 110.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 110 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 110.

111. Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 111.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 111 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 111.

112. Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 112.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 112 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 112.

113. Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 113.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 113 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 113.

114. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 114.

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B. Allegations Regarding Alleged Breach of Audit Obligations

115. Each CM admits that the allegations in paragraph 115 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in each of the CM's Licensing Agreements with Qualcomm and refers to the contents in those agreements without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 115 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 115.

116. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 116.

117. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 117.

118. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 118.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 118 of the Complaint **DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES;** Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY

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and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 118.

119. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 119.

C. Allegations Regarding Alleged Breach of Reporting Obligations

120. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 120.

121. Each CM admits that the allegations in paragraph 121 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in each of the CM's licensing agreements with Qualcomm and refers to the contents of those agreements without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 121 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a further response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 121.

122. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 122.

123. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 123.

D. Allegations Regarding Alleged Breach of Master Software Agreement

124. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 124.

125. Each CM admits that the allegations in paragraph 125 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained its licensing agreements with Qualcomm and refers to the contents of those agreements without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 125 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and

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126. Paragraph 126 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 126.

<u>COUNT I</u>

Foxconn's Alleged Breach of License Agreement

127. Paragraphs 1-126 of each CM's Answer are incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.

128. Paragraph 128 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 128.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 128 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 128.

129. Paragraph 129 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 129 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 129.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 129 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 129.

130. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 130.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form

a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 130 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 130.

131. Paragraph 131 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 131.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 131 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 131.

A. Foxconn's Alleged Refusal to Pay Royalties

132. Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 132 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Foxconn License Agreement and refers to the contents of that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 132 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 132.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 132 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 132.

133. Foxconn admits that paragraph 133 purports to recite from and characterize a document prepared by Foxconn but states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 133.

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Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 133 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 133.

134. Foxconn admits that paragraph 134 purports to recite from and characterize emails and statements by Foxconn and states that, if and to the extent the documents are ever held to be admissible, they will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 134.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 134 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 134.

135. Paragraph 135 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Foxconn admits that it has made royalty payments to Qualcomm for Q1 2017 cellular products. Except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 135.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 135 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 135.

136. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 136.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 136 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 136.

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Foxconn's Alleged Failure to Cooperate with Audits

137. Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 137 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Foxconn License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 137 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 137.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 137 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 137.

138. Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 138 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Foxconn License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 138 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a further response is required, and except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 138.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 138 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 138.

139. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 139.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 139 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 139.

140. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 140.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 140 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 140.

C. Foxconn's Alleged Reporting of Sales Information

141. Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 141 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Foxconn License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 141 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 141.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 141 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 141.

142. Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 142 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Foxconn License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 142 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 142.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 142 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL characterization in paragraph 142.

143. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every limitation in paragraph 143.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 143 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 143.

COUNT II

Foxconn's Alleged Breach of Master Software Agreement

144. Paragraphs 1-143 of CMs' Answer are incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.

145. Paragraph 145 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 145.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 145 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 145.

146. Paragraph 146 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Foxconn lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 146 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 146.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 146 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 146. 147. Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 147.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 147 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 147.

148. Foxconn admits that the allegations in paragraph 148 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Foxconn MSA and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description.
Paragraph 148 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 148.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 148 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 148.

149. Paragraph 149 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 149.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 149 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 149.

150. Paragraph 150 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Foxconn denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 150.

Compal, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form

a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 150 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 150.

COUNT III

Pegatron's Alleged Breach of License Agreement

151. Paragraphs 1-150 of CMs' Answer are incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.

152. Paragraph 152 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 152.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 152 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 152.

153. Paragraph 153 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 153 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 153.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 153 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 153.

154. Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 154.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 154 of the Complaint

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 154.

155. Paragraph 155 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 155.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 155 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 155.

A. Pegatron's Alleged Refusal to Pay Royalties

156. Pegatron admits that the allegations in paragraph 156 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Pegatron License Agreement and refers to the contents of that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 156 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 156.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 156 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 156.

157. Pegatron admits that paragraph 157 purports to recite from and characterize a document prepared by Pegatron but states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 157.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form 51 Counterclaims; Demand For Jury TRIAL

a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 157 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 157.

158. Pegatron admits that paragraph 158 purports to describe and characterize documents and statements by Pegatron and states that, if and to the extent the documents and statements are ever held to be admissible, they will speak for themselves. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 158.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 158 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 158.

159. Paragraph 159 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Pegatron paid royalties to Qualcomm for Q1 2017cellular products. Except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally andspecifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 159.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 159 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 159.

160. Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 160.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 160 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 160.

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Pegatron's Alleged Failure to Cooperate with Audits

161. Pegatron admits that the allegations in paragraph 161 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Pegatron License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 161 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 161.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 161 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 161.

162. Pegatron admits that the allegations in paragraph 162 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Pegatron License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 162 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, and except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 162.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 162 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 162.

163. Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 163.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 163 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 163.

53 DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 164. Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 164.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 164 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 164.

C. Pegatron's Alleged Reporting of Sales Information

165. Pegatron admits that the allegations in paragraph 165 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Pegatron License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 165 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 165.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 165 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 165.

166. Pegatron admits that the allegations in paragraph 166 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Pegatron License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 166 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 166.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 166 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 166.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 54 Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD 167. Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 167.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 167 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 167.

COUNT IV

Pegatron's Alleged Breach of Master Software Agreement

168. Paragraphs 1-167 of CMs' Answer are incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.

169. Paragraph 169 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 169.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 169 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 169.

170. Paragraph 170 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. Pegatron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 170 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 170.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 170 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 170.

171. Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and

characterization in paragraph 171.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 171 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 171.

172. Pegatron admits that the allegations in paragraph 172 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Pegatron MSA and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description.
Paragraph 172 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, and except as expressly admitted, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 172.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 172 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 172.

173. Paragraph 173 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 173.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 173 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 173.

174. Paragraph 174 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Pegatron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 174.

Compal, Foxconn and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form

a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 174 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 174.

COUNT V

Wistron's Alleged Breach of License Agreement

175. Paragraphs 1-174 of CMs' Answer are incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.

176. Paragraph 176 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 176.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 176 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 176.

177. Paragraph 177 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 177 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 177.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 177 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 177.

178. Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 178.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 178 of the

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 178.

179. Paragraph 179 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 179.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 179 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 179.

A. Wistron's Alleged Refusal to Pay Royalties

180. Wistron admits that the allegations in paragraph 180 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Wistron License Agreement and refers to the contents of that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 180 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, and except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 180.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 180 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 180.

181. Wistron admits that paragraph 181 purports to recite from and characterize a document reported by Apple but states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 181.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to Counterclaims; Demand For JURY TRIAL

form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 181 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 181.

182. Wistron admits that paragraph 182 purports to recite from and characterize statements by Wistron but states that, if and to the extent the statements are ever held to be admissible, they will speak for themselves. Except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 182.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 182 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 182.

183. Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 183.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 183 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 183.

B.

Wistron's Alleged Failure to Cooperate with Audits

184. Wistron admits that the allegations in paragraph 184 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Wistron License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 184 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 184.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 184 of the **DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES;** Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 184.

185. Wistron admits that the allegations in paragraph 185 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Wistron License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description.
Paragraph 185 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 185.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 185 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 185.

186. Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 186.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 186 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 186.

187. Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 187.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 187 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 187.

C. Wistron's Alleged Reporting of Sales Information

188. Wistron admits that the allegations in paragraph 188 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Wistron License Agreement and refers to that **DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 188 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 188.

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Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 188 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 188.

189. Wistron admits that the allegations in paragraph 189 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Wistron License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 189 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 189.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 189 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 189.

190. To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 190.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 190 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 190.

COUNT VI

Wistron's Alleged Breach of Master Software Agreement

191. Paragraphs 1-190 of CMs' Answer are incorporated by reference as if set

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL forth herein.

192. Paragraph 192 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 192.

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Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 192 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 192.

193. Paragraph 193 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Wistron lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 193 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 193.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 193 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 193.

194. Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 194.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 194 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 194.

195. Wistron admits that the allegations in paragraph 195 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Wistron MSA and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 195 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL required, except as expressly admitted, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 195.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 195 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 195.

196. Paragraph 196 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 196.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 196 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 196.

197. Paragraph 197 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Wistron denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 197.

Compal, Foxconn and Pegatron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 197 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 197.

COUNT VII

Compal's Alleged Breach of License Agreement

198. Paragraphs 1-197 of CMs' Answer are incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.

199. Paragraph 199 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 199.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 199 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 199.

200. Paragraph 200 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 200 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 200.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 200 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 200.

201. Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 201.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 201 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 201.

202. Paragraph 202 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 202.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 202 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 202.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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Compal's Alleged Refusal to Pay Royalties

203. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 203 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Compal License Agreement and refers to the contents of that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 203 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 203.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 203 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 203.

204. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 204 purport to describe and characterize an alleged report from Compal to Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 204.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 204 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 204.

205. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 205 purport to recite from an alleged email from Compal to Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 205 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 205.

206. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 206 purport to recite from an alleged email from Compal to Qualcomm and states that, if and to the extent the document is ever held to be admissible, it will speak for itself. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 206.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 206 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 206.

207. Paragraph 207 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal admits that it paid royalties to Qualcomm for Q1 2017 cellular products. Except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 207.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 207 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 207.

208. Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 208.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 208 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 208.

B. Compal's Alleged Failure to Cooperate with Audits

209. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 209 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Compal License Agreement and refers to that **DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES;** Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 209 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 209.

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Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 209 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 209.

210. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 210 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Compal License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 210 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 210.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 210 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 210.

211. Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 211.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 211 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 211.

212. Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 212.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 212 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 212.

C. Compal's Alleged Reporting of Sales Information

213. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 213 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Compal License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 213 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 213.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 213 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 213.

214. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 214 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Compal License Agreement and refers to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 214 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 214.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 214 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 214.

215. Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 215.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to 68 Counterclaims; Demand For Jury TRIAL form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 215 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 215.

COUNT VIII

Compal's Alleged Breach of Master Software Agreement

216. Paragraphs 1-215 of CMs' Answer are incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.

217. Paragraph 217 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 217.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 217 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 217.

218. Paragraph 217 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Compal lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 218 of the Complaint and therefore denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 218.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 218 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 218.

219. To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 219.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 219 of the

Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 219.

220. Compal admits that the allegations in paragraph 220 purport to describe and characterize certain terms contained in the Compal MSA and refer to that agreement without admitting or denying the accuracy of any such description. Paragraph 220 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, except as expressly admitted, Compal denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 220.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 220 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 220.

221. Paragraph 221 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 221.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 221 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 221.

222. Paragraph 222 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Compal denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 222.

Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 222 of the Complaint and therefore deny, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 222.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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COUNT IX

Declaratory Relief

223. Paragraphs 1-222 of CMs' Answer are incorporated by reference as if set forth herein.

224. Paragraph 224 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 224.

225. Paragraph 225 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 225.

226. Each CM admits that Qualcomm seeks declaratory relief but denies that it is entitled to such relief. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 226.

227. Paragraph 227 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 227.

228. Each CM admits that Qualcomm seeks declaratory relief but denies that it is entitled to such relief. Each CM denies, generally and specifically, the remaining allegations and characterizations in paragraph 228.

229. Paragraph 229 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, each CM denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation and characterization in paragraph 229.

JURY DEMAND

A response is not required to Qualcomm's demand for a jury trial. To the extent a response is deemed required, each CM admits Qualcomm demands a trial by jury, but denies that Qualcomm is entitled to any relief that it has requested in its Complaint. Each CM also requests a jury trial for all issues so triable, pursuant to Rule 38 of the

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Crutcher LLP

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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ANSWER TO QUALCOMM'S PRAYER FOR RELIEF

In reply to Qualcomm's Prayer for Relief (including subparts (a) through (n) thereof), each CM denies, generally and specifically, the allegations contained therein and further denies that Qualcomm is entitled to any relief whatsoever with respect to its claims against each CM. Qualcomm's Prayer for Relief should therefore be denied in its entirety and with prejudice, and Qualcomm should take nothing therefor. To the extent not expressly addressed above, the factual allegations in the Complaint are denied.

DEFENSES

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Further answering Qualcomm's Complaint and as additional answers thereto, each CM asserts the following affirmative defenses below. Assertion of any such defense is not a concession that the CMs have the burden of proving the matter asserted. Each CM reserves the right to assert additional defenses, including as warranted by facts learned through investigation and discovery.

FIRST ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to State a Claim)

Qualcomm's Complaint, and each and every claim stated therein, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Not Entitled to Declaratory Judgment)

Qualcomm's claims for declaratory relief are barred in whole or in part because there is no active case or controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

1	THIRD ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
2	(No Injunctive Relief)
3	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part because Qualcomm is not
4	entitled to injunctive relief. Any alleged injury to Qualcomm is not immediate or
5	irreparable and Qualcomm has an adequate remedy at law.
6	FOURTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
7	(Antitrust Violations)
8	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the contracts at
9	issue are illegal and unenforceable because they violate United States Federal antitrust
10	laws, including, at least, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
11	FIFTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
12	(Cartwright Act Violations)
13	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the contracts at
14	issue violate California Business and Professions Code § 16700 et seq. and are therefore
15	void and unenforceable.
16	SIXTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
17	<u>(Illegality)</u>
18	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the contracts at
19	issue are illegal and voidable.
20	SEVENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
21	<u>(Unenforceable Liquidated Damages / Penalty)</u>
22	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part, at least, because if
23	Qualcomm's claims and interpretations are credited, the contracts at issue would amount
24	to unenforceable liquidated damages provisions under California Civil Code § 1671
25	and/or would be an unenforceable penalty.
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EIGHTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Unconscionability)

Qualcomm cannot enforce the contracts at issue because the terms are substantively and/or procedurally unconscionable.

NINTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Unenforceability)

Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the contracts at issue are unenforceable due to, at least, California's Unfair Competition Laws, California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; public policy; exhaustion of the rights to collect licensing fees for the purportedly licensed patents; and/or Qualcomm's contractual commitment to license its standard essential patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. Qualcomm has made a binding, enforceable contract, at least, with ETSI, TIA, and ATIS, and each CM is an intended third-party beneficiary.

TENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Estoppel Due to FRAND Commitment)

Qualcomm is estopped from recovering damages in excess of a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rate based on its commitment to numerous standard-setting organizations, including, at least, ETSI, TIA and ATIS. The CMs reasonably relied upon Qualcomm's commitments to these standard-setting organizations. The CMs' reliance was reasonable and foreseeable and the CMs were harmed as a result of that reliance.

ELEVENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Estoppel)

Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

(Excuse)

The CMs are excused from performance, at least, because the current royalty rate is illegal and/or not in compliance with Qualcomm's contractual commitments to standard-setting organizations, including, at least, ETSI, TIA and ATIS, and/or because Qualcomm's right to collect licensing fees for its patents has been exhausted.

THIRTEENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Breach by Qualcomm)

Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because Qualcomm materially breached the licensing agreement.

FOURTEENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Unclean Hands)

Qualcomm's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

FIFTEENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Unjust Enrichment)

Qualcomm's claims are barred by the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

SIXTEENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Patent Exhaustion)

Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because Qualcomm's right to collect licensing fees for its patents was exhausted when Qualcomm sold its components to the CMs.

SEVENTEENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(License or Consent)

Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the CMs have an express license, consent, and/or an implied license based upon Qualcomm's sale of modem chips to the CMs.

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

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1	EIGHTEENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
2	<u>(Licensed by Apple)</u>
3	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because Apple has
4	obtained or will obtain a license or is otherwise permitted or will be permitted to practice
5	Qualcomm's patents.
6	NINETEENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
7	(Patent Misuse)
8	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the contracts at
9	issue are unenforceable due to patent misuse.
10	TWENTIETH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
11	(Expiration of Patents)
12	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because it purports to
13	enforce a license on patents that have expired and/or been abandoned.
14	TWENTY-FIRST ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
15	(Preemption by Federal Copyright Law)
16	Qualcomm's claims for breach of contract of the Master Software Agreements are
17	preempted by Federal Law, at least, under 17 U.S.C. § 301.
18	TWENTY-SECOND ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
19	(Copyright Misuse)
20	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the Master
21	Software Agreements at issue are unenforceable due to copyright misuse.
22	TWENTY-THIRD ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
23	<u>(Lack of Injury)</u>
24	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief because Qualcomm has not identified any
25	cognizable harm as a result of the alleged breach by the CMs.
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1	TWENTY-FOURTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
2	(Satisfaction of Duties)
3	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief because each CM satisfied its valid legal
4	obligations to Qualcomm in all material respects.
5	TWENTY-FIFTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
6	(Lack of Causation)
7	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part because of a lack of causation,
8	including, without limitation, because any injuries or damages that may have been
9	suffered were not caused solely or proximately by any act or omission of the CMs.
10	TWENTY-SIXTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
11	(Actions Justified or Privileged)
12	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part because the CMs' acts and
13	omissions were justified and/or privileged.
14	TWENTY-SEVENTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
15	<u>(Failure to Mitigate)</u>
16	Upon information and belief, Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part
17	by a failure to mitigate.
18	TWENTY-EIGHTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
19	<u>(Statute of Limitations)</u>
20	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part by the relevant statute of
21	limitations.
22	TWENTY-NINTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
23	<u>(Laches / Waiver)</u>
24	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of laches
25	and/or waiver.
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28	77 DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD
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1	THIRTIETH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
2	(Ratification, Agreement, Acquiescence or Consent)
3	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part because of ratification of,
4	agreement to, acquiescence in, or consent to CM's alleged conduct.
5	THIRTY-FIRST ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
6	<u>(Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel)</u>
7	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of res judicata
8	and collateral estoppel.
9	THIRTY-SECOND ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
10	<u>(Economic Loss Doctrine)</u>
11	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part by the economic loss doctrine.
12	THIRTY-THIRD ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
13	(Reformation)
14	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the contracts at
15	issue must be reformed to be consistent with Qualcomm's contractual commitment to
16	license its standard essential patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
17	THIRTY-FOURTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
18	(Rescission)
19	Qualcomm is not entitled to any relief against the CMs because the contracts at
20	issue must be rescinded in so far as the contracts seek relief beyond Qualcomm's
21	contractual commitment to license its standard essential patents on fair, reasonable and
22	non-discriminatory terms.
23	THIRTY-FIFTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
24	(Offset)
25	Qualcomm's claims are barred in whole or in part by equitable and/or statutory
26	set-off or offset.
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nn & _P	DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

THIRTY-SIXTH ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Reservation of Rights)

Each CM has insufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a belief as to whether it may have yet unstated separate and additional defenses available. Each CM reserves the right to amend this Answer to add, delete or modify defenses based upon legal theories, which may or will be divulged through clarification of Qualcomm's claims, through discovery, or through further legal analysis of Qualcomm's claims and positions in this litigation.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COUNTERCLAIMS

Thanks to the efforts of antitrust enforcers around the world, Qualcomm's anticompetitive practices and patent licensing abuses, long hidden through a web of secret agreements, are finally coming to light. Defendants and Counterclaimants Compal Electronics, Inc. ("Compal"), Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd. and its subsidiary FIH Mobile Ltd. (together, "Foxconn," and, separately, "Hon Hai" and "FIH"), Pegatron Corporation ("Pegatron"), and Wistron Corporation ("Wistron") (collectively, "the Counterclaimants") bring these counterclaims against Qualcomm to end its unlawful conduct, to seek damages for their injuries and to seek the restoration of competitive conditions in the markets affected. Each Counterclaimant brings its counterclaims based upon its own knowledge and/or on information and belief, as the terms of each Counterclaimant's agreements with Qualcomm were intended to be and have been kept confidential from each other.

I. <u>NATURE OF THE CASE</u>

1. Qualcomm is a global semiconductor company that has reaped billions of dollars in unearned profits from an illegal and monopolistic scheme that violates the antitrust laws and inflicts continuing antitrust injury on Counterclaimants. Law enforcement authorities around the world are actively investigating Qualcomm's illegal business practices and, in the past two years alone, three separate foreign governments have declared Qualcomm a monopolist and collectively have fined the company over \$1 billion. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has also launched an enforcement action to challenge Qualcomm's anticompetitive conduct.

2. In December 2016, after conducting an investigation into Qualcomm's monopolization of additional modem chip markets and holding numerous hearings at which Qualcomm presented evidence, the Korea Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC") announced a decision to impose *a record fine*—1.03 trillion South Korean Won, or more than \$850 million—for Qualcomm's monopolistic conduct, and to mandate

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changes to Qualcomm's business model in Korea. This decision followed the KFTC's decision in July 2009, when the KFTC levied the largest fine it had ever imposed on a company to date—\$207 million—on Qualcomm for abusing its dominant share of the CDMA modem chip market.

3. In December 2015, following an investigation, the European Commission ("EC") issued two Statements of Objections against Qualcomm, one of which alleged that Qualcomm's exclusivity arrangements with "a major smartphone and tablet manufacturer" harmed chipset competition. Press Release, *Antitrust: Commission Sends Two Statements of Objections on Exclusivity Payments and Predatory Pricing to Qualcomm*, European Commission (Dec. 8, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6271_en.htm. That manufacturer is Apple; the contract that the EC has preliminarily found to be unlawful is among the agreements at issue in this case.

4. On February 10, 2015, China's National Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC") found that Qualcomm violated the abuse of dominance provisions of the China Anti-Monopoly Law and, inter alia, imposed a fine of 8% of Qualcomm's annual revenue within the territory of China for 2013—a \$975 million fine. This finding followed the NDRC's investigation, which began in November 2013, of Qualcomm's anticompetitive practices.

5. Even as competition agencies around the world investigate and take action against Qualcomm, Qualcomm doubles down on its illegal behavior by seeking this Court's imprimatur on its illegal scheme by using the Court's authority to compel performance of illegal and onerous licensing deals and other unreasonable terms that Qualcomm requires as a precondition to purchasing its semiconductors, or "modem chips." These agreements, which Qualcomm has imposed upon Counterclaimants and others, are at the heart of a pending enforcement action brought by the Federal Trade Commission in the Northern District of California alleging that Qualcomm's conduct violates Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (and therefore violates Section 5 of the

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FTC Act). FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, slip op. at 18 (N.D. Cal. 1 2 June 26, 2017). In that action, U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh recently denied 3 Qualcomm's Motion to Dismiss the FTC's Complaint, finding that the FTC had pled viable claims for illegal monopolization, unlawful restraint of trade, and unfair 4 competition. Judge Koh held that the FTC had properly alleged: that Qualcomm is a 5 6 monopolist in possession of monopoly power in the markets for CDMA and premium-LTE modem chips (id. at 19); that Qualcomm's challenged agreements amount to 7 8 coerced contracts, combinations or agreements in restraint of trade in those markets 9 (id. at 18-19 & n.2); and that Qualcomm's conduct is monopolistic and anticompetitive 10 (*id.* at 19-50). In particular, Judge Koh found that the FTC adequately alleged: that 11 Qualcomm uses its monopolistic chokehold on modem chips to compel its customers (which include Counterclaimants) to license its cellular standard essential patents 12 13 ("SEPs") (id. at 21-24, 31-35); that Qualcomm imposes royalty and licensing terms in excess of fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory ("FRAND") levels in breach of 14 15 Qualcomm's FRAND commitments to standard setting organizations ("SSOs") (id. at 16 24-29); that Qualcomm imposes excessive royalties even when customers buy modem 17 chips from Qualcomm's rivals, thus deterring and foreclosing competition (id. at 32-35); that Qualcomm refuses to deal with its rivals and denies them the FRAND 18 19 licenses that would permit them to compete on a level playing field (*id.* at 38-46); and that Qualcomm altogether closed off competition for Apple devices (manufactured by 20 21 Counterclaimants) by trading partial relief from its monopolistic overcharges in 22 exchange for exclusivity (id. at 46-50).

6. Counterclaimants are contract manufacturers ("CMs") who assemble, test and produce various cellular products, including phones, tablets, and cellular-enabled computers. They are significant customers of Qualcomm—collectively they have purchased millions of modem chips from Qualcomm since 2013. Counterclaimants incorporate Qualcomm's modem chips into products they manufacture, including

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cellular devices, on behalf of original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") such as

Apple, **Sector** Counterclaimants do not have fixed-quantity contracts
with Apple or other OEMs, but, rather, accept orders from time to time, which vary at
the OEM's election. Qualcomm's royalties impose a direct monopolistic overcharge
on Counterclaimants, as well as on the economically unified affiliates of each,
reducing their respective sales and profits by decreasing OEMs' demand for
purchasing cellular devices (compared to the competitive "but-for" world where, as
discussed below, the all-in price of modem chips would be substantially lower).

9 7. This action challenges Qualcomm's unlawful monopoly maintenance, 10 restraint of trade, unfair competition and breaches of FRAND promises in the markets 11 for "modem chips," semiconductor devices that enable cellular communications in cell phones, tablets, cellular-enabled computers, and other cellular products. 12 13 Qualcomm has engaged in anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct that forecloses its competitors' modem chip sales, reduces their ability and incentive to innovate, 14 artificially inflates prices paid by Counterclaimants and other direct and indirect 15 Qualcomm customers, and raises prices for U.S. consumers for cell phones, tablets and 16 cellular-enabled computers. 17

8. Qualcomm is both a dominant supplier of modem chips and a licensor of patents that Qualcomm has declared essential to widely adopted cellular standards. Cellular devices sold by Qualcomm's customers must comply with these standards, even when they incorporate modem chips supplied by Qualcomm's competitors. In order to have its patents incorporated into the standards, Qualcomm promised SSOs that it would license standard-essential patents to all applicants on FRAND terms.

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¹ These semiconductor devices are also referred to as "baseband processors," "processors," "chips," and "chipsets." For simplicity, Counterclaimants refer to these semiconductor devices throughout as "modem chips," consistent with the court's terminology in *FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc.*

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Counterclaimants are third-party beneficiaries of these commitments, which Qualcomm has breached.

3 9. Qualcomm was one among many companies that contributed to the development of standards related to how cellular devices connect to voice and data 4 networks. As a contributor, Qualcomm is entitled to reasonable compensation based 5 on the value of its particular contribution. Qualcomm is not entitled to collect royalties 6 based on the contribution of others, or unrelated innovation by companies that utilize 7 8 the standards—but this is precisely the business model that Qualcomm has established 9 and that it protects through monopoly power, a web of restrictive agreements and unlawful licenses. In order to purchase Qualcomm modem chips or obtain access to 10 11 patents pledged to a cellular standard, Qualcomm demands that third parties pay Qualcomm a royalty much greater than the value of Qualcomm's contribution to that 12 13 standard—a value based on the entire price of the innovative products that only 14 incidentally incorporate the standard, as well as Qualcomm's entire patent portfolio, and not just the portion relating to the standard. 15

16 10. Qualcomm has excluded competitors, and restrained and harmed
17 competition through a set of interrelated policies and practices, including the
18 following:

a. Qualcomm withholds its modem chips unless a customer, including each Counterclaimant, accepts a license to standard-essential patents on terms imposed by Qualcomm, including outrageous and excessive royalties that the customer must pay even when using competitors' chips (broadly referred to as "no license-no chips").2

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² Qualcomm admits that "[t]he Contract Manufacturers' agreements are generally similar to the license agreements Qualcomm has entered into with hundreds of other cellular device manufacturers." Qualcomm's Mot. for Anti-Suit Injunction at 7, *Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.*, Case No. 17-cv-0108-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2017), ECF No. 91-1.

b. Qualcomm has consistently refused to license its cellular standardessential patents to its competitors, foreclosing them from effectively competing for sales to Counterclaimants and other Qualcomm customers, in violation of Qualcomm's FRAND commitments.

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c. In some instances, Qualcomm has offered OEMs incentive
payments (often tied to their specification of Qualcomm's modem chips, binding
Qualcomm's direct customers such as Counterclaimants) to induce acceptance
of Qualcomm's license terms, including payment of excessive royalties. For
example, Qualcomm imposed exclusive dealing arrangements on Apple Inc.
(and therefore on Counterclaimants as Apple's CMs), binding a particularly
important cell phone and tablet manufacturer.

d. Qualcomm has imposed additional anticompetitive and exclusionary restraints in its agreements with Counterclaimants, Apple,
Samsung (on information and belief), and others including, for example, express or implied exclusivity terms, requirements to grant cross-licenses to Qualcomm and _______, audit terms facilitating afterthe-fact efforts to threaten or impose further excessive and non-FRAND royalty terms (such as _______)

and terms (including confidentiality provisions) shielding Qualcomm's non-FRAND licensing scheme from scrutiny by the judiciary and by government enforcement agencies.

e. Qualcomm's litigation conduct is another component of its anticompetitive scheme. Qualcomm's lawsuit against the Counterclaimants, for example, is causally connected to its overarching anticompetitive scheme—it is intended to effectuate the scheme by rewarding Qualcomm with the recovery of illicit and supracompetitive royalties. Qualcomm has engaged in similar

litigation against Apple. Def's Answer & Am. Countercl., Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-cv-0108-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2017).

11. Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy of tying together the sale of its modem chips and licenses to its SEPs, while refusing to license its SEPs to competing chip manufacturers, along with its other exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct, dramatically increases customers' (and Counterclaimants') costs of challenging Qualcomm's preferred license terms before a court or other neutral arbiter—including 8 on the basis that those terms are above-FRAND-or to negotiate royalties in the shadow of such a challenge. This leaves Counterclaimants and Qualcomm's customers generally in a markedly different position than they would be in a typical patent licensing negotiation with a standards-setting participant. As a result, Counterclaimants, like other Qualcomm customers, have been forced to accept excessive royalties-including an added amount to ensure continued access to Qualcomm's modem chip supply-and other onerous license terms that do not reflect an assessment of terms that a court or other neutral arbiter would determine to be fair and reasonable.

12. By using its monopoly power to obtain excessive royalties that apply to modem chips supplied by its competitors, Qualcomm in effect collects a surcharge on Counterclaimants and other cellular device manufacturers even when they use non-Qualcomm modem chips. This surcharge weakens Qualcomm's competitors, including by reducing demand for their modem chips, and serves to maintain Qualcomm's monopoly in modem chip markets.

Qualcomm's refusal to license its competitors, such as Intel to 13. manufacture and sell modem chips, bolsters and perpetuates its ability to maintain excessive royalties and other unreasonable license terms in agreements with Counterclaimants and other Qualcomm customers. Qualcomm's competitors, unlike Counterclaimants and Qualcomm's other customers, do not depend on Qualcomm for

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modem chip supply, and would be better positioned than Counterclaimants or other 1 2 customers to negotiate licenses on FRAND terms. Moreover, Qualcomm's rivals 3 generally do (or, in the but-for world, would) rely on component sales, rather than 4 separate intellectual property licenses, to convey to their OEM and CM customers the 5 intellectual property rights that those customers need in order to use or resell the 6 components they have purchased. Qualcomm's competitors would thus be both better 7 positioned and motivated to negotiate licenses on FRAND terms allowing them to 8 market and sell authorized, unencumbered, patent-exhaustive modem chips, in turn 9 forcing Qualcomm to sell modem chips on the same basis to remain competitive.

Each Counterclaimant has been directly overcharged and injured as a 10 14. 11 result of Qualcomm's illegal scheme and brings this action to recover its damages, to enjoin Qualcomm from further violations of the law, and to request additional 12 13 appropriate relief. Counterclaimants have each paid excessive royalties to Qualcomm and collectively have paid billions of dollars in excessive royalties over the last four 14 years alone. As an illustrative example, Pegatron has paid almost \$ 15 since 2013. As another illustrative example, since 2013, Foxconn has paid over \$ 16 17 and Wistron has paid almost \$ These three Counterclaimants alone have collectively paid well over \$ in vastly inflated royalties to Qualcomm since 18 2013. For perspective, Qualcomm demands royalties that are a multiple of the 19 royalties that are charged by some other SEP licensors. These vast sums bear no 20 21 reasonable relationship to the value of Qualcomm's intellectual property rights but, 22 instead, reflect a tax on the innovations of others. As direct purchasers from Qualcomm, each Counterclaimant is entitled to recover the entirety of the overcharges 23 24 imposed by Qualcomm, regardless of whether or not any or all of the overcharge was passed on to Apple or to Counterclaimants' other customers. In any event, by means 25 of its complaint in this matter, Qualcomm is seeking to force Counterclaimants to 26 absorb 100% of Qualcomm's overcharges in connection with cellular products sold by 27

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Counterclaims; Demand for Jury TRIAL

Counterclaimants to Apple. Apple has indirectly borne billions of dollars of those overcharges in the past but, when Apple sought relief from Qualcomm's excessive royalty burden, Qualcomm conditioned partial relief on Apple's exclusive use of Qualcomm modem chips from 2011 to 2016, which in turn imposed such exclusivity for Apple products on Counterclaimants. Qualcomm's coercive exclusive supply arrangement with Apple denied other modem chip suppliers the benefits of working with a particularly important cell phone and tablet manufacturer and Counterclaimants, and hampered the development of those suppliers into effective competitors.

15. Qualcomm's conduct has harmed competition and the competitive process. At a time when cellular technologies are expanding to new and varied applications, Qualcomm's practices threaten further consumer harm in an industry in which competition and innovation are vitally important.

II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

A. Jurisdiction

16. This action for damages, declaratory relief, costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys' fees arises under, inter alia, the patent laws of the United States, 35 U.S.C. § 1 *et seq.*; the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 *et seq.*; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1337 (commerce and antitrust regulation), and 1338(a) (patents).

17. This court also has jurisdiction over these claims, and the pendent state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Each of the state law claims arises out of the same factual nucleus as the federal law claims.

18. The CMs have standing to bring this action for treble damages and other relief under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15.

19. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Qualcomm because it has its principal place of business in this District, and because Qualcomm's actions cause

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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harm in this District. Certain agreements that have been entered into by Qualcomm and each of the Counterclaimants are at the heart of this dispute, and they provide that 3 they are made and entered into in the State of California. Further, Qualcomm's wrongful conduct has been purposefully conducted within the District (e.g., at 4 Qualcomm's offices in San Diego, California), and Counterclaimants' injuries relate to 5 such conduct in the District. The Court further has jurisdiction over Qualcomm because it has filed suit in this District against Counterclaimants in order to enforce its illegal scheme.

> B. Venue

20. Venue is proper in this District because Qualcomm brought this action and thereby consented to venue. Alternately, venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), 1391(c), 1391(d), and 1400(b) and Sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22.

III. THE PARTIES

Pegatron Corporation ("Pegatron") is a corporation organized and existing 21. under the laws of Taiwan, with its principal place of business at 5F, No. 76, Ligong Street, Beitou District, Taipei City 112, Taiwan, R.O.C. Pegatron designs, manufactures, and sells a variety of consumer electronic products, including cellular phones, tablets, game consoles, televisions and multimedia players, as well as laptop and desktop computers, motherboards, and broadband and networking devices.

22. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd. ("Hon Hai") is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Taiwan, with its principal place of business at No. 66, Zhongshan Road, Tucheng Industrial Zone, Tucheng District, New Taipei City, Taiwan, R.O.C. Hon Hai designs, manufactures, and sells a variety of consumer electronic products, including cellular phones and tablets, electrical components, and laptop and desktop computers.

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23. FIH Mobile Ltd. (formerly Foxconn International Holdings Ltd.) ("FIH") is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Cayman Islands, with its principal place of business at 18 Youyi Road, Langfang Economic and Technological Development Zone, Hebei Province, People's Republic of China. FIH is a subsidiary of Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd. and designs, manufactures, and sells various cellular handset and communication products, including cellular phones and tablets.

24. Wistron Corporation ("Wistron") is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Taiwan, with its principal place of business at 158, Singshan Road, Neihu, Taipei, 11469, Taiwan, R.O.C. Wistron designs, manufactures, and sells a variety of consumer electronic products, including cellular phones, tablets, and mobile communications products, as well as laptop and desktop computers, server and storage systems, and LCD televisions.

25. Compal Electronics, Inc. ("Compal") is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Taiwan, with its principal place of business at Nos. 581 & 581-1, Ruiguang Road, Neihu District, Taipei City, 11492, Taiwan, R.O.C. Compal designs, manufactures, and sells a variety of consumer electronic products, including cellular phones, tablets, and wearables, as well as laptop and desktop computers, monitors, televisions, servers, and auto electronics.

26. Qualcomm Incorporated ("Qualcomm") is a publicly traded, for-profit company, incorporated in Delaware and having its principal place of business at 5775 Morehouse Drive, San Diego, California 92121. Qualcomm's principal businesses are the development, design, and sale of modem chips and other semiconductor devices used in cell phones and other mobile consumer products, and the licensing of intellectual property related to cellular technology. Qualcomm sells modem chips through, among others, a business unit called "Qualcomm CDMA Technologies" ("QCT"), which develops and supplies integrated circuits and system software, including modem chips, for use primarily in voice and data communications.

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Qualcomm purports to license or otherwise provides rights to use portions of
 Qualcomm's intellectual property portfolio through Qualcomm Technology Licensing
 ("QTL") and/or Qualcomm Incorporated. QCT is operated by Qualcomm
 Technologies, Inc. ("QTI"), another wholly-owned subsidiary of Qualcomm. In the
 fiscal year ending in September 2016, Qualcomm reported that QCT had over \$15.4
 billion in revenues and earnings before taxes of \$1.8 billion; and that QTL had over
 \$7.6 billion in revenues and earnings before taxes of \$6.5 billion.

27. Qualcomm has offices and employees in this District and regularly conducts business in this District.

28. Qualcomm includes Qualcomm Technology Licensing ("QTL"); Qualcomm Technologies Inc. ("QTI"); Qualcomm CDMA Technologies ("QCT"); and Qualcomm CDMA Technologies Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. ("QCTAP"). QTI is wholly owned by Qualcomm, and both QCT and QCTAP are operated by QTI and its subsidiaries.

IV. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND

A.

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Cellular Technology

29. Cellular communications depend on widely distributed networks implementing standardized protocols. Network operators, such as Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint, make substantial investments to build networks that comply with these standardized protocols.

30. Since the introduction of commercial cellular handsets, there have been four "generations" of cellular communication standards.

a. First-generation ("1G") standards, introduced in the 1980s, support analog transmission of voice calls.

b. Second-generation ("2G") standards, first deployed in the early 1990s, support digital transmission of voice calls. The leading 2G standards families are the Global System for Mobile communications ("GSM") and

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second-generation Code Division Multiple Access ("2G-CDMA"). In the United States, AT&T and T-Mobile operate legacy GSM networks, while Verizon and Sprint operate legacy 2G-CDMA networks.

c. Third-generation ("3G") standards, first deployed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, support higher data-transmission speeds. The leading 3G standards families are the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System ("UMTS") and third-generation CDMA ("3G-CDMA"). UMTS allowed GSM-network operators to transition economically to a 3G standard. 3G-CDMA did the same for 2G-CDMA-network operators.

d. Fourth-generation ("4G") standards, first deployed in late 2009 and the early 2010s, support substantially higher data-transmission speeds than 3G standards can support. The leading 4G standard is Long-Term Evolution ("LTE"). Most major network operators worldwide have deployed LTE.

B.

Baseband Processors, or "Modem Chips"

31. Baseband processors are semiconductor devices (sometimes referred to as "chips," "chipsets," or "modems," and referred to herein as "modem chips") within cellular devices. Modem chips allow handsets, tablets, cellular-enabled computers and other cellular devices to communicate with an operator's cellular network by performing functions such as signal generation, modulation, and encoding.

32. To communicate with an operator's network, a cellular device must contain a modem chip that complies with cellular communications standards that the network supports. For example, a handset containing a modem chip that complies only with UMTS standards cannot communicate with a 3G-CDMA network.

33. Modem chips that comply with more than one standard are known as "multi-mode" modem chips. A device that contains a multi-mode modem chip is capable of communicating with networks that deploy more than one standard or with multiple networks deploying different standards.

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34. To be used on a network deploying LTE, a cellular device must ordinarily contain a multi-mode modem chip that complies with both LTE and older 2G and 3G standards, for two reasons. First, LTE network infrastructure generally supports data, rather than voice, traffic. Therefore, to transmit voice calls, a modem chip must comply with 2G and 3G standards. Second, because the process of upgrading and replacing network infrastructure takes years, a modem chip must comply with 2G and 3G standards to communicate with the network in areas where the operator has not yet replaced or upgraded infrastructure equipment.

35. Thus, to be sold for use on a given carrier's network, a multi-mode modem chip must comply with the legacy 2G and 3G standards deployed by that network. A device that contains a modem chip that complies with GSM, UMTS, and LTE standards, but not CDMA standards, for example, cannot be sold for use on a CDMA network such as Verizon's.

C. Cellular Devices

36. In the late 2000s, smartphones that provide advanced computing capability began to emerge as alternatives to simple feature phones with voice and text-messaging capability. The launch of innovative products like Apple's iPhone in 2007 marked an important point in this transition. These innovative products revolutionized the telecommunications industry and completely redefined what users can do on their mobile phones. The iPhone, for example, combined three products—a mobile phone, a widescreen iPod music player, and a computer/Internet communications device—into one handheld device.

37. In 2010, Apple created and defined an entirely new category of devices with the iPad. The iPad is a computer tablet with a color multi-touch screen, a user interface akin to the iPhone, and functionality that spans both mobile computing and media storage and playback.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 38. Among many other functions, a modern mobile wireless device can send and receive, over cellular networks, telephone calls and/or other voice and video communications, text messages, and Internet data. Except when connected to a Wi-Fi network, a mobile wireless device cannot be used for communication without a modem chip, a component that, among other functions, acts as a small wireless radio and "plugs in" to a standardized telecommunications network.

39. Smartphones include many features in addition to the cellular connectivity and associated voice and text capabilities provided by early feature phones. Smartphones offer cameras, high-resolution touch-screen displays, powerful applications and graphics processors, and enhanced memory and storage, among other features. Many consumers today use their smartphone as their principal camera, for example. Smartphones typically offer consumers connectivity over both cellular networks, such as 4G-LTE or 3G-CDMA, and Wi-Fi networks.

40. Over time, competition has developed across several handset tiers, including premium (sometimes further divided into "premium" and "high"), mid, and low tiers. Premium-tier smartphones, including flagship brands like Apple's iPhone and Samsung's Galaxy-S line, typically include advanced features and technologies.

41. Premium smartphones have become increasingly important for OEMs and CMs. Premium smartphones tend to have higher prices and margins than lower-tier products and are important for OEM branding.

42. The United States, where average selling prices for handsets are significantly higher than the global average, is a particularly important territory for a number of leading OEMs. A significant proportion of Counterclaimants' cellular devices, including handsets, are either sold to OEMs in the United States, or are intended for resale by OEMs to customers and consumers in the United States.

43. Among cellular standards, LTE functionality is particularly important for modern smartphones, as consumers increasingly use smartphones to transmit large

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volumes of data. Cellular data traffic has grown exponentially in recent years, while the volume of cellular voice traffic has remained nearly flat.

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Qualcomm's Dominance in Modem Chip Supply

44. Qualcomm has long been the leading supplier of modem chips worldwide.Qualcomm has been particularly dominant in the supply of two types of modem chips:(i) modem chips that comply with CDMA standards; and (ii) premium modem chips, which comply with advanced LTE standards.

CDMA Modem Chips

45. A number of major carriers worldwide have deployed CDMA networks, including Verizon and Sprint in the United States. For most leading OEMs, leaving CDMA-compatible handsets out of their product lines has not been a realistic option. It is similarly unrealistic to ignore demand for CDMA-compatibility for tablets and computers with cellular capability. To manufacture and sell devices, including handsets, tablets and cellular-enabled computers, that operate on these networks, OEMs and CMs have therefore had to use modem chips that comply with CDMA standards ("CDMA modem chips").

46. Qualcomm has long been the dominant supplier of CDMA modem chips. Each year from at least 2006 through September 2015 (the end of Qualcomm's fiscal year), Qualcomm's worldwide share of CDMA modem chip sales exceeded 80%.

47. Qualcomm has aggressively protected its monopoly position and faces limited competition for the supply of CDMA modem chips. For most of the past ten years, the only supplier of CDMA modem chips other than Qualcomm has been Via Technologies, a Taiwan-based semiconductor company. Via's CDMA modem chip sales have focused on modem chip used in lower-tier handsets. This is in part because Via has not offered multi-mode modem chips that combine CDMA functionality with UMTS or LTE functionality. In 2015, Intel Corporation acquired Via's CDMA

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95 Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD business. Intel has not yet commercialized a modem chip product that integrates Via's CDMA technology with Intel's own multi-mode modem chip technologies.

48. MediaTek Inc., another Taiwan-based semiconductor company, licensed technology from Via in late 2013 and began to offer CDMA modem chips in 2015. MediaTek has not offered multi-mode CDMA modem chips suitable for use in flagship handsets, however, and its sales of CDMA modem chips have been small.

49. OEMs and CMs have had limited practical alternatives to Qualcomm for the supply of CDMA modem chips. Qualcomm has used its dominant position to obtain onerous and anticompetitive supply and licensing terms from OEMs and CMs, which have created substantial barriers to entry for would-be modem chip competitors.

Premium LTE Modem Chips

50. Most major network operators worldwide have deployed LTE networks, including U.S. operators Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint.

51. Since the introduction of the first LTE networks around 2010, LTE functionality has continually advanced, and the relevant standard-setting organizations have released a series of updated standards. Advances have included progressively faster data speeds to allow for data-intensive uses. For example, an early LTE release, Category 1, supported download speeds of 10 megabits per second (Mbps); a later LTE release, Category 6, supported download speeds of 300 Mbps; and a more recent LTE release, Category 12, supports download speeds of 600 Mbps.

52. As LTE technology has progressed, modem chip manufacturers have had to add features to keep up. Today, modem chips that comply with advanced LTE standards support advanced data download and upload speeds; advanced carrier aggregation and multiple-input multiple-output ("MIMO") capabilities; and advanced power-saving features, among other functions.

53. OEMs and CMs typically require modem chips with advanced LTE functionality for premium-tier cellular communications. For an OEM or CM

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manufacturing a premium-tier product, a modem chip that only supports earlier LTE features would not be a reasonable substitute for a modem chip that supports advanced LTE standards and features.

54. Competition among manufacturers of LTE modem chips thus occurs in tiers, including premium (sometimes further divided into "premium" and "high"), mid, and low tiers. A premium LTE modem chip supports advanced LTE functionality.

55. Qualcomm recognizes that handsets and modem chips compete in various tiers. Qualcomm's 2016 annual report, for example, refers to both "premium-tier smartphones" and Qualcomm's "premium-tier integrated circuit products."

56. Qualcomm has consistently been the dominant supplier of premium LTE modem chips. From at least 2012 through September 2015, Qualcomm's annual worldwide share of premium LTE modem chip sales exceeded 80%.

57. Qualcomm has faced limited competition in the manufacture and supply
of premium LTE modem chips, in no small part due to Qualcomm's demands for chip
exclusivity from OEMs and, by extension, CMs, including Counterclaimants.
MediaTek, for instance, has lagged behind Qualcomm in LTE modem chip sales and
has not supplied premium LTE modem chips for flagship handsets or tablets. Intel has
had even more limited LTE modem chip sales and achieved modest success in
premium LTE modem chips supply only recently, when it began to supply a portion of
Apple's modem chip requirements for the iPhone 7. On information and belief, Intel
was able to penetrate Apple's exclusivity with Qualcomm only because, at the time,
Qualcomm faced investigations, and in some instances fines, from various competition
regulators, including the Korea Fair Trade Commission, Japan Fair Trade Commission,
and the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission.³ Samsung and Huawei have recently self-

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³ Br. of *Amicus Curiae* Intel Corporation In Supp. Of Pl.'s Opp'n To Def.'s Mot. To Dismiss at 5, 21, *FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.*, No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2017).

supplied some premium LTE modem chips for Samsung and Huawei handsets, respectively, but this has not provided Qualcomm with meaningful competition in the merchant market.

58. OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, have had limited practical alternatives to Qualcomm for the supply of premium LTE modem chips. Qualcomm has used its dominant position to obtain onerous and anticompetitive supply and licensing terms from Counterclaimants and, on information and belief, other OEMs and CMs. It has used litigation against Counterclaimants as a tool to reinforce and perpetuate its exclusionary conduct.

V. <u>QUALCOMM'S FRAND-ENCUMBERED CELLULAR STANDARD</u> <u>ESSENTIAL PATENTS</u>

59. SSOs adopt cellular communications standards, including CDMA and LTE standards. Through SSOs, industry participants that may otherwise compete with each other collaborate on evaluating and selecting technologies for standardization. These collaborations can provide important benefits by resolving interoperability problems.

60. Standardization can also present competitive risks. Standard-setting participants often hold patents covering technologies that are incorporated into a standard. Once a standard incorporating proprietary technology is adopted, the potential exists for opportunistic patent holders to insist on patent licensing terms that capture not just the value of the underlying technology, but also the value of standardization itself. To address this "hold-up" risk, SSOs often require patent holders to disclose their patents and commit to license SEPs on FRAND terms. Absent such requirements, a patent holder might be able to parlay the standardization of its technology into a monopoly in standard-compliant products. If a patent holder does

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not choose to make this promise, SSOs generally design the standard without using the patented technology.

61. By making a FRAND commitment, a patent holder accepts the benefits of participating in standards development and of seeking incorporation of its patented technologies into a standard, but agrees in exchange not to exercise any market power resulting from its patents' incorporation into that standard.

62. FRAND royalties must start with the proper royalty base and a proper royalty rate, as required by the patent laws, but also must meet additional criteria designed to prevent misuse of the monopoly power conferred by adoption of a standard. In particular, FRAND royalties must be limited by the actual technical contribution of the patented technology to the standard, rather than (a) the "lock-in" value that arises from standardization of technologies, i.e., the value gained simply because companies are forced to use the technology mandated in the standard, (b) the value of all the technologies incorporated in an entire standard, or (c) the competing value of the many technologies, and many other standards that make up the actual device.

63. An SEP holder that makes a FRAND commitment also promises to license its SEPs to anyone willing to accept a license, i.e., a "willing licensee," and thus relinquishes its right to exclude a willing licensee from the standards-based technologies. Such a commitment is an important check on the patent holder's power to use SEPs to "hold up" implementers of the standard by refusing to license competitors or the customers of competitors, or by licensing competitors or their customers only on discriminatory terms that undermine competition among implementers of the standard. Without the FRAND commitment, SEP holders would take an easy path to monopoly profits because the standard requires use of the patented technology.

99 Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD 64. Most SSOs neither prescribe FRAND license terms nor offer a centralized
 dispute-resolution mechanism in the event that a patent holder and standard
 implementer cannot agree on such terms. Instead, most SSOs rely on the outcome of
 individual negotiations between the parties, and resort to remedies available from
 courts in the event of disagreement. Individual negotiations conducted in the shadow
 of a judicial determination of FRAND terms are therefore essential to the efficacy of
 the FRAND commitment.

8 65. FRAND obligations are more than a matter of a private contract between
9 owners of technology, on the one hand, and SSOs and their other members (and
10 implementers of the standard as intended third-party beneficiaries), on the other.
11 Instead, they are a core precondition for antitrust tolerance of the industry
12 collaboration on which standard-setting depends.

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66. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found:

[a] standard, by definition, eliminates alternative technologies. When a patented technology is incorporated in a standard, adoption of the standard eliminates alternatives to the patented technology. Although a patent confers a lawful monopoly over the claimed invention, its value is limited when alternative technologies exist. That value becomes significantly enhanced, however, after the patent is incorporated in a standard. Firms may become locked in to a standard requiring the use of a competitor's patented technology. The patent holder's IPRs, if unconstrained, may permit it to demand supracompetitive royalties. It is in such circumstances that measures such as FRAND commitments become important safeguards against monopoly power. *See* Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, *Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power*, 73 Antitrust L.J. 1, 5, 10-11 (2005).

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

67. Violation of the FRAND bargain can take several forms, including

demanding unreasonable royalties; applying royalties discriminatorily (for example,

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advantaging the patent owner's products by charging different licensees different 1 amounts or imposing differing conditions on different licensees, or by conditioning 2 3 royalties on licensees' agreement to foreclose rivals to the patent owner's products); and asserting that patents are essential to the standard when in fact they are not. 4 5 Qualcomm is guilty of all of these practices.

68. SSOs that adopt cellular telecommunications standards include the European Telecommunication Standards Institute ("ETSI"), the Telecommunications Industry Association ("TIA"), and the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions ("ATIS"). In some instances, telecommunications standards have been developed through partnerships among SSOs. For example, the Third Generation Partnership Project ("3GPP") focuses on the evolution of GSM, UMTS, and LTE technology, and the Third Generation Partnership Project 2 ("3GPP2") focuses on the development of CDMA technology.

69. ETSI, TIA, and ATIS require each party that participates in the standardsdevelopment process to commit to license its SEPs to firms that implement the standard on FRAND terms.

17 70. Qualcomm admits that it has participated in cellular standard setting 18 processes through ETSI, TIA, and ATIS, and has participated in 3GPP and 3GPP2. 19 Def's Answer ¶ 54, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 5:17-CV-00220-LHK-NMC (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2017) ("QC Answ."). Qualcomm was a leading developer and proponent 20 of CDMA technology, which underlies the 2G-CDMA and cdma2000 standards and 22 held a correspondingly high share of all patents declared essential to 2G-CDMA standards.

71. Qualcomm also admittedly participated in 3G-standard setting, QC Answ. ¶ 55, though its share of all patents declared essential to 3G-UMTS and 3G-CDMA standards is smaller than its share of 2G-CDMA SEPs.

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72. Qualcomm initially advocated a 4G standard known as Ultra-Mobile Broadband, but its advocacy was unsuccessful. Qualcomm later supported LTE standards, which other industry participants had initially proposed. Qualcomm's share of patents declared essential to LTE standards is much lower than its share of CDMA SEPs, and is roughly equal to the shares of other industry participants. One study of declared LTE SEPs found that Qualcomm had a 13% share of "highly novel" essential LTE patents, compared to 19% for Nokia and 12% for each of Ericsson and Samsung.

73. Qualcomm has admittedly committed to certain SSOs that promulgate cellular standards, including ETSI, TIA, ATIS, that it will license its standard-essential patents consistent with the respective SSOs' intellectual property rights policy. QC Answ. ¶ 57. Under these policies, Qualcomm is obligated to license its cellular SEPs covering 2G, 3G, and 4G technologies on FRAND terms.

74. For example, Qualcomm is a member of ETSI, an SSO based in Sofia Antipolis, France, which includes more than 800 members from countries across five continents. ETSI produces globally accepted standards for the telecommunications industry. For example, ETSI created or helped to create numerous telecommunication standards, including the 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS, and 4G/LTE cellular communication standards, described further below.

75. Like other SSOs, ETSI requires participants to commit to abide by its Intellectual Property Rights ("IPR") Policy, which sets forth the rights and obligations of its members. Pursuant to the IPR Policy, members are required to disclose standard-essential and potentially standard-essential patents and patent applications in a timely fashion. *ETSI Rules of Procedure*, Annex 6, Clause 4, http://www.etsi.org/website/document/legal/etsi_ipr-policy.pdf.

76. The IPR Policy further requires that SEP owners submit a written commitment that they are prepared to grant irrevocable licenses on FRAND terms. If no FRAND commitment is made, the IPR Policy provides for ETSI to investigate

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alternative technology options for the standard to avoid the IPR in question. *Id.* at
 Clause 6.

77. According to ETSI's self-reporting portal, Qualcomm has declared over 30,000 global assets to be "ESSENTIAL IPR." No objective party has tested the actual essentiality or validity of these assets.

78. Qualcomm has submitted IPR undertakings to ETSI with regard to each of the patents at issue in this matter. By submitting those declarations, Qualcomm promised that "[t]o the extent that the IPR(s) . . . are or become, and remain ESSENTIAL in respect of the ETSI Work Item, STANDARD and/or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION," Qualcomm is "prepared to grant irrevocable licenses under this/these IPR(s) on terms and conditions which are in accordance with Clause 6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy." *Id.* at App'x A.

79. Qualcomm, therefore, is contractually obligated to grant licenses on FRAND terms to these patents to Counterclaimants and other manufacturers of products that, through the modem chips they use, conform to ETSI standards, as well as to third-party suppliers of modem chips. Qualcomm made similar promises to other SSOs as well.

80. As part of the FRAND determination, courts have generally recognized that any FRAND rate should account for the concept of "royalty stacking." "Royalty stacking" arises because standards often implicate hundreds, if not thousands, of patents. If companies are forced to pay royalties to every SEP holder, the royalties will "stack" on top of each other and quickly become excessive. *See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys.*, Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014). By way of example, Qualcomm's extracted royalty of 5% of the total purchase price is inherently unreasonable because it fails to account for all of the other SEPs owned by other companies. If Qualcomm's royalty were reasonable and it was "stacked" with the other SEP holders' essential patents that charged the same rate as Qualcomm, the total

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royalties that would have to be paid by the OEMs would likely constitute more than half of the total purchase price.

81. Because Counterclaimants are third parties that, through the modem chips they use, implement 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE standard-compliant technology in the products they sell, Counterclaimants are third-party beneficiaries of the contracts between Qualcomm and ETSI, as well as the similar contracts between Qualcomm and other SSOs.

82. Counterclaimants relied on Qualcomm's promises to ETSI and on Qualcomm's similar promises to other SSOs. Specifically, Counterclaimants and other wireless device manufacturers made a conscious choice to develop and sell products compatible with 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE, relying on Qualcomm's promise that any third-party supplier of modem chips or products using them could avoid patent litigation and obtain a license to any patents that Qualcomm has declared essential to the 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE standards.

Qualcomm's breach of its FRAND commitments, described in significant 83. detail below, is a foundation of its scheme to acquire and abuse monopoly power in the 16 cellular industry. By refusing to license its SEPs to competing modem chip manufacturers, and by refusing to sell its modem chips to customers unless they first 18 license Qualcomm's SEPs, among other burdensome terms, Qualcomm forced purchasers of its modem chips to pay extortion-level royalties. By asserting that patents are essential to the standard when in fact they are not, Qualcomm seeks to justify its extortion-level royalties. By threatening "disloyal" modem chip customers with even less-favorable royalties and license terms if they purchased modem chips 24 from Qualcomm's competitors, discriminating between potential licensees by refusing to license its SEPs to competitors, and offering only "rebates" (and no FRAND license) to OEMs rather than charging CMs FRAND terms, Qualcomm excluded competition in the modem chip markets. And by foreclosing competitors from dealing

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
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with Apple (and its CMs), a key purchaser of modem chips, Qualcomm facilitated the marginalization and exit of many of those competitors, enhancing its own monopoly power.

84. Qualcomm has licensed its cellular SEPs to each counterclaimant and to others. Qualcomm has historically offered licenses at a base royalty rate of about 5% of the net selling price of a "Subscriber Unit," which may include a handset, tablet, or cellular-enabled computers.



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3	88. Currently, the royalty rate
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10	89. The rate paid by each Counterclaimant to Qualcomm is significantly

89. The rate paid by each Counterclaimant to Qualcomm is significantly higher than the rates charged by other licensors of cellular SEPs.

90. Qualcomm refuses to license FRAND-encumbered cellular SEPs to competing suppliers of modem chips, despite its FRAND commitments.

91. Among SEP holders, Qualcomm garners an outsized share of licensing revenues paid by OEMs and CMs. OEMs and CMs pay Qualcomm far more in royalties than they pay other SEP licensors, even those with comparable portfolios of cellular SEPs. For example, the royalty demanded by Qualcomm is a multiple of the royalty demanded manufacture another SEP license.

92. The royalties demanded by Qualcomm have been found by the district court presiding over the FTC's case against Qualcomm in the Northern District of California to be plausibly alleged as "above-FRAND." *FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.*, slip op. at 27. The royalties are manifestly excessive even if Qualcomm has historically collected a royalty rate of 5%. Indeed, the claim that Qualcomm has continued to extract the same 5% royalty on the total value of a cellular device supports, rather than contradicts, Counterclaimants' complaint that Qualcomm's royalty is above FRAND. *Id.* at 27-28. Early handsets were primarily used only to transmit voice calls and Qualcomm's cellular communications SEPs arguably contributed significantly to the

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL functionality and value of an early handset. By contrast, handsets today contain
numerous features that are unrelated to cellular network connectivity, such as cameras,
Wi-Fi access, and data storage. *See* Section IV(C), *supra*. Moreover, tablets and
cellular-enabled computers in particular contain feature-rich aspects unrelated to voice
call transmission. Thus, Qualcomm's SEPs contribute far less to the value of a 2017
cellular device than they contributed to the value of a 2007 phone. Nonetheless,
Qualcomm continues to demand a 5% royalty from the total value of the cellular
device today for Qualcomm's cellular communications SEPs, just as it did a decade
ago.

93. Moreover, Qualcomm has continued to earn the same 5% royalty on the sale of a cellular device despite the fact that Qualcomm's SEP portfolio has declined throughout cellphone standard generations. As described herein, Qualcomm held a high share of all patents declared essential to 2G-CDMA standards, but its share of patents declared essential to LTE standards is much lower than its share of CDMA SEPs and is roughly equal to the shares of other industry participants such as Nokia, Ericsson, and Samsung. *See* Section V, *supra*. Nonetheless, Qualcomm continues to extract the same royalty rate despite its increasingly diminished role.

94. In short, that Qualcomm collects the same 5% royalty on the total value of a 2017 cellular device as Qualcomm collected on the total value of a 2007 cellular device, despite the fact that both device technology and Qualcomm's SEP portfolio has changed dramatically over the past decade, is compelling evidence that Qualcomm's SEP royalty rates are above FRAND.

VI. QUALCOMM'S ALLEGED PATENT RIGHTS

95. Qualcomm asserts rights under multiple patents based upon
Counterclaimants' current activity of manufacturing and selling cellular devices.
These patents include at least U.S. Patent Nos. 7,246,242; 6,556,549; 9,137,822;
7,289,630; 8,867,494; 7,095,725; 6,694,469; 9,059,819; 7,096,021; 7,061,890;

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 8,000,717; 8,614,975; 8,761,068; 8,861,424; 8,873,471; 8,989,140; 9,007,974; and 9,144,071 (collectively, "Patents-in-Suit").

96. By way of example, Qualcomm has alleged that, "Absent
[Counterclaimants'] License Agreements, the cellular products they manufacture (for Apple and others) would infringe many thousands of patents in Qualcomm's
portfolio." Dkt. 1 ¶ 42; *see also* Dkt. 35 at 6 ("Absent [Counterclaimants'] license
agreements, the devices manufactured by [Counterclaimants], including Apple devices, would infringe numerous Qualcomm patents.").

97. Counterclaimants plan to continue to manufacture and sell cellular products.

98. Counterclaimants contend that they have the right to manufacture and sell cellular products without the need of a license from Qualcomm on the patents identified in paragraph 95.

99. Counterclaimants need not risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaratory judgement of its legal rights.

VII. <u>QUALCOMM USES ITS DOMINANT POSITION IN MODEM CHIPS</u> <u>TO PRECLUDE OEMS AND CMS FROM CHALLENGING ITS PREFERRED</u> <u>LICENSE TERMS</u>

100. Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy conditions OEMs' and CMs' including Counterclaimants'—access to its modem chips on acceptance of a license to Qualcomm's cellular SEPs on Qualcomm's preferred terms—including the payment of substantial royalties to Qualcomm on sales of cellular devices using a modem chip purchased from Qualcomm's competitors.

101. As alleged below, Qualcomm's policy is anticompetitive and exclusionary. The policy skews Qualcomm's license negotiations toward outcomes that raise the all-in prices that OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, must pay on both Qualcomm modem chips and those supplied by Qualcomm's competitors.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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These higher all-in prices reduce demand for competitors' modem chips, raise prices paid by consumers, and reduce demand for Counterclaimants' cellular products.

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A. **Qualcomm's Agreements with Compal**

On February 10, 2000, Compal and Qualcomm entered into a Subscriber 102. Unit License Agreement ("Compal SULA"). Under the Compal SULA, Compal has the right to manufacture and sell Subscriber Units, such as tablets, that incorporate certain Qualcomm intellectual property.

8 103. The Compal SULA grants Compal certain rights to certain patents owned 9 by Qualcomm, including both SEPs and patents that are not essential to any relevant 10 standard ("NEPs"). In exchange, the Compal SULA purports to obligate Compal to 11 pay Qualcomm upfront license fees as well as royalties on a quarterly basis. Compal's royalties are calculated as a percentage of the Net Selling 12 13 Price, or NSP (as defined in the Compal SULA) for each cellular product sold by 14 Compal during the relevant calendar quarter—even if no product contains a Qualcomm *modem chip*. The Compal SULA also requires Compal to provide a 15 16 cross-license to Compal's intellectual

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17	property related to certain technology.
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23	104. Compal and Qualcomm have executed amendments to the Compal SULA
24	at various times.
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106. On January 13, 2010, Compal and Qualcomm entered into a Master Software Agreement ("Compal MSA"). In exchange for upfront license fees, the Compal MSA grants Compal the copyright right with respect to certain Qualcomm software

107. Pursuant to its "no license-no chips" policy, Qualcomm requires entry into the Compal SULA in connection with the sale of modem chips to Compal. Since 2010, Qualcomm has also required entry into the Compal MSA and addenda thereto in connection with the sale of modem chips to Compal.

B.

Qualcomm's Agreements with FIH and Hon Hai

108. On October 18, 2005, FIH and Qualcomm entered into a Subscriber Unit License Agreement ("FIH SULA"). Hon Hai also signed the FIH SULA with respect to two sections. Under the FIH SULA, FIH has the right to manufacture and sell Subscriber Units, such as cellular devices and tablets, that incorporate Qualcomm's intellectual property.

109. Also on October 18, 2005, Qualcomm, FIH, and Hon Hai entered into a separate agreement granting Hon Hai a sublicense of FIH's rights under the FIH SULA.

110. FIH and Qualcomm executed amendments to the FIH SULA at various times.

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1	111. Pursuant to the FIH SULA, FIH and Hon Hai are granted certain rights to
2	certain patents owned by Qualcomm, including both SEPs and NEPs. In exchange, the
3	FIH SULA purports to obligate them to pay Qualcomm
4	license fees as well as royalties on a quarterly basis. Their royalties are calculated as a
5	percentage of the Net Selling Price, or NSP (as defined in the FIH SULA) for each
6	cellular product during the relevant calendar quarter—even if no product contains a
7	Qualcomm modem chip. The FIH SULA also requires FIH to provide a
8	cross-license to FIH's intellectual property
9	related to certain technology.
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25	113. On January 11, 2010, FIH and Qualcomm entered into a Master Software
26	Agreement ("FIH MSA"). In exchange for upfront license fees, the FIH MSA grants
27	FIH the copyright right with respect to certain Qualcomm software
28	111 Defendants' Answed and Defenses: Case No. 3:17 CV 01010 GPC MDD
unn & LP	DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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114. Pursuant to its "no license-no chips" policy, Qualcomm requires entry into the FIH SULA in connection with the sale of modem chips to FIH or Hon Hai. Since 2010, Qualcomm has also required entry into the FIH MSA and addenda thereto in connection with the sale of modem chips to FIH or Hon Hai.

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C. Qualcomm's Agreements with Wistron

On May 23, 2007, Wistron and Qualcomm entered into a Subscriber Unit 115. License Agreement ("Wistron SULA"). Under the Wistron SULA, Wistron has the right to manufacture and sell Subscriber Units, such as cellular devices, that incorporate certain Qualcomm intellectual property.

14 The Wistron SULA grants Wistron certain rights to certain patents owned 116. 15 by Qualcomm, including both SEPs and NEPs. In exchange, the Wistron SULA 16 purports to obligate Wistron to pay Qualcomm upfront license 17 fees as well as royalties on a quarterly basis. Wistron's royalties are calculated as a 18 percentage of the Net Selling Price, or NSP (as defined in the Wistron SULA) for each 19 cellular product during the relevant calendar quarter—even if no product contains a Qualcomm modem chip. The Wistron SULA also requires Wistron to provide a 20 cross-license to Wistron's

intellectual property related to certain technology.


23 24 25 26 117. 27 28 112 Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD **DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES:** COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY

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118. On April 7, 2010, Wistron and Qualcomm entered into a Master Software
Agreement ("Wistron MSA"). In exchange for upfront license fees, the Wistron MSA
grants Wistron the copyright right with respect to certain Qualcomm software
119. Pursuant to its "no license-no chips" policy, Qualcomm requires entry
into the Wistron SULA in connection with the sale of modem chips to Wistron. Since
2010, Qualcomm has also required entry into the Wistron MSA and addenda thereto in
connection with the sale of modem chips to Wistron.
D. Qualcomm's Agreements with Pegatron
120. In 2007, Pegatron was formed as a wholly-owned subsidiary of ASUSTek
Computer, Inc. ("ASUS").
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Pegatron and Qualcomm have executed 1 2 amendments to the Pegatron SULA at various times. 3 On July 13, 2010, Pegatron and Qualcomm entered into a Master 123. Software Agreement ("Pegatron MSA"). In exchange for upfront license fees, the 4 Pegatron MSA grants Pegatron the copyright right with respect to certain Qualcomm 5 software 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 124. Pursuant to its "no license-no chips" policy, Qualcomm requires entry into the Pegatron SULA in connection with the sale of modem chips to Pegatron. Since 2010, Qualcomm has also required entry into the Pegatron MSA and addenda thereto in connection with the sale of modem chips to Pegatron. E. Qualcomm's Announced Corporate Structure Is Designed to **Implement the "No License-No Chips" Policy**

125. Qualcomm is party to the agreements through which it licenses its cellular SEPs to Counterclaimants.

126. Qualcomm sells modem chips to Counterclaimants through its subsidiaries or branches, QCT and QCTAP. The sale of Qualcomm modem chips to Counterclaimants through QCT and/or QCTAP is authorized by Qualcomm.

127. Qualcomm's QTL division, by contrast, is responsible for licensing thousands of patents that Qualcomm has declared are essential to the 3G-CDMA, UMTS, and LTE standards.

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To facilitate its scheme, Qualcomm asserts that it has organized its 128. corporate structure to create an artificial division between (i) Qualcomm Inc., 3 including QTL, which holds Qualcomm's patents; (ii) Qualcomm's wholly-owned subsidiary QTI; and (iii) Qualcomm's U.S. and Asia-Pacific sales segments QCT and 4 QCTAP, which are operated by QTI and its subsidiaries. Despite any purported division, however, as a matter of legal and economic reality, Qualcomm is responsible 7 for all licensing and all chip sales by Qualcomm and its subsidiaries.

8 129. Qualcomm's declared corporate structuring is nothing more than a 9 corporate shell game. In a press release announcing the corporate restructuring of 10 QCT, Qualcomm admitted that any change in its corporate structure would not result 11 in "any change to the way in which it defines its operating segments for financial reporting purposes." Press Release, Qualcomm, Qualcomm Announces Plans to 12 13 Implement a New Corporate Structure, (June 28, 2012), available at 14 https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2012/06/28/qualcomm-announces-plans-15 implement-new-corporate-structure. Qualcomm, QTI, QCT, and QCTAP should be 16 treated as a single entity. Qualcomm's parent and subsidiary entities share such a unity 17 of interest that the separate personalities of the corporations no longer exist. Any 18 purported division between Qualcomm's parent and subsidiary entities is illusory and 19 an attempt to evade the law. Qualcomm, QTI, QCT, and QCTAP work together in refusing to sell chipsets to manufacturers unless they enter into separate patent license 20 21 agreements, demonstrating a unity of interest of extracting excess royalties for 22 Qualcomm. Permitting Qualcomm to hide its anticompetitive behavior behind alleged 23 corporate walls will lead to an inequitable result.

130. In late 2014, Qualcomm engaged in a high-level review to consider strategic options, including whether to separate Qualcomm's chip and licensing divisions into separate companies. QC Answ. ¶ 99.

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131. Ultimately, in December 2015, Qualcomm announced the completion of 2 its strategic review and decided not to break up the company. According to 3 Qualcomm's CEO, "[t]he strategic benefits and synergies of our model are not replicable" if Qualcomm split apart the two parts of its business.4 These "benefits and synergies" include the anticompetitive conduct and royalties described herein. Qualcomm has acknowledged that the "current structure . . . driv[es] enhanced overall financial performance of the Company." Id.

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F. Qualcomm's "No License-No Chips" Policy Is Anomalous Among **Component Suppliers**

Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy sets Qualcomm apart from 132. other suppliers of semiconductor and cellular-equipment components.

133. Other component suppliers have relied upon component sales, rather than separate patent licenses or separate copyright licenses, to convey to their OEM and CM customers the intellectual property rights that those customers need in order to use or resell the components they have purchased.

134. When a supplier sells a component, such as a modem chip, to an OEM or CM, that sale, under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, ordinarily terminates any right of the supplier under patent law to control any further use or sale of the component. Similarly, under the first-sale doctrine, the first sale of a copyrighted work exhausts the copyright holder's rights in that copy of the work.

135. Thus, for example, when a CM or OEM uses a chip from another of Qualcomm's competitors, the CM or OEM would be able to use or resell the chip with code loaded thereon-without first obtaining a separate patent or copyright

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⁴ Press Release, Qualcomm, Qualcomm Completes Review of Corporate and Financial Structure (December 15, 2015), available at

https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2015/12/15/qualcomm-completesreview-corporate-and-financial-structure.

license from the competitor—just as a consumer buying a smartphone or tablet does not have to obtain a separate patent license from the seller of the smartphone or tablet.


136. More generally, OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, purchase components from hundreds of suppliers. Among these suppliers, Qualcomm is unique in requiring, as a condition of a modem chip sale, a separate patent license and a separate software license requiring royalty payments for devices that use a competitor's components.

G. Qualcomm's "No License-No Chips" Policy Is Anomalous Among SEP Licensors

137. Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy also sets Qualcomm apart from other licensors of SEPs.

138. Ordinarily, if a SEP holder and a potential licensee can neither agree on license terms nor agree to submit those terms to binding arbitration, the SEP holder initiates a patent-infringement suit in which a court resolves issues of patent validity and infringement and, if the court deems a patent valid and infringed, determines and awards reasonable royalties. In some instances, a potential licensee may seek a declaratory judgment addressing the same issues.

139. These suits, when litigated to judgment, have resulted in royalties well below those that SEP holders offered prior to litigation. In one leading case, an SEP holder demanded royalties of between \$6 and \$8 per gaming console. The district court ultimately determined that the FRAND rate for the SEPs was \$0.04 per console. *Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.*, No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *99–101 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). In another case, an SEP holder demanded royalties that exceeded the selling price of the standard-compliant products. The district court ultimately determined that the cumulative FRAND royalty for the patents at issue was 0.19% of the selling price. *Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp.*, No. C-12-3451, 2014 WL 2738226, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2014).



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140. A potential licensee's ability to secure a FRAND determination from a court affects SEP-license negotiations. If the potential licensee's costs of going to court are low, relative to the value of the royalties and other terms that the parties are negotiating, both parties to the negotiation know that the potential licensee, if offered unreasonable terms, can choose to decline the offer and go to court to seek better terms.

141. Thus, the parties' expectations about the probable outcome of litigation determine the negotiated terms. In this sense, bargaining over royalties and other licensing terms occurs "in the shadow of the law."

142. Negotiated royalties will approximate judicially determined reasonable royalties, however, only if the costs to the prospective licensee of challenging the licensor's royalty demands are low, relative to the royalties demanded.

143. As the costs to the potential licensee of going to court rise, this becomes a less attractive option, and thus provides less protection to the potential licensee against unreasonable royalty demands.

H. Qualcomm's "No License-No Chips" Policy Denies CMs and OEMs the Opportunity to Challenge Qualcomm's License Terms in Court or to Negotiate Royalties Against the Backdrop of a Potential Challenge

144. Many OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, regard Qualcomm's royalties as above FRAND, and, absent Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy, they would have the ability and incentive to challenge Qualcomm's royalty demands in court.

145. Before a court, OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, could challenge Qualcomm's royalty demands on several grounds, including by citing evidence that:

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a. Qualcomm's royalties are disproportionately high relative to the value contributed by its patented inventions, and often are several times higher than the royalties of other SEP licensors that have made similar technical contributions;

b. Qualcomm has continued to insist on royalties calculated as a percentage of a device's price, even though, for example, handsets today offer a number of features—including cameras, high-resolution touch-screen displays, powerful applications and graphics processors—other than cellular connectivity;

c. Qualcomm's standard royalty rate has not fallen, even though many of Qualcomm's patents related to CDMA technology have expired and even though Qualcomm's SEPs contribute far less to the value of more recent models of phones than they contributed to a 2007 phone;

d. Qualcomm has required OEMs and CMs, including
Counterclaimants, to grant Qualcomm cross-licenses (in some cases, to both SEPs and non-SEPs), often with pass-through rights to other
Qualcomm customers, and has failed to adjust its royalty rate to account for the value of the cross-licensed patents; and

e. Qualcomm has asserted unreasonable royalties demands, including contending that

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146. Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy effectively denies OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, the opportunity to challenge Qualcomm's royalty demands on these and other grounds by dramatically increasing the costs of going to court.

147. As a result of Qualcomm's policy, the costs that a CM or OEM must incur to challenge Qualcomm's royalties are not simply attorneys' fees and other litigation costs, but also include actual or threatened loss of access to Qualcomm's modem chips.

148. Loss of access to Qualcomm's modem chips imposes substantial costs on CMs and OEMs. Given the dominant position that Qualcomm has had in the supply of CDMA and premium LTE modem chips, a CM or OEM unable to purchase such chips from Qualcomm would be severely hampered in efforts to design and sell critically important premium-tier phones, tablets and cellular-enabled computers, and phones, tablets and cellular-enabled computers for use on CDMA networks. This is particularly true for each Counterclaimant.

149. Qualcomm has also used its dominant position to negotiate supply terms that leave OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, vulnerable to a supply disruption in the event of a license dispute. Once a CM or OEM begins testing a device with a Qualcomm modem chip, the OEM is effectively "locked in" to that chip, and remains so over the commercial life of the device.

150. Absent Qualcomm's dominance in CDMA and premium LTE modem chips, a CM or OEM could protect itself against a supply disruption either (i) by

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substituting non-Qualcomm chips in new device designs or (ii) by using the prospect of substitution to negotiate supply terms with Qualcomm that protect the OEM from such a disruption. Qualcomm has used its dominance, however, to obtain terms that impede or prevent these measures.

151. These supply terms leave CMs and OEMs vulnerable to supply disruptions with serious consequences for their businesses. To avoid these consequences, OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, have acceded to royalties and other licensing terms that Qualcomm demanded even when they believed those terms to be above-FRAND. No Counterclaimant has succeeded in negotiating FRAND terms with Qualcomm.

152. Accordingly, because of Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy, these two processes for determining a reasonable royalty rate-i.e., bilateral negotiations in the shadow of the law, or a lawsuit itself-have been functionally foreclosed to OEMs and CMs.

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Qualcomm's "No License-No Chips" Policy Compels OEMs to Accept Qualcomm's Preferred License Terms

Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy has significantly influenced the 153. course of license negotiations with a number of OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, over the last decade.

154. To maintain access to Qualcomm's modem chips, OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, have accepted royalty and other license terms that they would not otherwise accept. Specifically, as a result of Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy, the royalties that OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, pay Qualcomm on devices using non-Qualcomm modem chips do not reflect assessments of royalties that a court or neutral arbiter would deem reasonable, including in light of Qualcomm's FRAND commitments. The royalties that OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, pay do not reflect the value of Qualcomm's SEPs, but also reflect

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Qualcomm's dominant position in modem chips, and include an added increment that 1 2 OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, pay Qualcomm to avoid disruption of 3 chip supply. For example, Samsung, an important OEM, contends that Qualcomm leveraged its cellular SEPs to coerce unreasonable licensing terms that have 4 anticompetitive, trade-restraining effects. Brief of Amici Curiae Samsung Electronics 5 6 Co. Ltd. and Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. in Opposition to Qualcomm Incorporated's 7 Motion to Dismiss ("Samsung Amici Br.") at 7, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 5:17-cv-8 00220-LHK-NMC (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017). From Samsung's perspective: 9 "Qualcomm coerces handset manufacturers to sign long-term licenses that disincentivize handset manufacturers from seeking alternative [modem chip] suppliers and enable Qualcomm to extract monopoly profits from the full handset whether or not the value is derived from Qualcomm's SEPs." Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).

155. In other words, Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy, together with its other exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct, means that the "all-in" price of any modem chip now consists of (i) the nominal price of the modem chip itself, which the OEM or CM must pay the modem chip manufacturer; (ii) a FRAND royalty, which the OEM or CM must pay to Qualcomm to practice Qualcomm's SEPs to the extent that such IP rights are valid and have not been exhausted; and (iii) an added surcharge, which the OEM or CM must pay to Qualcomm in order to ensure continued access to Qualcomm's modem chip supply.

J. Qualcomm's "No License-No Chips" Policy Has Harmed Competition and Inflicted Antitrust Injury on Counterclaimants

156. The incremental royalty that OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, pay to Qualcomm operates as a surcharge that raises OEMs' and CMs' costs of using modem chips supplied by Qualcomm's competitors, reduces demand for competitors' chips, and reduces the ability and incentive of competitors to

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL invest and innovate. The surcharge thereby maintains Qualcomm's monopoly power and raises handset prices paid by U.S. consumers.

157. When evaluating device designs, OEMs and CMs consider the all-in cost of a modem chip, consisting of both (i) the nominal price of the chip; and (ii) any patent royalties that the OEM or CM must pay to use that chip in a device.

158. Qualcomm's surcharge, by raising the latter cost component, increases the all-in cost to an OEM or CM of using a competitor's modem chip, and thus weakens the competitive constraint on Qualcomm's own all-in modem chip price. Qualcomm further seeks to insulate its all-in price from competitive constraint by,

159. By raising OEMs' and CMs' all-in costs of using competitors' modem chips, the surcharge diminishes CMs' and OEMs' demand for those chips and reduces competitors' sales and margins.

160. A supplier of CDMA and premium LTE modem chips must ship substantial volumes of chips and earn significant margins on those shipments to sustain the research and development required to maintain a viable business. Reduced sales and margins resulting from Qualcomm's surcharge diminish competitors' abilities and incentives to invest and innovate.

161. The above-FRAND royalties that Qualcomm extracts from OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, through Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy thus affects the markets for modem chips and harms competition in the modem chip markets. As described above, Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy entrenches Qualcomm's monopoly power in the sale of CDMA and premium LTE modem chips. That entrenched power allows Qualcomm to continue breaching its FRAND obligation

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to license competitors. All of this impairs competitors' abilities to invest and innovate in next-generation technologies.

162. By using its modem chip dominance to levy a surcharge on its competitors, Qualcomm has also limited competitors' ability to discipline the all-in prices that Qualcomm charges for modem chips. If Qualcomm used its dominance solely to raise the nominal prices of its own chips, those price increases would spur OEMs and CMs to seek substitutes and would attract entry and competitive pricing from modem chip competitors. By contrast, imposing a surcharge—which OEMs and CMs must pay regardless of whether they use modem chips supplied by Qualcomm or a Qualcomm competitor—enables Qualcomm to raise the all-in prices of chips without spurring substitution or attracting entry.

163. As the district court presiding over the FTC's case against Qualcomm has 12 13 held, it is irrelevant that "Qualcomm nominally imposes the same surcharge on all 14 modem chip sales," because "Qualcomm's surcharge does not affect Qualcomm and its competitors equally." FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., slip op. at 33. For Qualcomm, 15 "Qualcomm's surcharge is a means for Qualcomm to functionally extract a higher 16 17 price for Qualcomm's own modem chips without being underbid in the modem chips market by competing modem chip manufacturers." Id. The revenue from 18 19 Qualcomm's surcharge comes back to Qualcomm as profit, helping it to maintain its modem chips monopoly. Id. And, in any event, Qualcomm can (as it has in the past) 20 21 offer OEMs and CMs royalty relief conditioned on modem chip exclusivity. Id. Qualcomm's competitors, by contrast, cannot offer any such relief from Qualcomm's above-FRAND royalties, and "Qualcomm's surcharge works to reduce competitors' modem chips sales and margins, which prevents these competitors from effectively competing with Qualcomm." Id.

164. In effect, Qualcomm's surcharge artificially stunts its competitors' ability to effectively grow and challenge Qualcomm on the merits. Moreover, the surcharge

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represents higher profits to Qualcomm, both because the surcharge brings additional revenue to Qualcomm and because the reduction in competition enables Qualcomm to capture more of the modem chips market.

165. The district court has also found that Qualcomm's alleged course of conduct may "violat[e] its FRAND obligations twice over," and that "by not licensing its competitors and by threatening to withhold its chips to induce OEMs to pay an above-FRAND royalty rate[,] Qualcomm raises the 'all-in' modem chip price that OEMs pay on *all* modem chips." *FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.*, slip op. at 32. But for this conduct, Qualcomm's all-in prices would be far lower, and CMs and OEMs would likely pass some or all of these lower prices on to their customers in the form of lower device prices or increased features.

166. Qualcomm executives have recognized that Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy requires OEMs and CMs to accept higher royalties than they would otherwise accept.

167. In a June 2015 internal Qualcomm presentation, the presentation proposed that Qualcomm form a "5G Consortium" with major infrastructure-equipment manufacturers wherein members of the consortium would not sell a product to a carrier that is not licensed by the Consortium.

168. The internal presentation proposed that the consortium "pursue licensing on a non-FRAND basis for SEPs" because conditioning carrier access to equipment on the acceptance of a separate patent license would "Convinc[e] Carriers to Pay." This internal presentation noted that Qualcomm "employs this strategy today." *FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.*, slip op. at 11.

VIII. <u>QUALCOMM REFUSES TO LICENSE FRAND-ENCUMBERED SEPS</u> <u>TO ITS COMPETITORS</u>

169. The intellectual property rights policies of relevant SSOs do not restrict who is eligible to receive a FRAND license from a holder of a FRAND-encumbered

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patent. For instance, the ETSI IPR policy requires standard-setting participants to
commit to provide "irrevocable licenses on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
('FRAND') terms and conditions." The TIA policy requires any SEP holder that
wishes to monetize its essential patents to commit to license SEPs "to all applicants
under terms and conditions that are reasonable and non-discriminatory . . . to the extent
necessary for the practice of . . . the Standard." The ATIS policy requires SEP holders
to license SEPs "under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of
any unfair discrimination" to "applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose
of implementing the standard."

170. Qualcomm's FRAND commitments require it to license its competitors to make and sell modem chips using Qualcomm's SEPs.

171. Qualcomm itself recognizes that FRAND commitments are designed to ensure open access to standardized technologies. It argued in a past litigation filing that FRAND commitments "ensure[] that all industry participants will be able to develop, manufacture and sell products compliant with the relevant standard without incurring the risk that patent holders will be able to shut down those operations."

172. Similarly, in its 2016 annual report, Qualcomm stated: "The mobile communications industry generally recognizes that a company seeking to develop, manufacture and/or sell products that use CDMA- and/or LTE-based standards will require a patent license from us."

173. Qualcomm has also insisted on cross-licenses to its licensees' SEPs, for the benefit of Qualcomm's modem chip business and the customers of that business.

174. In breach of its FRAND commitments, at odds with its recognition that other industry participants "will require" a license to its FRAND-encumbered SEPs, and in tension with its practice of securing patent licenses for the benefit of its own customers, Qualcomm has consistently refused to license its SEPs to competing

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL suppliers of modem chips. Several of Qualcomm's former and current competitors, including Intel, MediaTek and Samsung, have sought exhaustive SEP licenses from Qualcomm for the purpose of manufacturing modem chips. In each instance, Qualcomm refused to grant an SEP license. QC Answ. ¶ 112.

175. A license to Qualcomm's cellular SEPs would provide substantial benefits to other modem chip suppliers and to their actual or potential customers, including Counterclaimants. Because Qualcomm refuses to license FRAND-encumbered SEPs to its competitors, these competitors cannot offer OEMs or CMs, including Counterclaimants, modem chips that convey the rights to Qualcomm's cellular SEPs. If Qualcomm *did* license its SEPs to competing modem chip manufacturers, those modem chip manufacturers could sell licensed modem chips to OEMs and CMs and, under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the OEM or CM would obtain the right to use the patents practiced by those modem chips without having to pay Qualcomm a royalty on the sale of those modem chips.

176. Instead, because Qualcomm refuses to license its modem chips to competitors and licenses its SEPs only to OEMs and CMs who make and sell handsets, tablets and cellular-enabled computers, Qualcomm collects a royalty on all handsets, tablets and cellular-enabled computers sold by an OEM, calculated as a percentage of the value of the device, regardless of whose components are in the device.

177. Qualcomm's ability to sustain a surcharge on its competitors' sales via patent license terms with OEMs would be limited if it licensed cellular SEPs to its competitors. Qualcomm's competitors, unlike its OEM and CM customers, do not depend on Qualcomm for modem chip supply. As a result, Qualcomm could not use a threatened disruption of modem chip supply to skew SEP-license negotiations with its competitors, and the royalties that would emerge from those negotiations would reflect the royalties that a court would deem reasonable.

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Qualcomm's refusal to license competing manufacturers of modem chips, 178. in contravention of its FRAND commitments, contributes to its ability to sustain a surcharge on its competitors' sales, extract exorbitant royalties by forcing a model where royalties are calculated on the value of the cellular device manufactured by CMs including Counterclaimants, and maintain its monopoly.

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IX. QUALCOMM EXTRACTED MODEM CHIP EXCLUSIVITY FROM APPLE IN EXCHANGE FOR PARTIAL ROYALTY RELIEF

179. On some occasions, Qualcomm has induced certain OEMs to accept its preferred license terms (including terms imposed on CMs) using both the "stick" of threatened supply disruption and the "carrot" of funds to be used for strategic or marketing purposes ("strategic funds") conditioned on the OEM's acceptance of Qualcomm's preferred terms. QC Answ. ¶ 103.

180. These strategic funds have, in some cases, accrued based on OEMs' or CMs', including Counterclaimants', purchase of Qualcomm's modem chips. QC Answ. ¶ 103.

181. In effect, Qualcomm pays OEMs to accept Qualcomm's preferred licensing terms (including terms imposed on CMs).

182. Conditioning such funds on OEMs' acceptance of license terms has helped Qualcomm "close the gap" with OEMs that resist license terms that they regard as unfair, and to maintain high royalties on devices that use competitors' modem chips.

Qualcomm's payment of these strategic funds are thus a way for 183. Qualcomm to continue and maintain its "no license-no chips" policy consistently across all OEMs and CMs.

184. Apple's licensing negotiations and arrangements with Qualcomm, as alleged by Apple, are illustrative examples of Qualcomm's use of "carrots" and "sticks."

185. Apple alleges that, like other OEMs, Apple's leverage in negotiations
 with Qualcomm has been constrained by Apple's need for access to a supply of
 Qualcomm's CDMA and premium LTE modem chips. Pl's Compl. ¶116, *FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc.*, No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC (N.D. Cal Jan. 17, 2017) ("FTC
 Compl."); Pl's Am. Compl. ¶108, *Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.*, No. 17-cv-0108-GPC MDD (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2017) ("Apple FAC").

186. Unlike other OEMs, however, Apple is not a direct Qualcomm licensee. Instead, Apple employs contract manufacturers that are licensed by Qualcomm, including Counterclaimants, and the contract manufacturers, under the terms of their respective agreements with Apple, look to Apple to reimburse the costs of the Qualcomm royalties they pay in connection with Apple devices. FTC Compl. ¶117; Apple FAC ¶ 74.

187. Apple, like other OEMs, regards Qualcomm's license terms, including the effective royalties charged by Qualcomm under its licenses with Apple's contract manufacturers, as inconsistent with Qualcomm's FRAND commitments. FTC Compl. ¶118; Apple FAC ¶¶ 159, 169.

188. According to Apple, it has negotiated with Qualcomm in an effort to reduce the royalty burden that Apple bears indirectly through its contract manufacturers. As a result of these negotiations, Apple entered into agreements with Qualcomm in 2007, 2011, and 2013. FTC Compl. ¶119; Apple FAC ¶¶ 94, 112, 114-115.

189. According to Apple, under a 2007 agreement, Qualcomm agreed to rebate to Apple royalties that Qualcomm received from Apple's CMs (including certain counterclaimants) in excess of a specified per-handset cap. Qualcomm's payment obligations were conditioned on certain exclusionary terms, including, among others, Apple not selling or licensing a handset implementing the WiMax standard, a

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prospective fourth-generation cellular standard championed by Intel and opposed by Qualcomm. FTC Compl. ¶120; Apple FAC ¶ 112.

190. Apple alleges that Qualcomm and Apple entered into additional agreements in 2011 and 2013. Under these agreements, Qualcomm provided Apple large lump sum payments that constituted partial relief from Qualcomm royalties (*i.e.*, the "carrot"). Qualcomm conditioned this relief on Apple's (and, therefore, Counterclaimants') exclusive use of Qualcomm modem chips in new iPhone and iPad models. FTC Compl. ¶121; Apple FAC ¶¶ 114-115.

191. Under Qualcomm's 2011 agreement with Apple, Qualcomm agreed to make substantial incentive payments from 2011 through 2016, explicitly conditioned upon Apple (and, therefore, Counterclaimants) using Qualcomm modem chips exclusively in all new iPhone and iPad models. If, during this period, Apple launched a new handset with a non-Qualcomm modem chip, it would forfeit all future payments and, depending on when a handset launched, could be required to refund past payments. FTC Compl. ¶122; Apple FAC ¶ 114.

192. Qualcomm's 2013 agreements with Apple modified and extended the exclusivity arrangement set forth in the companies' 2011 agreement. Under the 2013 agreements, Qualcomm agreed to rebate to Apple royalties that Qualcomm collected directly from Apple's contract manufacturers in excess of modified per-handset caps. Qualcomm's obligation to make these rebate payments was subject to, among other terms, a new condition—that Apple neither initiate nor induce others to initiate litigation claiming that Qualcomm had failed to offer a license on FRAND terms. Qualcomm also agreed to make substantial incentive payments in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, explicitly conditioned on Apple sourcing modem chips for new iPad and iPhone models exclusively from Qualcomm. If, during this period, Apple launched a new handset with a non-Qualcomm modem chip, it would forfeit all future incentive

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payments and, depending on when a device launched, could be required to refund past incentive payments. FTC Compl. ¶123; Apple FAC ¶ 115

193. In all, Qualcomm's 2011 and 2013 agreements with Apple provided for billions of dollars in conditional rebates from Qualcomm to Apple for modem chip sales from 2011 to 2016. These conditional rebates effectively penalized Apple's (and, therefore, Counterclaimants') use of any modem chips supplied by Qualcomm's competitors. FTC Compl. ¶124; Apple FAC ¶ 96.

194. According to Apple, Qualcomm's 2011 and 2013 agreements with Apple were, and were intended by Qualcomm to be, *de facto* exclusive deals that were as effective as express purchase requirements and that effectively foreclosed Qualcomm's competitors from gaining modem chip business for Apple cellular devices manufactured by Counterclaimants. FTC Compl. ¶125; Apple FAC ¶ 96.

a. Apple and Counterclaimants had at all relevant times an interest in developing and working with additional suppliers of modem chips.

b. The large penalties that Apple would face under its agreements with Qualcomm if it sourced modem chips from another chip supplier prevented Apple (and, therefore, Counterclaimants with respect to Apple devices) from using alternative suppliers during the effective exclusivity period under these agreements.

195. As a result of the exclusivity terms in its coerced agreements with
Qualcomm, Apple (and, therefore, Counterclaimants) sourced modem chips
exclusively from Qualcomm for all new iPad and iPhone products that it launched over
the five-year period from October 2011 until September 2016. FTC Compl. ¶126;
Apple FAC ¶¶ 96-97, 112-115.

196. Qualcomm's coerced exclusive deal with Apple excluded competition from other modem chip suppliers and harmed competition.

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197. Apple is a particularly important OEM from the perspective of a nascent modem chip supplier and confers benefits on a nascent supplier that make the supplier a stronger contender for other OEMs' and for CMs' business.

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a. Apple sells large volumes of premium handsets that require premium LTE modem chips. These chips ordinarily command higher prices and margins than lower-tier modem chips. Supplying Apple helps a nascent supplier to achieve a scale of business that confers research-and-development flexibility, among other things.

b. A nascent supplier learns directly from engagement with Apple's engineering teams and this engagement improves the supplier's modem chip offerings. Likewise, a nascent supplier benefits greatly from engaging directly with the CMs' technical and engineering teams as they are the teams who manufacture and assemble products for sale to OEMs.

c. A nascent supplier achieves technical validation by demonstrating its ability to meet Apple's demanding technical requirements.

d. A nascent supplier engaged by Apple can field-test its chipsthrough global launches that require real-world work with network operators and infrastructure vendors.

e. A nascent supplier obtains a reputational halo effect from selling to Apple. This reputational boost may help a supplier win sales at other OEMs.

198. Qualcomm's coerced exclusive agreements with Apple prevented Qualcomm's competitors from attaining these benefits during the term of the exclusivity period. These agreements also foreclosed a substantial share of the market for premium LTE modem chips. The agreements significantly impeded the development of other modem chip suppliers into effective competitors to Qualcomm reducing choice and innovation to the detriment of modem chip purchasers, including Counterclaimants.

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199. Counterclaimants have been further injured by Qualcomm's use of conditional rebates in lieu of reducing the above-FRAND royalties paid directly by 3 Counterclaimants. Qualcomm has claimed, and has sued Counterclaimants for, royalties in excess of those to be paid indirectly by Apple (after netting out conditional 4 5 rebates)—and even when Qualcomm is aware that Apple has not remitted funds to Counterclaimants to cover such royalties. Qualcomm is also aware that Apple has also 7 not remitted funds to pay amounts that Qualcomm claims Counterclaimants have incurred (but that Counterclaimants dispute) such as

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X. **QUALCOMM BREACHES ITS CONTRACTS WITH COUNTERCLAIMANTS**

200. At all relevant times, Qualcomm agreed and was required by law to act in accordance with the express and implied terms (including, but not limited to, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) of the SULAs, the MSAs, and its contractual commitments to SSOs (to which Counterclaimants are third-party beneficiaries). Qualcomm has breached these agreements, as the following examples illustrate.

201. As noted above, each of the SULAs entered into between Qualcomm and each of the Counterclaimants provide that royalties are calculated as a percentage of the Net Selling Price, or NSP (as defined in the SULA) for each cellular product sold during the relevant calendar quarter.

202. The SULAs also entitle Qualcomm to conduct limited audits of Counterclaimants' applicable books and records.

203. Consistent with its overall strategy, Qualcomm has wielded its audit authority in bad faith in order to demand royalties that are excessive, non-FRAND, and not contemplated within the express terms or purpose of the SULAs or the justified expectations of Counterclaimants.

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20	207. Qualcomm's unreasonable royalty assessments violate the SULAs. As
21	noted above, the SULAs provide that
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26	Qualcomm's demands have no basis in the contracts executed between it and
27	each counterclaimant. Qualcomm has no right to use or threaten to use the alleged
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unpaid royalties described in paragraphs 204 through 206 as a basis to interfere in any way with Counterclaimants' rights under the SULAs.

208. Qualcomm's conduct also breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in its SULAs with each Counterclaimant and has denied each Counterclaimant the terms to which it agreed, and the benefits of its justifiable expectations with respect to such terms.

209. Further, as discussed herein, pursuant to its FRAND commitments, 7 8 Qualcomm made numerous voluntary commitments to license its SEPs on fair, 9 reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. By imputation, Qualcomm represents that the royalties it charges Counterclaimants are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. 10 11 In reality, the royalties are anything but, as they are inflated by Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy in addition to its other anticompetitive conduct. The royalties 12 13 not only include fair compensation for Qualcomm's SEPs (which Counterclaimants 14 agreed to pay) but also include an additional increment reflecting Qualcomm's modem chips monopoly (which Counterclaimants did not agree to pay). In this way, 15 Qualcomm deprives Counterclaimants of their rights to be charged fair and reasonable 16 17 royalties, within the contemplation of the parties. Moreover, Qualcomm's refusal to license competitors, enabled and sustained by its "no license-no chips" policy, not only 18 19 helps to sustain its excessive, above-FRAND rates, but also deprives Counterclaimants of the benefit of purchasing chips from Qualcomm's competitors, by foreclosing competition and thereby making chip alternatives unavailable to Counterclaimants.

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 but by refusing to license rivals and imposing exclusivity deals on

 OEMs, Qualcomm has
 against the

 common purpose and justifiable expectations of the parties.

210. By this and other conduct, Qualcomm breaches the express and implied terms of the SULAs. This conduct also breaches the implied covenant of good faith

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and fair dealing inherent in Qualcomm's agreements with ETSI, TIA, and ATIS, insofar as it deprives Counterclaimants of their rights to a FRAND rate.

211. Further, by suing Counterclaimants for a sum of royalties that includes an amount of royalty rebates that Qualcomm has withheld from Apple, Qualcomm is now attempting to reap from its conduct an amount far in excess of what it would be entitled to under its agreements with Counterclaimants.

212. To understand why, one must view the SULAs in the context of Qualcomm's agreements with Apple, and in light of the expectations of the parties (including Counterclaimants, Qualcomm, and Apple) with respect to payment of royalties.

213. To explain: Counterclaimants generally do not advance their own funds to pay the patent royalties. Instead, the standard practice is for Counterclaimants to charge and collect the royalty payment from its customers (*i.e.*, Apple), before then paying Qualcomm.

214. But this initial royalty is only half the story. From 2013 through mid-2016, Qualcomm provided Apple with royalty rebates under a Business Cooperation and Patent Agreement ("BCPA") between Apple and Qualcomm. These rebates are designed to reduce the royalty burden borne by Apple, indirectly through its CMs, by a substantial amount. Qualcomm uses these rebates as "carrots," conditioned on OEMs', like Apple's, acceptance of Qualcomm's oppressive terms, in order to "close the gap" in some licensing negotiations. These "carrots" are a way for Qualcomm to continue to maintain its "no license-no chips" policy—and the above-FRAND royalties that result—consistently across all OEMs and CMs.

215. Qualcomm is fully aware of the mechanics by which the royalties are paid: Counterclaimants are generally reimbursed for the royalties first by Apple; Counterclaimants then pay royalties to Qualcomm, at which point Qualcomm remits a portion back to Apple. This arrangement has been in effect for much of the time for

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which Counterclaimants have been manufacturing products for Apple. Apple FAC ¶¶ 73-76, 94-102.

216. In September 2016, Qualcomm improperly ceased making rebate payments to Apple to retaliate against Apple for providing information to competition agencies. However, Qualcomm continues to demand the full amount of royalties from Counterclaimants, rather than the amount of royalties that is net of the rebate payments it owes to Apple—all while it continues to pocket the rebates it owes to Apple. This conduct results in Qualcomm attempting to reap significantly more than what it bargained for under the agreements.


Qualcomm is attempting, therefore, to enforce the SULAs in a manner 217. that unfairly frustrates Counterclaimants' rights under the Agreements, in violation of the express and implied terms of the SULAs. This conduct also breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in Qualcomm's agreements with ETSI, TIA, and ATIS, insofar as it deprives Counterclaimants of their rights to a FRAND rate.

16 218. Additionally, Qualcomm has not provided to any Counterclaimant a list of the specific patents that it has declared as essential, nor has it provided a list of the patents that are practiced by those products manufactured by the Counterclaimants. Nor has Qualcomm demonstrated why or how its intellectual property is essential to the cellular standard implemented by Counterclaimants' products. Indeed, Qualcomm has played hide-the-ball. For example, when asked by one Counterclaimant to identify its current, non-expired cellular SEPs, Qualcomm offered no information, but unhelpfully directed it to search the entire contents of the U.S. Patent and Trade Office website. Meanwhile, Qualcomm has also removed from its website its public list of 24 U.S. patents disclosed to ETSI and precluded archive searching of that list. This uncooperative conduct makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a licensee to determine which patents Qualcomm has declared to be currently essential to cellular standards.

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219. Furthermore, patent licensing offers made by Qualcomm as the result of a 1 2 Chinese regulatory finding also demonstrate Qualcomm's bad faith in refusing to 3 distinguish between essential and non-essential patents and in the royalty rates that it is charging. In 2015, China's National Development and Reform Commission 4 ("NDRC") completed an inquiry into Qualcomm's licensing practices. The NDRC 5 6 determined that Qualcomm had abused its dominant market position, ordered Qualcomm to cease such illegal activities, and imposed a fine upon Qualcomm 7 8 equaling eight percent of its sales in China in 2013. Qualcomm subsequently 9 submitted a rectification plan to the NDRC, which the NDRC reviewed and approved 10 (the "NDRC resolution" or "rectification plan").

11 220. Qualcomm has made an "offer"
12 according to Apple, to Apple, to license Qualcomm's Chinese 3G/4G declared13 essential patents on terms purportedly "in accordance with" the rectification plan.



Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP product. As described herein and below, Qualcomm's demand violates the law governing patent royalties, as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Qualcomm's FRAND commitments to ETSI and others.

221. At a minimum, Qualcomm has evidenced bad faith in its interpretation of license terms in a manner not contemplated by the parties or the general purpose of the license agreements, and in claiming that the patents to which it is granting a license are essential to a standard—and a product's implementation of such standard—when they are not. Qualcomm has neither provided Counterclaimants with meaningful information that could permit them to determine which of Qualcomm's patents are essential to the cellular standards used by their products, nor has Qualcomm engaged in the rigorous analysis needed to prove that its patents are valid, enforceable, essential, and infringed, and, consequently, the FRAND royalty for each of such patents. This has denied Counterclaimants the benefits of Qualcomm's FRAND commitments and helps Qualcomm extract extortion-level royalty rates for its patent portfolio by virtue of simply alleging that it "holds a great many patents that are essential to cellular standards."

222. Indeed, Qualcomm appears to be trying to shield its patents from legal scrutiny. According to Apple, it has been attempting to negotiate in good faith with Qualcomm since 2015 for a license agreement consistent with Qualcomm's FRAND obligations. Apple FAC ¶ 123. In connection with such negotiations, Apple provided Qualcomm with a FRAND offer, which included significant payments to Qualcomm over the next seven years, the methodology used to arrive at such offer, and a bank guarantee of the royalty amount offered. Qualcomm rejected Apple's attempt to negotiate and, instead, reverted to its prior terms.

223. According to Apple, Qualcomm ultimately agreed to share with Apple patent information about Qualcomm's SEP portfolio, including infringement allegations about 20 U.S. patents it has declared to ETSI as essential to 3G/UMTS

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and/or 4G/LTE. Apple FAC ¶ 124. After a number of back-and-forth exchanges, on March 18, 2016, Qualcomm then provided a list of "the patents Qualcomm 3 Incorporated has disclosed to ETSI as potentially containing ESSENTIAL IPR" as well as "the portion of the standards to which each of the patents relate." Apple FAC ¶ 4 5 138.

224. After such negotiations ultimately failed, Apple brought suit against Qualcomm in the related, co-pending matter of Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc. In that case, Apple has brought declaratory judgment claims of noninfringement and invalidity of 18 patents against Qualcomm: Apple asserted declaratory judgment claims of noninfringement of nine patents in its initial Complaint filed on January 20, 2017 (the "Original Patents-in-Suit"), and then asserted declaratory judgment claims of invalidity of the Original Patents-in-Suit, plus declaratory judgment claims of noninfringement and invalidity of nine additional patents in its Amended Complaint filed on June 20, 2017. According to Apple, these additional nine patents appear on the March 18, 2016 list that Qualcomm sent to Apple as alleged evidence that Apple should pay Qualcomm's usurious above-FRAND royalties. Apple FAC ¶ 146.

225. Though Qualcomm has denied the allegations that the Original Patents-in-Suit are "not essential to the 3G/UMTS standard" and that no claim of those patents "has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Apple or the purchasers of Apple's products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Apple's products," Qualcomm did not assert infringement counterclaims against Apple for the Original Patents-in-Suit. Apple FAC ¶ 140-141. Qualcomm will respond with respect to the remaining patents by July 21, 2017.

On information and belief, Qualcomm's decision not to assert formal 226. infringement counterclaims for the Original Patents-in-Suit against Apple is part of Qualcomm's improper efforts to evade its burden to show, as a condition predicate to

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receiving any FRAND royalties, that it possesses a valid and enforceable patent that is actually essential to the standard(s) to which Qualcomm has declared it, which has not been exhausted by authorized sales of Qualcomm modem chips, and that Apple products infringe that patent. Apple FAC ¶ 144.

XI. <u>QUALCOMM SEEKS TO ENFORCE ITS ANTICOMPETITIVE</u> <u>SCHEME THROUGH LITIGATION</u>

7 227. Another component of Qualcomm's unlawful scheme is its initiation of 8 litigation which is "causally connected" to the independent anticompetitive harm 9 caused by Qualcomm's "No License-No Chips" policy and its other exclusionary 10 conduct. Microsoft Mobile Inc. v. Interdigital, Inc., No. 15-723-RGA, 2016 WL 11 1464545 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016). On May 17, 2017, Qualcomm filed a lawsuit against Counterclaimants, alleging that each breached its SULA by failing to remit 12 13 to Qualcomm certain royalty payments that are being challenged as illegal by the FTC, 14 enforcement agencies around the world, Counterclaimants and Apple, among others. Qualcomm seeks injunctive relief that would force Counterclaimants to immediately resume payment. In that lawsuit, Qualcomm seeks to use litigation as a tool to effectuate its scheme by compelling payment of the challenged supracompetitive above-FRAND royalties.

228. Qualcomm's efforts to extract supracompetitive above-FRAND royalties from resistant customers would be ineffective without the threat of litigation. For this reason, Qualcomm's litigation conduct gives rise to an independent but related antitrust injury on the part of Counterclaimants, in that it imposes litigation fees and costs necessary to defend against the payment of supracompetitive licensing terms; induces Counterclaimants and OEMs, such as Apple, to license Qualcomm's technology and purchase Qualcomm's modem chips; prevents Counterclaimants and OEMs from obtaining access to alternative modem chip technology; and underlines the substantial threat that Counterclaimants and others will be forced to capitulate to

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Qualcomm's business demands, including its extortionary royalty rates, to avoid
 further litigation.

3 229. The *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine does not immunize Qualcomm's conduct from scrutiny. "[O]therwise protected litigation can be a part of an 'anticompetitive 4 scheme' claim" where, as here, "the other aspects of the scheme independently 5 6 produce anticompetitive harms." Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 527 F. 7 Supp. 2d 1084, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Zenith Electronics, LLC v. Sceptre, 8 Inc., No. 14-cv-5150, 2015 WL 12765633 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015). The lawsuits 9 brought by Qualcomm to collect its unlawful royalties are components of its larger monopolistic scheme; the other aspects of that scheme independently maintain 10 11 Qualcomm's monopoly power and effectuate its hold-up power to demand the supracompetitive royalties that Qualcomm seeks to collect through the processes of 12 13 this Court.

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XII. <u>QUALCOMM PREVENTED APPLE FROM BRINGING ITS</u> <u>CONCERNS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT</u>

Qualcomm Muzzles Apple

230. As a condition of even partial relief from its above-FRAND royalties, Qualcomm sought to gag Apple and prevent it from bringing its concerns to law enforcement or challenging Qualcomm's compliance with FRAND commitments.

231. As alleged by Apple, through the terms of the BCPA, Qualcomm conditioned royalty relief on a provision that restricted Apple from initiating or inducing certain legal actions in three particular identified areas: (i) assertion of patents against Qualcomm; (ii) claims that Qualcomm failed to offer a license to its SEPs on FRAND terms; and (iii) claims that Qualcomm's patent rights were exhausted. Apple FAC ¶ 185. The BCPA carved out an acknowledgment that Apple has a responsibility to respond to enforcement agencies' requests for information. *Id.* But in restraining Apple from initiating action or bringing concerns to law

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enforcement, Qualcomm conditioned billions of dollars on Apple's silence before courts and regulators about Qualcomm's business practices. And Qualcomm is now 3 interpreting that agreement to retaliate against Apple for responding to requests for information about Qualcomm's practices from competition agencies, inhibiting lawenforcement review of Qualcomm's anticompetitive practices. Id.

232. The FTC recently alleged that Qualcomm's ongoing anticompetitive scheme is premised on avoiding judicial scrutiny of its non-FRAND licensing scheme, including by deterring device manufacturers from seeking FRAND determinations by relying on its power to withhold supply of Qualcomm's modem chips. According to the FTC, Qualcomm's "no license-no chips' policy effectively denies OEMs the opportunity to challenge Qualcomm's royalty demands . . . dramatically increasing OEMs' costs of going to court." FTC Compl. ¶ 78. The BCPA's gag clause is another such effort to evade scrutiny, one that has the purpose and effect of keeping Qualcomm's monopoly power safe from the rule of law.

Qualcomm Bundles, Ignores Patent Exhaustion Principles, Prevents Patent Exhaustion Suits

As explained above, Qualcomm demands that its customers not only pay 233. to purchase modem chips, but also requires customers to take a license for patents that may be substantially embodied in those chips. In doing so, Qualcomm is forcing its customers, including Counterclaimants, to pay for exhausted patent rights and take licenses that they do not need. This violates established principles of patent exhaustion. Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., No. 15-1189, 2017 WL 2322830, at *14 (U.S. May 30, 2017).

234. Moreover, to the extent Qualcomm is demanding that customers take a license for a portfolio that includes both exhausted and non-exhausted patents, Qualcomm is forcing its customers to pay for a license to exhausted patents in order to obtain a license to non-exhausted patents.

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1 235. These actions are improper attempts to extend Qualcomm's patent 2 monopoly. It is black-letter law that a patentee must respect "established limits ... in 3 employing the leverage of his patent to control or limit the operations of the licensee." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135-36 (1969). A 4 patentee must ensure any license restrictions and conditions it imposes are "reasonably 5 6 within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure." Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (quotation 7 8 omitted). By insisting that purchasers of its modem chips take a license to and pay 9 royalties on exhausted patents in addition to paying a purchase price for the chips, Qualcomm is demanding more than the "one reward" that the Patent Act's "right to 10 11 exclude" entitles it to receive and, as a result, is impermissibly extending the temporal scope of its patent monopoly. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964) ("[W]e 12 13 conclude that a patentee's use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the 14 expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se."); Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2413 (2015) ("That patent (not antitrust) policy gave rise to the Court's 15 16 conclusion that post-patent royalty contracts are unenforceable — utterly 'regardless of 17 a demonstrable effect on competition.""). The result of this extension is that the offending license provisions are unenforceable. Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 18 1023 (9th Cir. 2007). 19

236. Qualcomm is similarly attempting improperly to extend its copyright monopoly. Virtually identical principles apply when purchasers of Qualcomm's modem chips (such as Counterclaimants) are forced to take a license (the MSA) for copyrights that may be substantially embodied in those chips. In doing so, Qualcomm is forcing its customers, including Counterclaimants, to pay for exhausted copyrights, and thereby take an unnecessary license for such copyrights. "Differentiating between the patent exhaustion and copyright first sale doctrines would … make little theoretical or practical sense: The two share a 'strong similarity … and identity of purpose"

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Lexmark, slip op. at 4 (quoting Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 13 (1913)). ""[P]ublic policy ... forbids the use of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the [Copyright] Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant." Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990) (bracketed language in original; citation omitted).

237. Qualcomm has gone to great lengths to prevent its practices from being challenged in the courts.

8 238. First, as alleged by Apple, through the BCPA, Qualcomm imposed a gag
9 order on Apple to prevent it from bringing a claim that Qualcomm's patents were
10 exhausted. Apple FAC ¶ 191. With the BCPA's expiration, Qualcomm has now
11 asserted a counterclaim alleging that Apple's obligation not to file an exhaustion suit
12 continued beyond the expiration date of the BCPA. Qualcomm also asserts that
13 Apple's exhaustion claim releases Qualcomm from any obligation to make past
14 payments it has already withheld under the BCPA due to Apple's provision of
15 information requested by competition agencies. Qualcomm's First Am. Countercl., ¶¶
16 378–379.

239. Second, as alleged by Apple, Qualcomm limited Apple's financial incentives to bring an exhaustion claim by requiring Apple to pay for exhausted patents, even if a court were to determine that no licensing fee is owed. Apple FAC ¶ 192.

240. Third, Qualcomm interprets a different agreement with Apple, the Master Software Agreement, as forbidding Apple from bringing an exhaustion count as well, claiming that Apple breached that agreement by asserting exhaustion claims in this Court and in actions outside of the United States. Qualcomm's First Am. Countercl., Count XI, ¶¶ 388–396.

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Qualcomm Demands Above-FRAND Royalties from Apple's CMs for Exhausted Patents

241. On May 17, 2017, in retaliation for Apple's lawsuit against Qualcomm, Qualcomm filed the instant lawsuit, suing Counterclaimants for royalty payments that Qualcomm claims are due under its license agreements **agreements** with them. And Qualcomm has now moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to force the CMs to pay royalties that Qualcomm claims they owe.

242. However, as Apple alleged, most of the licensing fees that Qualcomm has sued Counterclaimants to recover are royalty rebates Qualcomm has withheld from Apple as part of Qualcomm's scheme to thwart government enforcement worldwide of competition laws. Apple FAC ¶ 195. Qualcomm has expressly withheld these rebates from Apple because of Apple's responses to requests for information from government agencies enforcing competition laws. *Id.* Qualcomm is thus demanding that Counterclaimants pay those monies that would otherwise be rebated to Apple except for Qualcomm's obstruction of justice.

243. The licensing fees that Qualcomm has sued Counterclaimants to recover also include royalties that Apple has challenged as unlawful in litigation with Qualcomm as violations of Qualcomm's FRAND obligations and the antitrust laws.

244. According to Apple, it has made clear that while "Qualcomm's refusal to meet its FRAND commitments and its insistence on taxing [Apple's] innovation is both illegal and anticompetitive," Apple is "ready to pay a fair and reasonable amount for the use of Qualcomm's patented technologies." Apple FAC, Ex. Z. According to Apple, it informed Qualcomm, prior to Qualcomm's commencement of litigation against Counterclaimants, that it has posted a bank guarantee reflecting a FRAND royalty rate, and expressed a willingness to provide further guarantees for future years as needed. Apple FAC ¶ 198.

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245. Nevertheless, although the dispute over the royalties to which Qualcomm is entitled for the modem chips incorporated in Apple iPhones and iPads is a dispute between Apple and Qualcomm, and has been placed directly at issue by Apple's claims against Qualcomm, Qualcomm has retaliated against Apple and its CMs by suing Counterclaimants to recover, on an expedited basis, the same royalties that are at issue, and challenged as illegal, in Apple's claims against Qualcomm.

Apple Responds to Agency Requests

246. Government agencies investigating Qualcomm have sought information from third parties who do business with Qualcomm, including Apple. According to Apple, it has responded to requests for information from the FTC, the EC, the KFTC, and the TFTC about its contractual relationship with Qualcomm. Apple FAC ¶ 209.

247. Apple alleges that Qualcomm has had the opportunity to advocate on its own behalf in these investigations, by making submissions of its own and cross-examining witnesses. For example, Qualcomm representatives were present when Apple made its presentation to the KFTC, and those representatives (including Qualcomm's President) were given the opportunity to comment on Apple's testimony. Apple FAC ¶ 211.

248. The BCPA permits—as it must—Apple to respond to requests from governmental agencies on any topic and in any way it sees fit. Apple FAC ¶ 212. Apple contends that it has provided information and presentations only at the requests of the agencies and has not "induced" any agency or any other third party to take action against Qualcomm on the grounds that Qualcomm's licensing practices violated the FRAND promise or that Qualcomm's patents were exhausted. *Id*.

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Qualcomm Retaliates by Withholding Nearly \$1 Billion from Apple, While Demanding the Same from Apple's CMs

249. Apple alleges that, from 2013 through mid-2016, Apple received quarterly rebates from Qualcomm, including the rebates required under the BCPA, called BCP Payments. Apple FAC ¶ 214.

250. Qualcomm abruptly changed course for the second quarter 2016 BCP Payment. Apple FAC ¶ 215.

251. In September 2016, Qualcomm stopped making BCP Payments without warning. The BCP Payment for the second quarter of 2016 fully accrued on June 30, 2016, and was due on September 13, 2016. Apple submitted all the required documentation, and all other conditions in the normal reporting and payment periods were fulfilled. However, Apple did not receive the payment as scheduled. Apple FAC ¶ 216.

252. According to Apple, the date of Qualcomm's first refusal to pay the rebate it owed is not coincidental. Apple made a presentation to the KFTC, at the KFTC's request, on August 17, 2016, just a few weeks before Qualcomm refused to pay this BCP Payment. In other words, not even one month later, Qualcomm retaliated against Apple for its testimony. Apple FAC ¶ 218.

253. Qualcomm indicated to Apple it would withhold all future payments due to "legal issues" regarding Apple's interactions with the KFTC and other competition agencies. Qualcomm confirmed that it "will not make any further BCP Payments to Apple" after the first quarter of 2016. Apple FAC ¶ 220.

254. According to Apple, Qualcomm's pretextual excuses for withholding BCP Payments are unsupported in the BCPA or in fact. Apple FAC ¶ 221.

255. Apple's interactions with government agencies regarding Qualcomm inthe last three years, including the KFTC, have all been at the request of those agencies.The KFTC independently reached out to Apple for information about Qualcomm's

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business and licensing practices, well after the KFTC had initiated its investigation of Qualcomm. Apple FAC ¶ 224.

256. Apple's communications with government agencies regarding Qualcomm were related to and in furtherance of the agencies' investigations or administrative proceedings. Apple FAC \P 225.

257. Because Apple's actions fall squarely within the unconditional exception in the third paragraph of Section 7 of the BCPA for responses to government requests, Qualcomm has no basis to challenge those statements further. Apple FAC ¶ 226.

258. Apple alleges that, further, Qualcomm offered to pay Apple the nearly \$1

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10 billion it owed if Apple would, in Qualcomm's words:

(i) publicly and specifically retract and correct each of Apple's misstatements about Qualcomm to regulatory agencies, including those detailed above; (ii) inform the relevant agencies that such statements were and are untrue; (iii) disclose Apple's correspondence with any agencies relating to any investigation of Qualcomm;⁵ (iv) provide any and all additional facts to regulators and Qualcomm relating to Apple's dealings with Intel concerning any possible or actual consideration from Intel to Apple relating to Apple's implementation of WiMax or the use of Intel chips; and (v) provide Qualcomm with the requested information about any communications between Apple's senior executives and Samsung.

Apple FAC ¶ 232.

259. Qualcomm offered to repay Apple nearly \$1 billion in withheld BCP Payments if Apple recanted its true and, in many cases, sworn testimony before government agencies. Apple FAC ¶ 233.

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⁵ Notably, Qualcomm may be demanding this discovery in an attempt to make an endrun around a court order. On January 7, 2016, Qualcomm filed an ex parte application in the Northern District of California for third-party discovery from Apple and other companies that the KFTC had contacted in its investigation of Qualcomm. The KFTC opposed Qualcomm's request, arguing that this discovery would "discourage third parties from cooperating with the KFTC." The Court denied Qualcomm's request. *In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc.*, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2016).

260. Qualcomm's actions—interpreting BCPA Section 7, paragraph 2 to give it
 the power to restrict Apple's responses to government investigations, withholding
 payments that it owes Apple in retaliation for providing information to competition
 agencies, and offering to pay Apple the money Qualcomm owes only if Apple recants
 its testimony to government agencies—violate the express terms of the BCPA, and
 also violate public policy. Apple FAC ¶ 234.

261. Apple had a legal duty to comply with all subpoenas and civil investigative demands from the FTC. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 57b-1; 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.7, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12.

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262. Similarly, the International Competition Network, of which the FTC, the EC, and the TFTC are members, states in its Guidance on Investigative Process:

Cooperation and engagement from parties and third parties are key contributing factors to an agency's ability to pursue fair and effective investigations. The credibility of a competition agency and, more broadly, of the overall mission of competition enforcement are closely tied to the integrity of the agency's investigative process and public understanding of such process. . . . Engagement with third parties (e.g., competitors, customers, sector regulators, or other nonparties that agencies may contact during an investigation) also promotes more informed and robust enforcement. Agencies should provide interested third parties with the opportunity to submit views to the agency during an investigation, and where appropriate, the opportunity to meet or discuss their views with the agency.

20 Int'l Competition Network, *Guidance on Investigative Process* at 1, 5,

21 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1028.pdf.

22 263. Retaliation against cooperating third parties violates established public
23 policy. For example, responses to civil investigative demands, such as Apple's
24 responses to the FTC's requests, are generally required to remain confidential "to
25 safeguard the rights of individuals under investigation and to *protect witnesses from*26 *retaliation.*" *In re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig.*, 116
27 F.R.D. 390, 392 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (*quoting Illinois v. Abbott*, 460 U.S. 557 (1983))
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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (emphasis added); *see also A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC*, 18 F.3d 138, 144–46 (2d Cir. 1994) (voluntary disclosures within the FTC's subpoena power also treated as confidential under 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2). Qualcomm's demand that Apple disclose its communications with agencies, on pain of a nearly-billion-dollar penalty, violates this established public policy in favor of confidentiality and protecting against retaliation.

264. The same is true outside the United States. The KFTC has stated that it "relies heavily on third parties to gain information relevant to ongoing investigations and to detect anticompetitive activity in Korea," and like "many of its international counterparts, the KFTC often depends on the cooperation of third parties when investigating alleged antitrust violations." *Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm*, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1 at 1032.

265. Retaliation against cooperating third parties is forbidden in Korea. The Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act expressly states that an entity cannot retaliate against a third party for "[c]ooperating in investigations conducted by the Fair Trade Commission under Article 50." Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act art. 23-2. Article 23-3 of that Act prohibits entrepreneurs from discontinuing transactions, reducing quantities, or giving "any disadvantage" to another entrepreneur who has cooperated in investigations by the KFTC. *Id.* art. 23-3. Indeed, the KFTC is currently investigating Qualcomm's behavior in retaliating against Apple for its interactions with the agency, and may impose sanctions as a result.

266. Courts routinely invalidate contracts that restrain witnesses from engaging in government investigation. E.g., *Cariveau v. Halferty*, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 423–24 (Ct. App. 2000) (invalidating clause that prohibited customer from disclosing securities broker's misconduct); *D'Arrigo Bros. of Cal. v. United Farmworkers of Am.*, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 181 (Ct. App. 2014) (refusing to interpret settlement-agreement clause to prohibit union from cooperating with Agricultural Labor Relations Board investigation); *EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc.*, 94 F.3d 738, 745 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP that settlement agreements could not prohibit employees from assisting an EEOC investigation); *SEC v. Lipson*, No. 97 C 2661, 1997 WL 801712, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1997) (holding that an "effort to preclude voluntary cooperation by potential witnesses with the SEC is unenforceable as against public policy"); *see also Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co.*, 457 F.2d 850, 853–54 (10th Cir. 1972) ("It is public policy in Oklahoma and everywhere to encourage the disclosure of criminal activity.").

267. Despite these and other established public policies encouraging free exchange of information and prohibiting retaliation, Qualcomm has not paid Apple what it owes. As of the date of filing this Complaint, Qualcomm has failed to pay either the money that it owed for the second quarter of 2016, which was due in September 2016, or the BCP Payment for the third quarter of 2016, which fully accrued on September 30, 2016, and was due on December 14, 2016. Apple FAC ¶ 241.

268. Qualcomm also failed to make the final BCP Payment, for the fourth quarter of 2016; that BCP Payment fully accrued on December 31, 2016, and became due on March 16, 2017. Apple FAC ¶ 242.

269. In total, Qualcomm is withholding a substantial amount — nearly \$1 billion — that it owes Apple under the BCPA, in breach of its obligations and in retaliation for Apple's cooperation with competition authorities. Apple FAC ¶ 243.

270. This behavior is an egregious overreach and violation of the law, even against the backdrop of Qualcomm's extensive illegal business practice. It confirms that Qualcomm will go to great lengths to ensure that these practices are concealed from government regulators with the power to mandate changes and impose substantial fines.

271. Any alleged amount that Qualcomm contends it is owed by Apple's CMs must take into account the BCP Payments that it owes to Apple. These BCP Payments are intended to offset the royalty burden that Qualcomm imposes on Apple, through its

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CMs. Qualcomm is unjustifiably withholding the BCP Payments, in furtherance of its scheme to thwart government enforcement worldwide of competition laws.

272. It would be against public policy to allow Qualcomm to recover from Counterclaimants those monies that would otherwise be rebated to Apple except for Qualcomm's obstruction of justice.

XIII. QUALCOMM'S MONOPOLY AND MARKET POWER

273. The relevant technology markets at issue here are the markets for the technology embodied in Qualcomm's cellular SEPs. ETSI and other SSOs have promulgated standards for a number of wireless communication standards, including LTE. By declaring its patents to be essential to those standards, and inducing reliance on its FRAND commitments, Qualcomm acquired monopoly power in the market for the technologies on which each relevant SEP reads, and any ex ante alternatives to those technologies.

274. Before a standard is adopted, all of the alternative technologies to perform each particular function within the standard compete in a relevant product market consisting of all technologies capable of performing that function. Once an SSO selects a particular patented technology to perform a particular function, competition within that technology market is eliminated, as competing technologies are no longer available as alternative means of implementing the standard. As a result, standardization confers monopoly power on patented technologies embodied in the standard, including the relevant standards on which Qualcomm's declared-essential patents read.

275. Alternatives to Qualcomm's declared-essential patents were available in the LTE standard-setting process. Qualcomm's FRAND commitments induced ETSI and other SSOs to incorporate the technologies covered by Qualcomm's declaredessential patents in the LTE standard, thereby eliminating competition within the

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relevant technology markets and conferring monopoly and market power within those markets on Qualcomm.

276. Demand for the technology embodied in Qualcomm's cellular SEPs is distinct and independent from demand for Qualcomm's chips. For example, competitor modem chip manufacturers have sought patent licenses to Qualcomm's cellular SEPs that, if granted, would allow competitors to offer modem chips on an authorized, unencumbered, and patent-exhaustive basis.

277. Qualcomm also has monopoly and market power with respect to CDMA modem chips and premium LTE modem chips. Direct evidence of this power includes evidence of Qualcomm's ability to use threatened loss of access to modem chips to raise the all-in prices of modem chips, prices that include both nominal chip prices and license fees. Qualcomm's ability to impose burdensome terms, including the requirement that customers grant **Constitution** cross-licenses and accept ties of various unwanted licenses for intellectual property to the purchase of Qualcomm's modem chips, is further direct evidence of the existence and exercise of monopoly power.

16 278. Qualcomm's monopoly and market power is also established through circumstantial evidence, including dominant shares of relevant markets with 17 substantial barriers to entry. The relevant markets for the purposes of assessing 18 19 Qualcomm's monopoly and market power are no broader than the worldwide markets for (i) CDMA modem chips; and (ii) premium LTE modem chips. Modem chips 20 21 without CDMA functionality are not close enough substitutes to prevent Qualcomm from raising all-in prices for CDMA modem chips. No other product, including 3G 22 UMTS or LTE modem chips, is a substitute for CDMA modem chips for use in 23 devices intended for use on carrier networks that require CDMA compatibility, and no 24 25 other product constrains the all-in price of CDMA modem chips at levels below the monopoly price. Similarly, modem chips without premium LTE functionality are not 26 close enough substitutes to prevent Qualcomm from raising all-in prices for premium 27

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LTE modem chips. No other product, including 3G UMTS, CDMA, or low-end or mid-range LTE modem chips, is a substitute for premium LTE modem chips for use in 2 3 flagship devices, such as Apple's iPhone, intended for use on carrier networks that require LTE compatibility, and no other product constrains the all-in price of premium 4 5 LTE modem chips at levels below the monopoly price.

Qualcomm has maintained dominant shares of the CDMA and premium 279. LTE modem chip markets. Each year from at least 2006 through September 2015, Qualcomm's worldwide share of CDMA modem chip sales exceeded 80%. From at least 2012 through September 2015, Qualcomm's annual share of worldwide premium LTE modem chip sales has also exceeded 80%.

11 Entry into the markets for CDMA and premium LTE modem chips is 280. difficult, costly, and time-consuming. Barriers to entry include the need to make substantial, costly, and time-consuming investments in technology research and development; the need to develop ongoing customer relationships with leading OEMs and CMs; and certification requirements imposed by network operators. Qualcomm's conduct-including (i) the effective surcharge that Qualcomm imposes on the modem chip sales of competitors and potential competitors, (ii) Qualcomm's exclusive dealing agreements and (iii) Qualcomm's refusal to license to its competitors FRANDencumbered patents essential to CDMA and LTE standards-is another significant barrier to entry.

281. The relevant geographic market is worldwide. There are no material geographic barriers to competition for modem chip sales.

XIV. HARM TO COMPETITION AND COUNTERCLAIMANTS CAUSED BY **QUALCOMM'S PRACTICES**

Qualcomm's anticompetitive practices have excluded competitors, 282. increased prices for CMs, OEMs, and their customers, including U.S. consumers, restricted output, and suppressed innovation.

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283. Qualcomm's anticompetitive conduct has relaxed the constraints that competitors' entry and expansion would otherwise impose on all-in prices in modem chip markets.

284. Through its "no license-no chips" policy, Qualcomm has increased CMs', including Counterclaimants', and OEMs' all-in costs of using competitors' modem chips. Qualcomm's conduct has also diminished demand for those chips, reduced competitors' sales and margins, and diminished competitors' ability and incentive to invest and innovate.

285. Developments in the cellular modem chip industry reflect the natural consequences of Qualcomm's conduct. Several former competitors of Qualcomm have sold off or shuttered their modem chip businesses, unable to achieve the sales volumes and margins needed to sustain a viable business. While Intel and MediaTek have remained in the business, these firms have felt significant pressures, including on modem chip margins.

286. If Qualcomm's remaining competitors were to exit the business as a result of Qualcomm's anticompetitive conduct, this would have a significant further adverse impact on competition in modem chip markets and on innovation.

287. Competition often drives firms to innovate in next-generation technologies and products. Competing firms often approach research and development efforts differently, increasing the likelihood of successful innovation.

288. Enhanced innovation in mobile technologies would offer substantial benefits to OEMs and CMs, including Counterclaimants, along with their customers, especially as these technologies expand to new applications, including extending mobile connectivity to consumer appliances, vehicles, buildings, and other products. By suppressing innovation, Qualcomm's anticompetitive practices threaten these benefits.

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289. Qualcomm's anticompetitive conduct, however, skews its licensing negotiations toward outcomes that reflect not only the value of its patents and copyrights, but also its monopoly power in modem chips. Absent Qualcomm's unlawful conduct, Qualcomm would not seek royalties for expired, exhausted, unwanted, or unneeded intellectual property, and Qualcomm's licenses would include fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, and would not include elevated royalties that impose a surcharge on Qualcomm's competitors. Absent Qualcomm's unlawful conduct, Qualcomm could obtain fair compensation for its valid intellectual property, while its competitors could compete based on the merits of their respective offerings.

290. Qualcomm's practices have harmed competition and customers (like Counterclaimants) both within the markets for CDMA and premium LTE modem chips and in other modem chip markets in which OEMs pay Qualcomm inflated royalties. These include markets for UMTS-compliant modem chips and lower-tier LTE modem chips.

291. Qualcomm's practices are not reasonably necessary to accomplish any significant procompetitive benefits. The anticompetitive harm from those practices outweighs any procompetitive benefits, and Qualcomm could reasonably achieve any procompetitive goals through less restrictive alternatives.

CLAIMS AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Sherman Act § 2

292. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above and in the counts below.

293. Qualcomm's conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes unlawful monopolization of the markets for CDMA and premium LTE modem chips in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

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294. One relevant product market for the purposes of Counterclaimants' monopolization claim is the sale of premium LTE modem chips.

295. Another relevant product market for the purposes of Counterclaimants' monopolization claim is the sale of CDMA modem chips.

296. The relevant geographic market is worldwide in each case.

297. As alleged above, Qualcomm's monopoly power in the relevant markets is shown by its high and durable market shares, substantial barriers to entry, and demonstrated ability to repeatedly force customers, such as CMs, including Counterclaimants and their economically unified affiliates, and OEMs, such as Apple, to accept one-sided, non-standard, and unreasonable supply terms. Moreover, when faced with allegations that Qualcomm has monopoly power in these markets, Qualcomm has not disputed them.6

298. As alleged above and in further detail below, Qualcomm has willfully acquired or maintained its monopoly power in the relevant markets by engaging in exclusionary and anticompetitive acts. Qualcomm has been engaged in a continuing violation of the law; each time it has used its monopoly power to commit an overt exclusionary act it has inflicted new and accumulating injury on Counterclaimants and others. Since at least as early as 2007, Qualcomm has engaged in systematic, continuous conduct to exclude competition in the relevant markets. Qualcomm's anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct is a multi-faceted but synergistic and interrelated whole, with each of the parts making possible and reinforcing the effects of the others.

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⁶ Def. Qualcomm Incorporated's Administrative Mot. To File Under Seal Portions Of Its Mot. To Dismiss And Mem. Of P. & A. In Supp., *FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.*, No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017); *FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.*, No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, slip op. at 19 ("Qualcomm does not contest that FTC has adequately alleged that Qualcomm has 'monopoly power' in the markets for CDMA and premium-LTE modem chips.").

Qualcomm's exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct includes (i) 1 299. 2 withholding its modem chips unless a customer, including each Counterclaimant or its 3 economically unified affiliate, accepts a license to standard-essential patents and other intellectual property on terms demanded by Qualcomm, including outrageous and 4 5 excessive royalties that the customer must pay even when using competitors' chips, in 6 contravention of its FRAND commitments; (ii) refusing to license its cellular standardessential patents to its competitors, foreclosing them from effectively competing for 7 8 sales to Counterclaimants and other Qualcomm customers, in violation of Qualcomm's 9 FRAND commitments; (iii) coercing exclusivity from Apple as a condition of partial relief from Qualcomm's exorbitant and non-FRAND royalties and contractually 10 "gagging" customers, depriving them of any ability to challenge Qualcomm's non-11 FRAND licensing scheme; (iv) using litigation as a tool to effectuate the 12 independently-anticompetitive aspects of its scheme by suing for payment of the 13 challenged supracompetitive above-FRAND royalties; (v) in its agreements with 14 OEMs and/or CMs, utilizing

; and (vi) engaging in the

exclusionary and anticompetitive acts and practices set forth in Count II below, each act also violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Qualcomm's licensing practices and its modem chip practices are inextricably intertwined with each other (e.g., absent its "no license, no chips" policy, Qualcomm could not sustain its refusal to license competitors), and all of these practices are central components of Qualcomm's overall monopolistic and anticompetitive scheme. This conduct has foreclosed Qualcomm's competitors from dealing with Counterclaimants and with Apple, and other OEMs and CMs, leading to the marginalization and exit of many of those competitors, and to the acquisition and maintenance by Qualcomm of monopoly power and its imposition and perpetuation of supracompetitive royalties and pricing.

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300. First, for many years, Qualcomm has tied together the sale of its modem 1 chips and licenses to its SEPs. Qualcomm will sell modem chips only to "Authorized 2 3 Purchasers," who must first license a broad portfolio of patent rights, including Qualcomm's SEPs. Since 2010, Qualcomm has also required purchasers of modem 4 chips to take a license to copyrighted software under an MSA. Under Qualcomm's 5 6 licensing structure, Counterclaimants, their economically unified affiliates, and others were required to enter into contracts with Qualcomm conditioning sales of modem 7 8 chips on the license of Qualcomm's patent portfolio, and were also required to enter 9 into contracts licensing specified copyrighted software used in connection with the modem chips. Due to Qualcomm's refusal to license rival chipset manufacturers, 10 11 device manufacturers purchasing modem chips from Qualcomm's competitors must also become Authorized Purchasers of Qualcomm, even if they may purchase few or 12 13 no modem chips from Qualcomm, and similarly must take a license to Qualcomm's patent rights, including its SEPs, and its copyrighted software. In essence, Qualcomm 14 has structured its licensing such that it makes licenses available to only those who 15 purchase its modem chips, and modem chips available to only those who have licensed 16 from it. In this manner, Qualcomm ensures that all modem chip purchasers, whether 17 18 they buy modem chips from Qualcomm or a competitor, must negotiate with 19 Qualcomm for a license.

301. By virtue of its "no license-no chips" policy, and the other exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct alleged herein, Qualcomm gains the ability to levy a surcharge—in the form of non-FRAND royalties—on the modem chips sold by Qualcomm's competitors. Qualcomm also imposes substantial lump-sum payment obligations for its licenses. Qualcomm's ability in particular to levy a surcharge on the modem chips sold by its competitors forecloses demand for those chips and makes them less effective competitors. In this way, Qualcomm's conduct is exclusionary and anticompetitive, giving Qualcomm the power to exclude competition and harm device

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manufacturers, including Counterclaimants and their economically unified affiliates, through the imposition and maintenance of non-FRAND royalties and monopoly overcharges on modem chips, including by forcing Counterclaimants, their affiliates, and others to accept other burdensome terms, such as **and the set of the s**

302. Qualcomm's high nominal royalty rates for its SEPs give some OEMs powerful incentives to seek discounts off those rates, particularly manufacturers of feature-rich smartphones and tablets, such as Apple, who are disproportionately burdened by Qualcomm's royalty structure. Qualcomm uses the threat of its high nominal royalty rates for its SEPs to force Apple and others to demand substantial quantities of its modem chips, offering in exchange to reduce the royalty for its SEPs to levels closer to, although still far above, the range required by FRAND. Such relief, however, was withheld from Counterclaimants and their affiliates, Qualcomm's direct purchasers, in order to perpetuate the illusion that Qualcomm charges the same royalty rate to all customers.

303. Qualcomm ties licenses to its SEPs and software copyrights to purchases
of modem chips, despite the requests of device manufacturers for the provision of
these products on an unbundled basis. Given the opportunity, Counterclaimants, their
affiliates, and many other CMs and OEMs, including Apple, would prefer to be free
both to license Qualcomm's SEPs at FRAND rates and to purchase modem chips from
Qualcomm's competitors, rather than be forced to purchase from Qualcomm a bundle
comprising a license to Qualcomm's SEPs, copyrights, and substantial quantities of
modem chips.

304. Qualcomm's tie of licenses and modem chips forecloses substantial portions of the modem chip market to Qualcomm's competitors, particularly the sale of premium LTE modem chips for use in the feature-rich smartphones and tablets disproportionately burdened by Qualcomm's royalty structure. Due to the importance

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of scale economies in the manufacture and sale of modem chips, and the significant commercial validation and learning-by-doing that would be available to rivals but for Qualcomm's foreclosure of sales to Counterclaimants, the foreclosure attributable to Qualcomm's tie of modem chips and licenses is substantial and significantly contributes to the creation and maintenance of Qualcomm's monopoly power.

305. There is no procompetitive justification for the "no license-no chips" policy. Other suppliers convey intellectual property rights in the sale of the products embodying that intellectual property, as does Qualcomm in markets where it lacks monopoly power.

10 306. Second, Qualcomm's refusal to offer SEP licenses on FRAND terms to its 11 competitors, as alleged above, is an unlawful refusal to deal with competitors and an act of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Qualcomm 12 13 Inc., slip op. at 43 ("Qualcomm's voluntary commitment to license its SEPs on 14 FRAND terms pursuant to the standard setting process, are the type of voluntary actions that can support an antitrust duty to deal."). A FRAND license would give 15 16 competing modem chips manufacturers the right to market authorized, unencumbered, 17 patent-exhaustive sales of modem chips to Apple, its CMs, and other mobile device suppliers. Qualcomm's failure to license on FRAND terms eliminates the ability of 18 19 Counterclaimants, their affiliates, and other mobile device suppliers to purchase modem chips from Qualcomm's competitors without also paying royalties to 20 21 Qualcomm, and thus exposes Counterclaimants, their affiliates, and other mobile 22 device suppliers to the threat of exorbitant non-FRAND royalties, based on the price of their mobile devices, a threat which Qualcomm uses to force Apple (and, therefore, 23 Counterclaimants and their affiliates) and others to deal exclusively or nearly 24 25 exclusively with Qualcomm on the purchase of modem chips. In this way, Qualcomm's refusal to offer a FRAND license to competitors has a close causal 26 connection with the acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power in the LTE 27

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chipset market. But for Qualcomm's FRAND evasion, Qualcomm would have been forced to offer exhaustive patent licenses to its cellular SEPs on FRAND terms to Intel, 2 3 Broadcom, and others. An exhaustive patent license to Qualcomm's cellular SEPs would have made these modem chips suppliers more effective competitors to 4 Qualcomm in the modem chips markets, leading to lower prices and enhanced 5 6 innovation in the modem chips markets, to the benefit of Counterclaimants, their affiliates, Apple, other OEMs, and ultimately consumers. 7

8 307. There is no legitimate business justification for Qualcomm's strategic 9 refusal to license other modem chips manufacturers. Qualcomm for many years 10 licensed such manufacturers. Qualcomm, as alleged above, also engaged in a voluntary course of dealing with its rivals by participating in the standard-setting process and committing to SSOs that it would license its SEPs to its modem chip competitors, but then altered this voluntary course of dealing by refusing to license its modem chip rivals once its IP was incorporated into cellular communications standards. This refusal is motivated by anticompetitive malice and amounts to a willingness to sacrifice short-term profits (licensing of competitors at profitable FRAND rates) in a manner that is irrational but for its tendency to harm competition. Qualcomm itself insists that device manufacturers do precisely what Qualcomm refuses to do: grant licenses to their SEPs to Qualcomm's modem chips unit. Further, given the relative paucity of modem chips competitors and the fact that Qualcomm's cellular SEPs are generally embodied in the modem chip (or components thereof), it would be considerably more efficient for licensing to occur first and foremost at the modem chip level.

308. Third, since 2011, Qualcomm has conditioned billions of dollars in lump sum payments, discounts, rebates, and royalty rebates and caps on the express agreement by Apple (imposed in turn on Counterclaimants and their affiliates) to purchase modem chips for Apple smartphones and tablet computers exclusively from

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Qualcomm, through the TA and the FATA. It has done so in a variety of ways, including (i) specific forward-looking loyalty rebates on modem chip prices that are expressly conditioned on exclusivity; (ii) clawback of previously paid rebates if Apple uses any non-Qualcomm modem chips; and (iii) a royalty cap implicitly conditioned on chip exclusivity.

6 309. Until recently, these payments have precluded Apple, and Counterclaimants and their affiliates, from cost-effectively shifting even a portion of 7 8 Apple's modem chip needs from Qualcomm to Qualcomm's competitors, because 9 shifting even a small portion of Apple's needs to a competitor would result in lost price and royalty concessions on all purchases from Qualcomm (including in many cases 10 11 price concessions on past purchases), including on many products and product lines that Qualcomm's competitors could not supply at all (i.e., CDMA modem chips) or in 12 sufficient quantities to meet all of Apple's needs (e.g., premium LTE modem chips). 13 14 Although Apple, Counterclaimants and their affiliates have for many years been ready and able to switch a smaller portion of modem chip purchases (e.g., for non-CDMA 15 iPads) to Qualcomm's rivals, Qualcomm's imposition of exclusivity has prevented 16 17 switching suppliers on a less than full-line basis, even with non-Qualcomm modem chips priced substantially lower than comparable Qualcomm modem chips. 18

310. But for these exclusivity conditions, to which Apple was forced to agree to avoid absorbing royalty rates on all purchases of modem chips practicing Qualcomm's SEPs that were well above FRAND levels, Apple, Counterclaimants and their affiliates would have shifted at least a portion of modem chip purchases to Qualcomm's rivals, thereby making those rivals more effective competitors to Qualcomm in the future, and providing to Counterclaimants, their affiliates, and Apple the benefit of a more competitive modem chip market.

311. However, until recently, these penalties have made it economically infeasible to purchase any modem chips from Qualcomm's competitors. It is not

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feasible to switch a substantial portion of Apple's requirements to a new supplier all at once, or even over a short period of time, and therefore Qualcomm's rivals could not compete on the all-or-nothing terms imposed by Qualcomm.

312. As a result, from fall 2011 through spring 2016, all of Apple's new cellular devices used Qualcomm modem chips exclusively. Apple used only Qualcomm modem chips in the iPhone 4s, iPhone 5, iPhone 5s, iPhone 5c, iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus, iPhone 6s, iPhone 6s Plus, and iPhone SE and in cellular-enabled models of the iPad third generation, iPad fourth generation, iPad Air, iPad Air 2, iPad Minis, and iPad Pros. Each Counterclaimant manufactured one or more of these Apple devices.

313. The anticompetitive effects of Qualcomm's conduct include the elevation of CDMA and premium LTE modem chip all-in prices above competitive levels, the imposition on Counterclaimants and their affiliates of onerous, unreasonable, and costly supply terms, the suppression of innovation in the modem chip markets, and the elimination of choice in the modem chip markets.

314. Similar to the TA and FATA, the BCPA conditioned a degree of royalty relief, offsetting the royalty burden that Qualcomm directly imposes on Apple's CMs and that the CMs seek to pass on to Apple, on Apple's acceptance of anticompetitive contract terms that cement Qualcomm's monopoly power in modem chips. Paragraph 2 of Section 7 of the BCPA between Qualcomm and Apple violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act by shielding Qualcomm's non-FRAND licensing scheme from scrutiny by the judiciary and by government enforcement agencies. The BCPA's gag clause prevented Qualcomm's illegal and extortionate scheme from coming to light for years, and thereby enhanced and extended Qualcomm's monopoly power in the relevant modem chips markets.

315. FRAND challenges by implementers of a standard such as Apple are vital to the enforcement of the FRAND commitment. Just as implementers are normally in

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the best position to determine whether or not an intellectual property right is invalid,
 implementers are often well-positioned to know whether a licensor's terms are
 compliant with FRAND. Apple's prolific track record as a willing licensee of cellular
 SEPs from other patentees gives it insight into what FRAND is and how far
 Qualcomm's terms depart from FRAND, and positioned it well to challenge
 Qualcomm's FRAND evasion.

316. Similarly, implementers, such as Apple, generally have the greatest economic incentive to challenge the terms of Qualcomm's SEP licensing. A successful FRAND challenge by Apple would result directly in more competitive modem chips markets, and lower SEP royalties and modem chip prices, to the benefit of Apple, its CMs and consumers. As a large and strategic indirect purchaser of modem chips, Apple had particularly strong incentives in this regard. No other device manufacturer likely would have benefitted as much as Apple from the introduction of additional competition in the modem chips market, and, for these reasons, muzzling Apple through Section 7, paragraph 2 of the BCPA contributed significantly to the maintenance of Qualcomm's non-FRAND licensing and the monopoly power it made possible.

317. By exposing Apple to billions of dollars in additional royalty payments during the term of a FRAND challenge, Section 7, paragraph 2 of the BCPA reduced Apple's ability and incentive to enforce Qualcomm's FRAND commitments.

318. By limiting Apple's ability and incentive to challenge Qualcomm's compliance with FRAND, Section 7, paragraph 2 of the BCPA harmed competition and consumers. Specifically, Section 7, paragraph 2 allowed Qualcomm to continue to charge Counterclaimants and their affiliates non-FRAND royalties at the expense of consumers, and to extend its exclusionary and non-FRAND licensing scheme.

319. Section 7, paragraph 2 is outside the scope of Qualcomm's patent rights. The restriction of Apple's freedom to challenge Qualcomm's compliance with

167 DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL FRAND is not an incident of Qualcomm's patent rights. See Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1970) ("From all this we can only conclude that the right to estop licensees from challenging a patent is not part of the 'limited protection' afforded by the patent monopoly.").

320. Competition agencies around the world have found similar restraints to be anticompetitive. For example, the European Commission found it anticompetitive that an SEP owner insisted, under the threat of the enforcement of an injunction, that Apple give up its rights to challenge the validity or infringement by Apple's mobile devices of those SEPs. Similarly, the NDRC in 2015 fined Qualcomm nearly \$1 billion for anticompetitive conduct that included the imposition of contract terms on device manufacturers that penalized, but did not expressly prevent, them from challenging Qualcomm's SEP licensing. The FTC recently alleged that Qualcomm's anticompetitive business model was premised on just such a practice of coercing customers into abandoning FRAND determinations by the courts or neutral third parties, and filed suit to permanently enjoin the scheme.

16 321. Additionally, as a component of its unlawful scheme, Qualcomm has initiated legal proceedings, including against Counterclaimants, in order to improperly 17 use the judiciary's enforcement power to compel payment of its supracompetitive 18 19 above-FRAND royalties. These legal proceedings include the following: On May 17, 20 2017, Qualcomm filed a lawsuit against Counterclaimants, alleging that each breached its SULA by failing to remit to Qualcomm certain royalty payments that are being challenged as illegal by the FTC, enforcement agencies around the world, 22 Counterclaimants and Apple, among others. Qualcomm seeks preliminary and 23 permanent injunctive relief that would force Counterclaimants to resume payment. 24 25 Qualcomm seeks to use litigation as a tool to effectuate its scheme by compelling payment of the challenged supracompetitive above-FRAND royalties. 26

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Qualcomm's litigation conduct is "causally connected" to the independent 1 322. 2 anticompetitive harm caused by Qualcomm's "No License-No Chips" policy and its 3 other exclusionary conduct. Microsoft Mobile Inc. v. Interdigital, Inc., No. 15-723-RGA, 2016 WL 1464545 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016). Qualcomm's efforts to extract 4 supracompetitive above-FRAND royalties from resistant customers would be 5 ineffective without the threat of litigation. Qualcomm's litigation conduct therefore 6 7 gives rise to an independent but related antitrust injury on the part of Counterclaimants 8 and others in that it imposes litigation fees and costs necessary to defend against the 9 payment of supracompetitive licensing terms, induces Counterclaimants and OEMs, 10 such as Apple, to license Qualcomm's technology and purchase Qualcomm's modem 11 chips, prevents Counterclaimants and OEMs from obtaining access to alternative modem chip technology, and underlines the substantial threat that Counterclaimants 12 13 and others will be forced to capitulate to Qualcomm's business demands, including its 14 extortionary royalty rates, to avoid litigation.

323. Qualcomm's conduct is not immunized by the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. "[O]therwise protected litigation can be a part of an 'anticompetitive scheme' claim" where, as here, "the other aspects of the scheme independently produce anticompetitive harms." *Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc.*, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2007); *see also Zenith Electronics, LLC v. Sceptre, Inc.*, No. 14-cv-5150, 2015 WL 12765633 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015). As previously alleged, the lawsuits brought by Qualcomm to enforce its licensing agreements are components of its larger monopolistic scheme.

324. Qualcomm's exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct has caused each Counterclaimant to suffer antitrust injury and damages, including the payment of supracompetitive overcharges and surcharges, and the loss of profits.

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COUNT II

Sherman Act § 1

325. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above and in the counts above and below.

326. Qualcomm's agreements, as alleged herein, constitute unlawful restraints of trade in the relevant markets for CDMA and premium LTE modem chips in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The contracts, combinations, or agreements necessary to support an antitrust action under Section 1 can be found when a single actor successfully coerces unwilling participants to enter into or adhere to agreements that have anticompetitive effects. As alleged above, Qualcomm entered into and engaged in coercive contracts, combinations, or agreements in restraint of trade with multiple parties (including Counterclaimants, their affiliates, Apple and other OEMs) who were forced to accept anticompetitive and exclusionary terms as a result of Qualcomm's monopoly power. Qualcomm has not contested that the Federal Trade Commission similarly "adequately alleged a 'contract, conspiracy, or combination' sufficient for its §1 theories." *FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.*, slip op. at 19, n.2.

327. Such contracts, combinations, or agreements constitute unreasonable and unlawful restraints of trade in the relevant modem chip markets alleged herein, in which Qualcomm possesses monopoly power, and such restraints lack any countervailing procompetitive justification. As alleged above and below, Qualcomm engages in a scheme of coercing others into illegal agreements in restraint of trade which caused injury to competition and harm to Counterclaimants and their affiliates.

328. For many years, Qualcomm has tied together the sale of its modem chips and licenses to its SEPs. Qualcomm will sell modem chips only to "Authorized Purchasers," who must first license a broad portfolio of patent rights, including Qualcomm's SEPs. Since 2010, Qualcomm has also required purchasers of modem chips to take a license to copyrighted software under an MSA. Under Qualcomm's

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licensing structure, Counterclaimants, their affiliates, and others were forced to enter 1 into contracts with Qualcomm conditioning sales of modem chips on the license of 2 3 Qualcomm's patent portfolio, and were also required to enter into contracts licensing specified copyrighted software used in connection with the modem chips. In essence, 4 Qualcomm has structured its licensing such that it makes licenses available to only 5 6 those who purchase its modem chips, and modem chips available to only those who have licensed from it. In this manner, Qualcomm ensures that all modem chip 7 purchasers, whether they buy modem chips from Qualcomm or a competitor, must 8 9 negotiate with Qualcomm for a license.

329. Qualcomm ties licenses to its SEPs and software copyrights to purchases of modem chips despite the requests of device manufacturers for the provision of these products on an unbundled basis. Given the opportunity, Counterclaimants, their affiliates, and many other CMs and OEMs, including Apple, would prefer to have the opportunity both to license Qualcomm's SEPs at FRAND rates, and to purchase modem chips from Qualcomm's competitors, rather than be forced to purchase from Qualcomm a bundle comprising a license to Qualcomm's SEPs, copyrights, and substantial quantities of modem chips.

330. As described above, Qualcomm possesses sufficient economic power in the relevant modem chip markets to force purchasers to make separate purchases of tied IP rights. Absent this unlawful tie, purchasers would choose to acquire IP rights elsewhere or on different terms, (e.g., from rivals of Qualcomm who market and sell or who in the but-for world would be able to market and sell authorized, unencumbered, patent-exhausted modem chips). Qualcomm's tying conduct has involved the imposition of billions of dollars of above-FRAND royalties for the tied IP rights and has foreclosed competition.

331. There is no procompetitive justification for the "no license-no chips" policy. Other suppliers convey intellectual property rights in the sale of the products

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embodying that intellectual property, as does Qualcomm in markets where it lacks monopoly power.

332. Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy (i.e., its conditioning of the supply of modem chips on the coerced purchase of one or more separate IP rights) is, both alone and as intertwined with the restraints alleged above and below, unlawful under Section 1.

333. These and other restraints of trade, including the following, are also unlawful under Section 1: (i) coerced agreements between Qualcomm and Counterclaimants and their affiliates incorporating anticompetitive terms such as (but not limited to) tying and bundling arrangements (tying the right to buy modem chips to one or more of the following: SEP licenses, copyright licenses, and licenses for expired or exhausted patents and/or copyrights; and tying or bundling together SEP licenses, non-SEP licenses, copyright licenses for expired or exhausted patents and/or copyrights), express or implied exclusivity terms, requirements to grant

cross-licenses to Qualcomm and

above-FRAND

royalty terms imposing royalties (including monopoly surcharges) on the sale of devices regardless of whether the device contains a Qualcomm modem chip, audit terms facilitating after-the-fact efforts to threaten or impose further excessive and non-FRAND royalty terms (such as

and terms (such as confidentiality provisions) shielding Qualcomm's non-FRAND licensing scheme from scrutiny by the judiciary and by government enforcement agencies; (ii) coerced agreements between Qualcomm and OEMs, such as Apple, incorporating anticompetitive terms such as (but not limited to) express or implied exclusivity terms, terms facilitating the imposition and collection of above-FRAND royalties (including

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monopoly surcharges) on the sale of devices regardless of whether the device contains 1 2 a Qualcomm modem chip, and terms (such as gag provisions) shielding Qualcomm's 3 non-FRAND licensing scheme from scrutiny by the judiciary and by government enforcement agencies; and (iii) coerced agreements between Qualcomm and other 4 5 CMs and OEMs incorporating anticompetitive terms, such as (but not limited to) tying and bundling arrangements, express or implied exclusivity terms, requirements to grant cross-licenses to Qualcomm on non-compensatory terms and other IP and commercial restrictions, above-FRAND royalty terms imposing royalties (including monopoly surcharges) on the sale of devices regardless of whether the device contains a Qualcomm modem chip, audit terms facilitating after-the-fact efforts to threaten or impose further excessive and non-FRAND royalty terms, and terms (such as confidentiality provisions) shielding Qualcomm's non-FRAND licensing scheme from scrutiny by the judiciary and by government enforcement agencies.

334. Qualcomm's anticompetitive restraints of trade have caused each Counterclaimant and its economically unified affiliates to suffer antitrust injury and damages, including the payment of supracompetitive overcharges and surcharges, and the loss of sales and profits.

COUNT III

Cartwright Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq.)

335. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

336. California is the world's sixth largest economy and the home of Silicon Valley. California companies (like Apple and Intel) have transformed the world through their inventions and created hundreds of thousands of jobs both on their own and through the companies that have grown as a result of the products that they have developed. California has a strong interest in insuring the continued development of its economy by protecting against unfair and unlawful business emanating from

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL California and conducted by companies with their principal places of business in California. Qualcomm's anticompetitive conduct occurred in California, and the connection between such conduct and California is not merely "slight and casual" or *de minimis*.

Qualcomm is a citizen of California, with its principal place of business in 5 337. San Diego, California, subject to general jurisdiction in all courts located within the State of California. California was the nexus of Qualcomm's unlawful and anticompetitive business practices alleged in these counterclaims. Qualcomm devised its anticompetitive business decisions in California and extracted unlawful profits in California. Each SULA with each Counterclaimant was made and entered into in the State of California. Qualcomm's largest indirect customer for its modem chips-Apple—is headquartered in California. Qualcomm's largest remaining competitor in the modem chip manufacturing business-Intel-is headquartered in California. Qualcomm's chips were contained in, and Qualcomm's intellectual property was embodied in, millions of cellular devices that were sold in California, including large numbers manufactured by Counterclaimants, which California sales were foreseen by Qualcomm. Qualcomm's unreasonable licensing demands of Apple alleged above were made during in-person meetings at Qualcomm's offices in San Diego, California.

338. The State of California has a clear, substantial, legitimate, and compelling interest in protecting competition in California and entertaining claims by all victims of Qualcomm's unlawful and anticompetitive conduct that emanated from within California's borders.

339. Qualcomm's agreements, as alleged above, constitute unlawful "trusts" ("combination[s] of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons" for anticompetitive purposes) under the California Cartwright Act. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 *et seq.* The Cartwright Act applies to the anticompetitive, trade-restraining conduct of a single firm when that firm by coercive conduct, imposes restraints to which customers or

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others involuntarily adhere. If a "single trader" pressures customers into 1 2 anticompetitive contract terms, including exclusive dealing arrangements or illegal tie-3 ins, an unlawful combination is established within the meaning of the Cartwright Act, irrespective of any monopoly or conspiracy. Stated differently, a "combination" 4 within the meaning of the Cartwright Act is formed where a trader uses coercive 5 6 tactics to impose restraints on uncooperative businesses. As alleged above, Qualcomm entered into and engaged in trusts or combinations in restraint of trade by coercing 7 8 multiple parties (including Counterclaimants, their affiliates, Apple, and other OEMs). 9 Id. § 16720 et seq. Such trusts or combinations constitute unreasonable and unlawful restraints of trade in the relevant modem chip markets alleged herein, in which Qualcomm possesses monopoly power, and lack any countervailing procompetitive justifications. These trusts or combinations are unlawful under the Cartwright Act.

340. Qualcomm's conduct also violates Business and Professions Code § 16727, which makes it unlawful for "any person to lease or make a sale or contract for the sale of ... commodities ... or to fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, merchandise, machinery, supplies, commodities, or services of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect ... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of trade or commerce in any section of the State."

341. The trusts or combinations alleged herein are unlawful, against public policy and void. *Id.* § 16726. Further, the coerced anticompetitive contracts and agreements alleged above are absolutely void and not enforceable at law or in equity. *Id.* § 16722.

342. Counterclaimants are "persons" within the meaning of the Cartwright Act as defined in California Business and Professions Code § 16702.

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 343. Qualcomm's violations are continuing and will continue unless enjoined by the Court.

344. Qualcomm's violations of the Cartwright Act have caused each Counterclaimant to suffer antitrust injury and damages, including the payment of supracompetitive overcharges and surcharges, and the loss of sales and profits.

COUNT IV

Violations of the California Unfair Competition Law

345. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

346. By the acts alleged, Qualcomm's conduct constitutes a violation of California Business & Professional Code § 17200, *et seq*. (the "Unfair Competition Law" or "UCL"), which prohibits "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent" business acts and practices.

347. Qualcomm has engaged in multiple unlawful business acts or practices as alleged above and herein. Qualcomm's conduct violates, *inter alia*, the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Cartwright Act. As such, Qualcomm's acts also constitute unlawful conduct under the UCL.

348. Qualcomm's act and practices as alleged above and herein are also unfair.

349. Qualcomm's unlawful and unfair business acts and practices significantly threaten and harm competition in the relevant markets alleged above and in the markets for mobile wireless handsets, tablets, cellular-enabled computers, and other CDMA- and LTE-compliant products, in California and elsewhere.

350. Counterclaimants seek, and are entitled to, all forms of relief available under California's Unfair Competition Law. Pursuant to § 17203, Counterclaimants seek from Qualcomm restitution and disgorgement of all earnings, profits, compensation, benefits, and other ill-gotten gains obtained by Qualcomm as a result of its conduct in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq*.

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 351. Pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204, Counterclaimants also seek
 an order enjoining Qualcomm from continuing to engage in the acts as set forth in
 these counterclaims. Counterclaimants, and the public, will be irreparably harmed if
 such an order is not granted.

COUNT V

Breach of Contract (FRAND Commitments)

352. Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

353. Qualcomm entered into express or implied contractual commitments with at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS relating to the cellular standards for, *inter alia*, 2G-CDMA, 3G, and 4G/LTE cellular technologies.

354. As part of its contractual commitment, Qualcomm pledged to offer
irrevocable licenses for any of Qualcomm's alleged SEPs, including at least U.S.
Patent Nos. 7,246,242; 6,556,549; 9,137,822; 7,289,630; 8,867,494; 7,095,725;
6,694,469; 9,059,819; 7,096,021; 7,061,890; 8,000,717; 8,614,975; 8,761,068;
8,861,424; 8,873,471; 8,989,140; 9,007,974; and 9,144,071 on FRAND terms to any
third-party planning to practice the standard.

355. Every third party that would potentially implement 2G-CDMA, 3G, and 4G/LTE cellular technologies was an intended third-party beneficiary of those contracts.

356. Counterclaimants are third parties that implement 2G-CDMA, 3G, and 4G/LTE cellular technologies in products that they manufacture.

357. Counterclaimants are therefore third-party beneficiaries to the contractual commitments that Qualcomm made with at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS.

358. Qualcomm had a contractual obligation to offer irrevocable licenses on FRAND terms for its SEPs to Counterclaimants.

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Qualcomm breached that commitment by failing to offer licenses to its 359. 2 SEPs under reasonable rates, with reasonable terms, and on a non-discriminatory basis. Although Counterclaimants ultimately signed patent licensing agreements with Qualcomm, Qualcomm leveraged its monopoly over the modem chip market to force Counterclaimants to sign a license with unfair and unreasonable terms.

360. As a result of Qualcomm's contractual breach, Counterclaimants have been injured in their business and are threatened by imminent loss of profits, loss of customers and potential customers, and loss of goodwill and product image.

361. Counterclaimants have suffered and will suffer irreparable injury by reason of the acts, practices and conduct of Qualcomm, as described above, unless the Court enjoins such acts, practices, and conduct.

COUNT VI

Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (FRAND Commitments)

Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate by reference each of the 362. allegations set forth above.

Qualcomm's actions, as alleged above, constitute breaches of its implied 363. covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Qualcomm's contracts with at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS.

364. By violating its FRAND commitment to license any SEPs, including at least U.S. Patent Nos. 7,246,242; 6,556,549; 9,137,822; 7,289,630; 8,867,494; 7,095,725; 6,694,469; 9,059,819; 7,096,021; 7,061,890; 8,000,717; 8,614,975; 8,761,068; 8,861,424; 8,873,471; 8,989,140; 9,007,974; and 9,144,071, on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, including by: (i) offering blatantly unreasonable licensing terms to Counterclaimants, (ii) charging Counterclaimants exorbitant non-FRAND royalties and refusing to license competitors, and (iii) demanding royalty payments from Counterclaimants that exceed the net royalty

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payment to which Qualcomm is entitled in light of and because of Qualcomm's withholding of rebates from Apple, and by bringing suit for licensing fees that include those fees illegally withheld from Apple, Qualcomm has violated its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Qualcomm's contracts with at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS, and Counterclaimants are entitled to bring suit as third-party beneficiaries.

365. As a result of Qualcomm's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Counterclaimants have been injured in their business and are threatened by imminent loss of profits, loss of customers, and loss of goodwill and product image.

366. Counterclaimants have suffered and will suffer irreparable injury by reason of the acts, practices, and conduct of Qualcomm, as described above, unless the Court enjoins such acts, practices, and conduct.

COUNT VII

Promissory Estoppel

367. Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

368. Qualcomm made a clear and definite promise to potential licensees through its commitments to at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS that Qualcomm had granted, or would grant, licenses to any essential patents under fair and reasonable rates, with fair and reasonable terms, and on a non-discriminatory basis.

369. The intended purpose of Qualcomm's promises was to induce reliance upon this promise so that companies like Counterclaimants would manufacture electronics with cellular capabilities compatible with the relevant standards—e.g., 2G-CDMA, 3G, and 4G/LTE. Qualcomm knew or should have reasonably expected to know that it would induce reliance on these promises by companies such as Counterclaimants.

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370. Counterclaimants contracted with companies, like Apple, to manufacture products compliant with the relevant standards in reliance on Qualcomm's promises.

371. Qualcomm is estopped from reneging on its promises to at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

372. Counterclaimants have been harmed as a result of their reasonable reliance on Qualcomm's promises and are threatened by imminent loss of profits, loss of customers and potential customers, and loss of goodwill and product image.

373. Counterclaimants have suffered and will suffer irreparable injury by reason of the acts, practices and conduct of Qualcomm, as described above, unless the Court enjoins such acts, practices, and conduct.

COUNT VIII

Declaratory Judgment that Qualcomm Did Not Comply with Its Obligations

374. Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

375. There is a dispute between the parties concerning whether Qualcomm has offered Counterclaimants licenses to Qualcomm's SEPs under FRAND terms consistent with Qualcomm's promises to at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS.

376. The dispute is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

377. Counterclaimants are entitled to a declaratory judgment that Qualcomm has not offered Defendants licenses to Qualcomm's SEPs under FRAND terms.

COUNT IX

Waiver

378. Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

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DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 379. Qualcomm expressly stated in its declarations to at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS that Qualcomm would license its identified patents under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.

380. Through these express declarations, Qualcomm voluntary and intentionally waived its rights to obtain compensation for its identified patents for the 2G-CDMA, 3G, and 4G/LTE standards other than at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms.

381. Counterclaimants will suffer irreparable injury by reason of the acts, practices and conduct of Qualcomm, as described above, unless the Court enjoins such acts, practices, and conduct.

COUNT X

Negligent Misrepresentation

382. Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

383. Qualcomm at least negligently made a false promise to at least ETSI, TIA, and ATIS that it would license its SEPs on FRAND terms so as to induce the SSOs to adopt its technology.

384. Qualcomm knew that, absent such a promise, the SSOs were obligated to search for alternatives, and to revise, or even abandon, the standard altogether if a viable alternative could not have been found to avoid Qualcomm's technology.

385. Qualcomm thus intended to induce, and did induce, the SSOs to rely upon Qualcomm's negligently false promise and not consider alternatives to Qualcomm's allegedly essential patents.

386. The SSOs, including ETSI, TIA, and ATIS, had no knowledge of the falsity of Qualcomm's promise, and reasonably and detrimentally relied upon Qualcomm's promise to offer a license on FRAND terms to anyone practicing the standard.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 387. In reliance upon Qualcomm's promise to offer FRAND licenses, Counterclaimants contracted with companies to manufacture electronic devices that comply with cellular standards, such as 2G-CDMA, 3G, and 4G/LTE.

388. Once the standards were widely adopted, and the industry became reliant upon those standards that allegedly incorporate Qualcomm's SEPs, Qualcomm reneged on its promise by exploiting its new-found market power to demand unreasonable and excessive licensing terms, far in excess of the patents' own value. Indeed, Qualcomm refuses to license only the patents it considers essential to practicing the standard. Instead, Qualcomm leverages its allegedly essential patents to demand additional royalties for its admittedly non-essential patents.

389. Counterclaimants have been harmed as a result of Qualcomm's negligent misrepresentations and are threatened by imminent loss of profits, loss of customers and potential customers, and loss of goodwill and product image.

390. Counterclaimants have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT XI

Breach of Contract (License Agreements)

391. Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

392. Qualcomm has entered into License Agreements with each of the Counterclaimants, which include express and implied terms (including the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

393. Qualcomm's actions, as alleged above, constitute breaches of the License Agreements.

394. Qualcomm has breached the express and implied terms of the License Agreements, including by: (i) exercising in an unreasonable manner its authority under the License Agreements to assess royalties and to conduct audits, depriving

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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Counterclaimants of the common purpose and justifiable expectations under the 2 License Agreements, in an attempt to extract more money from Counterclaimants; (ii) 3 charging Counterclaimants exorbitant non-FRAND royalties and refusing to license competitors, violating the common purpose and justifiable expectations under the License Agreements; and (iii) demanding royalty payments from Counterclaimants that exceed the net royalty payment to which Qualcomm is entitled in light of and because of Qualcomm's withholding of rebates from Apple, and by bringing suit for licensing fees that include those fees illegally withheld from Apple.

395. As a result of Qualcomm's breaches of contract, Counterclaimants have been injured in their business, and are threatened by imminent loss of profits, loss of customers, and loss of goodwill and product image.

396. Counterclaimants have suffered and will suffer irreparable injury by reason of the acts, practices, and conduct of Qualcomm, as described above, unless the Court enjoins such acts, practices, and conduct.

COUNT XII

Declaration of Unenforceability Under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1598–99

397. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

398. Counterclaimants each entered into its own SULA with Qualcomm.

399. The SULAs each contain a provision that purports to require Counterclaimants pay royalties to Qualcomm based upon the net selling prices of the manufactured product.

400. This royalty provision is unenforceable because it violates public policy prohibiting the extension of patent rights beyond their proper boundaries. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1598–99. This provision improperly extends Qualcomm's patent rights in multiple ways.

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401. First, the royalty provision is unenforceable because it requires payment of royalties on patents for which Qualcomm's rights have already been exhausted through Qualcomm's sale of modem chips and other components to Counterclaimants. To the extent those components substantially embody any of Qualcomm's patent rights, Qualcomm's authorized sale of those components to Counterclaimants exhausts those patent rights.

402. Second, to the extent Qualcomm's patent rights are not substantially embodied in Qualcomm's modem chips and other components, the royalty provision is unenforceable because Qualcomm is impermissibly broadening the scope of its patent rights through its "no license-no chips" policy. If Qualcomm's patent rights are not exhausted by the sale of its modem chips and other components, then the required patent license should not be necessary to purchase Qualcomm's modem chips. Under Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy, however, Qualcomm is leveraging its monopoly in the modem chip market to extract patent licenses from its customers for patents that are not even embodied in the purchased chips. In other words, Qualcomm is tying its chip monopoly to its patent licensing business. This impermissibly broadens the scope of Qualcomm's patent rights to cover products that do not even embody the patents.

403. Similarly, even if the modem chips do substantially embody the SEPs,Qualcomm also requires users to license its NEPs to purchase modem chips.Qualcomm is therefore using its monopoly to broaden the scope of its patent rights as to those NEPs by forcing customers to take a license in order to purchase its modem chips.

404. Third, the royalty provision is unenforceable because it improperly extends Qualcomm's patent rights to cover the many aspects of the manufactured product that have nothing to do with Qualcomm's patents—e.g., video, audio, touch screen.

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405. Similarly, to the extent Qualcomm's royalty is based upon:

, Qualcomm is impermissibly broadening the scope of its patent rights.

406. Fourth, the royalty provision improperly extends Qualcomm's patent rights beyond their geographic borders by requiring a license on patents for countries that the manufactured products will never enter.

407. Fifth, the royalty provision also improperly extends Qualcomm's patent rights by requiring a license on expired patents.

408. An actual case or controversy exists between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm concerning their rights and obligations under the royalty provision of their respective SULAs.

409. In sum, the royalty provision impermissibly extends the scope of Qualcomm's patent rights by requiring a royalty on exhausted patents and/or products that do not practice the patents, unpatented components and/or services, patents that do not cover the same geographic region, and expired patents. The royalty provision therefore impermissibly extends Qualcomm's monopoly.

410. Counterclaimants seek a judicial determination that the royalty provision of their respective SULAs is unenforceable as against public policy. *See* Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1598–99.

411. A judicial determination is necessary and appropriate at this time for Counterclaimants to ascertain their rights and obligations, in view of Qualcomm's breach of contract claim against Counterclaimants under the SULAs. The parties' relationship is ongoing, and a judicial determination would inform the parties' future conduct.

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1	COUNT XIII
2	Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,246,242
3	412. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the
4	allegations set forth above.
5	413. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,246,242 (the "'242 patent")
6	reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):
7	Claim 1
8	[a] A method for checking integrity of messages transmitted during a connection between a first party and a second party, comprising:
9	[b] specifying a first value at the first party, a second value at least partly at the first party and a count value at least partly at the second party to calculate an
10	first party and a count value at least partly at the second party to calculate an authentication value of a message, the first value being valid for one connection between the first party and the second party only;
11 12	[c] transmitting the message and calculated authentication value from the first party to the second party;
13	[d] calculating a second authentication value at the second party based on the received message;
14 15	[e] comparing the calculated authentication value with the second authentication value to determine whether the authentication values match;
	[f] accepting the message if the authentication values match;
16 17	[g] wherein the authentication values are calculated based on the message, the first value specified by the first party and the counter value at least partly specified by the second party.
18	414. The '242 patent is not essential to the 3G/UMTS standard, including, but
19	not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP Technical Specification ("TS") 33.102,
20	at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not
21	require the following claim limitation: 1.[b].
22	415. No claim of the '242 patent has been or is infringed, either directly,
23	contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by
24	Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the
25	manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants'
26	products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants'
27	products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[b].
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416. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '242 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a Declaratory Judgment.

417. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '242 patent.

COUNT XIV

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 7,246,242

418. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

419. One or more claims of the '242 patent fails to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '242 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,711,400.

420. U.S. Patent No. 6,711,400 issued on March 23, 2004, from an application that was filed on April 1, 1997. Because the filing date of this reference predates the earliest application to which the '242 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

421. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '242 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a Declaratory Judgment.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

422. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '242 patent is invalid.

COUNT XV

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 7,246,242

423. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

424. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '242 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

425. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '242 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a Declaratory Judgment.

426. To the extent that the '242 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '242 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.* ("*CSIRO*"), 809 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015); *Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.*, 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014); *Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig.*, No. 11 C 93089, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); *Microsoft*, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements, and has not offered FRAND terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a FRAND royalty for the '242 patent in this manner.

COUNT XVI

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,556,549

427. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

allegations set forth above.

428. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6,556,549 (the "'549 patent")

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 1
[a]	In a communication system in which each base station in communication with a remote station transmits a reverse link busy bit indicating whether its reverse link capacity has been exhausted, a method of determining the reverse link transmission rate of said remote station comprising:
[b]	determining a reverse link transmission rate in accordance with a combined reverse link busy signal generated in accordance with reverse link busy bits transmitted by each of said base stations; and
[c]	transmitting reverse link data in accordance with said reverse link transmission rate.

429. The '549 patent is not essential to the 3G/UMTS standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 25.211, 25.212, 25.214, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

430. No claim of the '549 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

431. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '549 patent 189 DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

432. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '549 patent.

COUNT XVII

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 6,556,549

433. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

434. One or more claims of the '549 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '549 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,269,239, U.S. Patent No. 5,673,259, U.S. Patent No. 5,659,578, U.S. Patent No. 6,584,086, and/or U.S. Patent No. 5,603,096.

435. U.S. Patent No. 6,269,239 issued on July 31, 2001, from an application that was filed on May 19, 1999, and claims priority to a provisional application filed on December 11, 1998. Because the effective filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the '549 patent, it qualifies as prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

436. U.S. Patent No. 5,659,578 issued on August 19, 1997, over one year before the July 2, 1999 filing date of the '549 patent, and from an application that was filed on November 23, 1994. As a result, this reference qualifies as prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e).

437. U.S. Patent No. 6,584,086 issued on June 24, 2003, from an application that was filed on April 21, 1998. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the '549 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

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438. U.S. Patent No. 5,603,096 issued on February 11, 1997, over one year before the July 2, 1999 filing date of the '549 patent, and from an application that was filed on July 11, 1994. As a result, this reference qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e).

439. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '549 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

440. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '549 patent are invalid.

COUNT XVIII

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 6,556,549

441. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

442. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '549 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

443. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '549 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

444. To the extent that the '549 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '549 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the

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actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See

2 CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013

3 WL 5593609, at *13; *Microsoft*, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above,

Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND

terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on

FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement,

7 invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration
8 that sets a FRAND royalty for the '549 patent in this manner.

COUNT XIX

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Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,137,822

445. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

allegations set forth above.

446. Representative claim 12 of U.S. Patent No. 9,137,822 (the "822 patent")

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

reads as	s follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):	
	Claim 12	
[a]	In a wireless communication system, an apparatus to determine an indicator of channel quality, the apparatus comprising:	
[Б]	a processor configured to determine a metric of forward link geometry as a function of an observed transmission, wherein said observed transmission is selected from a group consisting of pilot signals, noise, and traffic on data channels, or any combination thereof, and to determine an estimate of channel quality as a function of at least the metric of the observed transmission;	
[c]		
[d]	and a plurality of access sequences in the plurality of groups of access sequences are distributed non-uniformly, such that the plurality of access of sequences are distributed in proportion to a number of access terminals requiring a given amount of power needed to send an indicator of acknowledgment to an access terminal; and	
[e]	a selector configured to select an access sequence, randomly, from the group of the plurality of groups corresponding to a determined channel quality value.	
4	47. The '822 patent is not essential to the 4G/LTE standard, including, but not	
limited	limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 36.300, 36.321, at least because, by way	
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of non-limiting example, the 4G/LTE standard does not require the following claim 2 limitation: 12.[d].

448. No claim of the '822 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 12.[d].

449. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '822 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

450. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '822 patent.

COUNT XX

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 9,137,822

451. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

452. One or more claims of the '822 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 12, of the '822 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 7,061,890.

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453. U.S. Patent No. 7,061,890 issued on June 13, 2006, from an application that was filed on June 4, 2001. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the '822 patent, it qualifies as prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

454. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '822 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

455. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '822 patent are invalid.

COUNT XXI

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 9,137,822

456. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

457. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '822 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

458. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '822 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a Declaratory Judgment.

459. To the extent that the '822 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '822 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See*

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1 CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, 2 Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND 3 terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on 4 FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, 5 invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration 6 that sets a FRAND royalty for the '822 patent in this manner. 7 8 **COUNT XXII**

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Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,289,630

460. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

461. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,289,630 (the "'630 patent")

13 reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

15	Teaus	s as	tonows (claim clement chameration added for convenience).
14			Claim 1
14	П	[a]	A method for protecting traffic in a radio access network supporting multiple
15			radio bearers to/from a mobile station, the radio access network being connected to at least two core networks;
16		1.1	
10		b]	the method comprising:
17		[c]	maintaining a core network-specific authentication protocol;
18	[[d]	maintaining a radio bearer-specific ciphering process;
		[e]	generating, for each ciphering process, a count parameter comprising a
19			cyclical sequence number and a hyperframe number which is incremented each time the cyclical sequence number completes one cycle; and
20		fl	
21		[f]	for each core network or authentication protocol:
		g]	initializing a first radio bearer of a session with a hyperframe number
22			exceeding the highest hyperframe number used during the previous session; and
23		h	
		_11 J	at the end of a session, storing at least part of the highest hyperframe number used during the session.
24			humber used during the session.
25		46	52. The '630 patent is not essential to the 3G/UMTS standard, including, but
26	not limited to, the standards described in 3GPP TS 23.236, 25.331, 33.102, at least		
27			
28			195
	DEF	FENI	DANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD ERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY
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because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitation: 1.[h].

463. No claim of the '630 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products so not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[h].

464. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '630 patent, with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

465. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '630 patent.

COUNT XXIII

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 7,289,630

466. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

467. One or more claims of the '630 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '630 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of *Security Architecture* (3GPP TS 33.102 version 3.2.0).

468. *Security Architecture* (3GPP TS 33.102 version 3.2.0) was published in October 1999. On information and belief, *Security Architecture* (3GPP TS 33.102

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version 3.2.0) was publicly distributed and accessible before the March 1, 2000 filing
date of the earliest application to which the '630 patent claims priority, e.g., by and
through the Third Generation Partnership Project ("3GPP2") organization. Because the
reference was described in a publication before the March 1, 2000 filing date of the
earliest application to which the '630 patent claims priority, this reference qualifies as
prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

469. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '630 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

470. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '630 patent are invalid.

COUNT XXIV

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 7,289,630

471. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

472. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '630 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

473. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '630 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

474. To the extent that the '630 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select

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as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '630 1 2 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the 3 actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 4 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, 5 Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND 6 terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on 7 FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, 8 9 invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a FRAND royalty for the '630 patent in this manner. 10 11

COUNT XXV

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Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,867,494

475. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

476. Representative claim 17 of U.S. Patent No. 8,867,494 (the "'494 patent")

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

1 7		Claim 17	
17	[a]	A method for communication in a wireless network, comprising:	
18	[b]	receiving first information on a first downlink channel from a first sector, and	
19		second information on a second downlink channel from a second sector, on a first downlink carrier frequency;	
20	[c]	jointly encoding first feedback information corresponding to a first downlink channel state for the first downlink channel at the first sector with second	
21		feedback information corresponding to a second downlink channel state for	
22		the second downlink channel at the second sector using a channelization code; and	
23	[d]	transmitting the jointly encoded first and second feedback information on an uplink channel over a first uplink carrier frequency.	
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25	4	77. The '494 patent is not essential to any 3G/UMTS standard, including, but	
26	not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 25.212, 25.214, 25.308, at least		
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28		198	
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because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitation: 17.[b].

478. No claim of the '494 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 17.[b].

479. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '494 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

480. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '494 patent.

COUNT XXVI

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,867,494

481. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

482. One or more claims of the '494 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 17, of the '494 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent Application No. 2008/0085708.

483. U.S. Patent Application No. 2008/0085708 was published on April 10,2008. Because the reference was described in a publication before the earliest

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application to which the '494 patent claims priority, this reference qualifies as prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

484. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '494 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

485. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '494 patent are invalid.

COUNT XXVII

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 8,867,494

486. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

487. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '494 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

488. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between
Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '494 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

489. To the extent that the '494 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '494 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See CSIRO*, 809 F.3d at 1305; *Ericsson*, 773 F.3d at 1209; *Innovatio IP Ventures*, 2013

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WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above,

2 Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND

terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on 3

FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, 4

invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration 5 that sets a FRAND royalty for the '494 patent in this manner. 6

COUNT XXVIII

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,095,725

490. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

allegations set forth above.

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491. Representative claims 9 and 26 of U.S. Patent No. 7,095,725 (the "725

patent") reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 9
[a]	An apparatus comprising:
[b]	a transmit subsystem;
[c]	a processor coupled to the transmit subsystem and configured to control a data transmission rate of the transmit subsystem;
[d]	wherein the processor is configured to determine a new data transmission rate which is constrained to decrease by a limited amount from a current data transmission rate,
[e]	wherein the processor is configured to determine the new data transmission rate by determining a plurality of limiting rates and selecting a minimum of the limiting rates as the new data transmission rate; and
[f]	a transmit queue, wherein the limiting rates comprise at least a data-justified rate corresponding to an amount of data in the transmit queue.
	Claim 26
[a]	An apparatus comprising:
[b]	a transmit subsystem; and
[c]	a processor coupled to the transmit subsystem and configured to determine a new data transmission rate of the transmit subsystem by selecting the new rate from a plurality of limiting rates when the wireless communication system is in a not-busy state,
[d]	wherein the limiting rates include a ramp-up-limited rate which is set equal to the greater of a current data transmission rate and a sticky rate.

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492. The '725 patent is not essential to the 3G/UMTS standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 25.309, 25.321, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitations: 9.[d], 26.[d].

493. No claim of the '725 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitations: 9.[d], 26.[d].

494. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '725 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

495. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '725 patent.

COUNT XXIX

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 7,095,725

496. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

497. One or more claims of the '725 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claims, claims 9 and 26, of the '725 patent are anticipated

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and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 7,058,124 and/or *cdma2000 High Rate Packet Data Air Interface Specification* (3GPP2 C.S0024, Version 2.0).

498. U.S. Patent No. 7,058,124 issued on June 6, 2006, from an application that was filed on June 28, 2001. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the '725 patent, it qualifies as prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

499. *cdma2000 High Rate Packet Data Air Interface Specification* (3GPP2 C.S0024, Version 2.0) ("cdma2000 V2.0") was published on October 27, 2000, over one year before the December 19, 2002 filing date of the '725 patent. On information and belief, cdma2000 V2.0 was publicly distributed and accessible over one year before the December 19, 2002 filing date of the '725 patent, e.g., by and through the Third Generation Partnership Project 2 ("3GPP2") organization. As a result, this reference qualifies as prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b).

500. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '725 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

501. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '725 patent are invalid.

COUNT XXX

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 7,095,725

502. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

503. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '725 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

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504. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a 2 definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between 3 Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '725 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient 4 5 immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

505. To the extent that the '725 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '725 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND terms.

14 Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, invalidity, 15 16 and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a 17 FRAND royalty for the '725 patent in this manner.

COUNT XXXI

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,694,469

506. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

507. Representative claim 11 of U.S. Patent No. 6,694,469 (the "'469 patent") reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 11	
[a]	An apparatus configured to retransmit signals in a communication system,	
	comprising:	
[b]	a decoder configured to decode contents of a unit of received signal;	
[c]	a first feedback signal generator configured to generate a first feedback signal;	

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Claim 11[d]a first processor configured to determine a quality metric of said unit of signal;
and instruct said feedback signal generator to generate a feedback signal in
accordance with said quality metric; and[e]a preamble detector configured to detect and decode a preamble of said unit
of signal; and wherein said first processor is further configured to prevent
decoding of said unit of signal if said preamble indicates that said unit of
signal is not to be decoded.

508. The '469 patent is not essential to the 3G/UMTS or the 4G/LTE standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 25.211, 25.214, 25.221, 25.321, 25.322, 36.213, 36.300, 36.321, 36.322, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS or the 4G/LTE standard does not require the following claim limitation: 11.[e].

509. No claim of the '469 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 11.[e].

510. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '469 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

511. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '469 patent.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COUNT XXXII

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 6,694,469

512. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

513. One or more claims of the '469 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 11, of the '469 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,707,814, U.S. Patent No. 5,684,791, U.S. Patent No. 4,970,714, U.S. Patent No. 6,735,202, U.S. Patent No. 6,275,471 and/or *ATM User-Network Interface Specification, Version 3.0.*

514. U.S. Patent No. 6,707,814 issued on March 16, 2004, from an application that was filed on June 29, 1998, and claims priority to a foreign application filed on June 30, 1997. Because the effective filing date of this reference predates April 14, 2000, which is the filing date of the '469 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

515. U.S. Patent No. 5,684,791 issued on November 4, 1997, from an application that was filed on November 7, 1995. Because the reference issued as a patent over one year before April 14, 2000, which is the filing date of the '469 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e).

516. U.S. Patent No. 4,970,714 issued on November 13, 1990, from an application that was filed on January 5, 1989. Because the reference issued as a patent over one year before April 14, 2000, which is the filing date of the '469 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e).

517. U.S. Patent No. 6,735,202 issued on May 11, 2004, from an application that was filed on January 10, 2000. Because the effective filing date of this reference

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

predates April 14, 2000, which is the filing date of the '469 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

518. U.S. Patent No. 6,275,471 issued on August 14, 2001, from an application that was filed on May 12, 1998. Because the effective filing date of this reference predates April 14, 2000, which is the filing date of the '469 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

519. *ATM User-Network Interface Specification, Version 3.0* was published on September 10, 1993. On information and belief, the *ATM User-Network Interface Specification, Version 3.0* was publicly distributed and accessible over one year before April 14, 2000, which is the filing date of the '469 patent, *e.g.*, by and through the PTR Prentice Hall. Because the reference was published over one year before April 14, 2000, which is the filing date of the '469 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b).

520. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '469 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

521. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '469 patent are invalid.

COUNT XXXIII

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 6,694,469

522. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

523. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '469 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

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524. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '469 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a Declaratory Judgment.

6 525. To the extent that the '469 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select 7 8 as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '469 9 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the 10 actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, 12 13 Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND 14 terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, 15 16 invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a FRAND royalty for the '469 patent in this manner. 17

COUNT XXXIV

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,059,819

526. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,059,819 (the "819 patent") 527. reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 1	
[a]	A method for wireless communications, comprising:	
[b]	estimating channel quality information for a plurality of downlink carriers;	
[c]	identifying a number of activated carriers in the plurality of downlink carriers; and	

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	Claim 1
[d]	configuring an uplink control channel based at least in part on a number of activated carriers in the plurality, of downlink carriers,
[e]	wherein the uplink control channel is configured using an encoding scheme selected based at least in part on the number of activated carriers while maintaining a constant feedback cycle independent of the number of activated carriers.

528. The '819 patent is not essential to any 3G/UMTS standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 25.212, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

529. No claim of the '819 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

530. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '819 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

531. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '819 patent.

COUNT XXXV

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 9,059,819

532. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 533. One or more claims of the '819 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '819 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent Application No. 2010/0226327.

534. U.S. Patent Application No. 2010/0226327 was filed on January 12, 2010. Because the filing date of this reference predates the earliest application to which the '819 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

535. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '819 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

536. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '819 patent are invalid.

COUNT XXXVI

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 9,059,819

537. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

538. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '819 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

539. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '819 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

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540. To the extent that the '819 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, 1 and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select 2 3 as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '819 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the 4 5 actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See 6 CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, 7 Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND 8 9 terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, 10 11 invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration 12 that sets a FRAND royalty for the '819 patent in this manner. 13 COUNT XXXVII 14 Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,096,021 15 541. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the 16 allegations set forth above. 542. Representative claim 12 of U.S. Patent No. 7,096,021 (the "'021 patent") 17 reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience): 18 Claim 12 19 A terminal of a cellular radio system configures to initiate, while using a first $\begin{bmatrix} a \end{bmatrix}$ cellular radio system, measurement of the power levels of signals transmitted 20 by at least one second cellular radio system for a decision to change over to said second cellular radio system, comprising: 21 means for receiving at least one threshold value transmitted to the terminal by [b] 22 the first cellular radio system, 23 means for measuring a power level of a signal transmitted by at least one base [c] station of the first cellular radio system, 24 means for comparing the measured power level with said at least one threshold [d] 25 value, 26 27 28 211 **DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES;** Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD **COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY**

TRIAL

	Claim 12		
[e]	means for transmitting to the first cellular radio system a request for a free time period in which to perform the measurement, said means being arranged to transmit the request for the free time period in which to perform the measurement only after said measured power level remains below said at least one threshold value, and		
[f]	means for initiating the measurement of the power level of the signal of at least one base station of said at least one second cellular radio system during at least one said free time period in which to perform the measurement,		
[g]	wherein the terminal maintains radio connection with the first cellular radio system while measuring the second cellular radio system.		

543. The '021 patent is not essential to the 3G/UMTS or the 4G/LTE standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 36.214, 36.300, 36.331, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 4G/LTE standard does not require the following claim limitation: 12.[e].

544. No claim of the '021 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 12.[e].

545. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '021 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

546. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '021 patent.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COUNT XXXVIII

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 7,096,021

547. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

5 548. One or more claims of the '021 patent fail to meet the conditions of
6 patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101
7 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting
8 example, the representative claim, claim 12, of the '021 patent is anticipated and/or
9 rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,154,652, U.S. Patent No. 5,117,502,
0 *Compressed Mode Techniques for Inter-Frequency Measurements in a Wide-band DS-*1 *CDMA System*, Gustafsson et al., The 8th IEEE International Symposium on Personal
2 Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, Helsinki, Finland (Sept. 1–4, 2007), and/or
3 *WCDMA—The Radio Interface for Future Mobile Multimedia Communications*,
4 Dahlman et al., IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Nov.
5 1998).

549. U.S. Patent No. 6,154,652 issued on November 28, 2000, from an application that was filed on December 4, 1998. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '021 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

550. U.S. Patent No. 5,117,502 issued on May 26, 1992, from an application that was filed on March 15, 1991. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '021 patent claims priority and the reference issued as a patent over one year before the filing date of the earliest application to which the '021 patent claims prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e).

551. Compressed Mode Techniques for Inter-Frequency Measurements in a Wide-band DS-CDMA System was published in September 1997, over one year before

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

the May 26, 1999 filing date of the earliest application to which the '021 patent claims priority. On information and belief, cdma2000 V2.0 was publicly distributed and accessible over one year before the May 26, 1999 filing date of the earliest application to which the '021 patent claims priority, e.g., by and through the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer ("IEEE") organization. As a result, this reference qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b).

552. *WCDMA—The Radio Interface for Future Mobile Multimedia Communications* was published in November 1998, before the May 26, 1999 filing date of the earliest application to which the '021 patent claims priority. As a result, this reference qualifies as prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

553. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '021 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

554. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '021 patent are invalid.

COUNT XXXIX

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 7,096,021

555. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

556. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '021 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

557. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '021 patent

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

To the extent that the '021 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, 3 558. and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select 4 as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '021 5 6 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See 7 8 CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 9 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, 10 Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on 11 12 FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration 13 that sets a FRAND royalty for the '021 patent in this manner. 14

COUNT XL

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,061,890

559. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

allegations set forth above.

560. Representative claim 4 of U.S. Patent No. 7,061,890 (the "'890 patent")

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 4	
[a]	A method for selecting a random access channel (RACH), comprising the	
	steps of:	
[b]		
	(Universal Mobile Telecommunication System) Terrestrial Radio Access	
	Network), and determining a total number of RACHs available in a cell	
	depending on the received RACH system information; and	
[c]	selecting a scrambling code for one of the RACHs using the determined total	
	number of the RACHs and a unique identifier of a user equipment (UE),	
[d]	wherein the selected scrambling code has a serial number defined as a	
	remainder obtained by dividing the unique identifier of the UE by a quotient	
	obtained by dividing the total number of the RACHs by a persistence level	
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COUNT	DUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY	

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

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TRIAL

Claim 4 transmitted from the UTRAN.

561. The '890 patent is not essential to the 3G/UMTS standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 33.102, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitation: 4.[d].

562. No claim of the '890 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 4.[d].

563. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '890 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

564. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '890 patent.

COUNT XLI

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 7,061,890

565. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

566. One or more claims of the '890 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting

example, the representative claim, claim 4, of the '890 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,393,047, U.S. Patent No. 6,724,813, and/or U.S. Patent No. 6,535,736.

567. U.S. Patent No. 6,393,047 issued on May 21, 2002, from an application that was filed on June 16, 1998. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '890 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

568. U.S. Patent No. 6,724,813 issued on April 20, 2004, from an application that was filed on October 14, 1998. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '890 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

569. U.S. Patent No. 6,535,736 issued on March 18, 2003, from an application that was filed on December 11, 1998. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '890 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

570. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '890 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

571. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '890 patent are invalid.

COUNT XLII

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 7,061,890

572. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 573. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '890 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

574. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '890 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

575. To the extent that the '890 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '890 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See CSIRO*, 809 F.3d at 1305; *Ericsson*, 773 F.3d at 1209; *Innovatio IP Ventures*, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; *Microsoft*, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a FRAND royalty for the '890 patent in this manner.

COUNT XLIII

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,000,717

576. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

577. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,000,717 (the "717 patent") reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

Claim 1	
[a]	An apparatus, in a base station functioning as a serving base station for a
	mobile station, for controlling reverse link communication in a distributed
	base station communication system, comprising:
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	Claim 1
[b]	means for receiving a maximum tolerable coupled load representing a
	maximum coupled load at another base station functioning as a non-serving
	base station to the mobile station, the maximum tolerable coupled load
	determined to be the reserved maximum load at the another base station due
	to reverse link transmissions of mobile stations served by the base station;
[c]	
	parameter measured at the another base station due to the mobile station; and
[d]	means for managing reverse link transmissions of the mobile station in
	accordance with the maximum tolerable coupled load.

578. The '717 patent is not essential to any 4G/LTE standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 36.300, 36.420, and/or TS 36.423, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, no 4G/LTE standard requires the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

579. No claim of the '717 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

580. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '717 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

581. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '717 patent.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

COUNT XLIV

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,000,717

582. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

583. One or more claims of the '717 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '717 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent Application No. 2002/00102985, U.S. Patent No. 6,069,883, and/or U.S. Patent No. 6,968,192.

584. U.S. Patent Application No. 2002/0102985 was filed on January 31, 2001, and was published on August 1, 2002. Because the filing date of this reference predates the earliest application to which the '717 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (e).

585. U.S. Patent No. 6,069,883 issued on May 30, 2000, from an application that was filed on April 8, 1997, and claims priority to a prior application filed on October 5, 1995. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '717 patent claims priority and the reference issued as a patent over one year before the filing date of the earliest application to which the '717 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and/or (e).

586. U.S. Patent No. 6,968,192 issued on November 22, 2005, from an application that was filed on June 7, 2001, and was published on May 2, 2002. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '717 patent claims priority and the reference was published over one year before the filing date of the earliest application to which the '717 patent claims priority and the reference was published over one year before the filing date of the earliest application to which the '717 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and/or (e).

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

587. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '717 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

588. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '717 patent are invalid.

COUNT XLV

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 8,000,717

589. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

590. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '717 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

591. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '717 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

592. To the extent that the '717 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '717 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See CSIRO*, 809 F.3d at 1305; *Ericsson*, 773 F.3d at 1209; *Innovatio IP Ventures*, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; *Microsoft*, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND 221

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on
 FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement,
 invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration

that sets a FRAND royalty for the '717 patent in this manner.

COUNT XLVI

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,614,975

593. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

594. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,614,975 (the "'975 patent")

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 1
[a]	A method for synchronizing a wireless communication system, comprising:
[b]	
	the base station, the stratum level corresponding to a number of base stations
	including a global timing source node and zero or more intermediate base
	stations between the base station and the global timing source node; and
[c]	ceasing all transmissions from the base station for the silence duration.

595. The '975 patent is not essential to any 4G/LTE standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 36.413, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, no 4G/LTE standard requires the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

596. No claim of the '975 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

597. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '975 patent

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

598. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '975 patent.

COUNT XLVII

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,614,975

599. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

600. One or more claims of the '975 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '975 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 7,990,944 and U.S. Patent Application No. 2006/0140135.

601. U.S. Patent No. 7,990,944 issued on August 2, 2011, from an application that was filed on September 6, 2007. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '975 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

602. U.S. Patent Application No. 2006/0140135 was filed on December 28, 2004, and was published on June 29, 2006. Because the filing date of this reference predates the earliest application to which the '975 patent claims priority and the reference was published over one year before the filing date of the earliest application to which the '975 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and/or (e).

603. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between

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Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '975 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

604. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '975 patent are invalid.

COUNT XLVIII

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 8,614,975

605. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

606. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '975 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

607. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '975 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

608. To the extent that the '975 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '975 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See CSIRO*, 809 F.3d at 1305; *Ericsson*, 773 F.3d at 1209; *Innovatio IP Ventures*, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; *Microsoft*, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement,

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a FRAND royalty for the '975 patent in this manner.

COUNT XLIX

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,761,068

609. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

allegations set forth above.

610. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,761,068 (the "'068 patent")

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 1	
[a]	A method of initiating a high speed uplink channel, comprising:	
[b]	receiving, at a user equipment (UE), an order on a high speed shared contro channel (HS-SCCH) from a Node B, wherein the order is configured to trigger the UE to start transmitting on a high speed dedicated physical contro channel (HS-DPCCH) in CELL FACH;	
[c]	performing a physical random access channel (PRACH) procedure in response to the receiving of the order;	
[d]	performing a collision resolution procedure in response to the receiving of th order; and	
[e]	transmitting, in response to the order, a current channel quality indicato (CQI) of the UE on the HS-DPCCH prior to achieving a collision resolution result from the collision resolution procedure.	

611. The '068 patent is not essential to any 3G/UMTS standard, including, but not limited to, the standards described in 3GPP TS 25.212, 25.214 and/or 25.321, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

612. No claim of the '068 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

613. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '068 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

614. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '068 patent.

COUNT L

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,761,068

615. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

616. One or more claims of the '068 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '068 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 8,730,989.

617. U.S. Patent No. 8,730,989 issued on May 20, 2014, from an application that was filed on February 10, 2012, and claims priority to provisional applications filed on February 11, 2011, April 29, 2011 and August 12, 2011. Because the effective filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '068 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

618. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy betweenCounterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the

'068 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

619. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '068 patent are invalid.

COUNT LI

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 8,761,068

620. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

621. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '068 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

622. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '068 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

623. To the extent that the '068 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '068 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See CSIRO*, 809 F.3d at 1305; *Ericsson*, 773 F.3d at 1209; *Innovatio IP Ventures*, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; *Microsoft*, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, invalidity,

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and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a

FRAND royalty for the '068 patent in this manner.

COUNT LII

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,861,424

624. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

allegations set forth above.

625. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,861,424 (the "'424 patent")

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 1
[a]	A method for wireless communications, comprising:
[b]	allocating resources of a backhaul link between a donor base station and a
	relay base station to the relay base station for communicating with the donor
	base station; and
[c]	transmitting a control channel indicating the allocated resources to the relay
	base station,
[d]	wherein the control channel is transmitted on a subset of physical resource
	blocks (PRBs) of subframes assigned for downlink communications on the
	backhaul link, and
[e]	wherein a size of the control channel is aligned with a bandwidth-dependent
	resource block group (RBG) size.

626. The '424 patent is not essential to any 4G/LTE standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 36.216, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, no 4G/LTE standard requires the following claim limitation: 1.[b-e].

627. No claim of the '424 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[b-e].

628. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between

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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '424 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

629. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '424 patent.

COUNT LIII

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,861,424

630. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

631. One or more claims of the '424 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '424 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. patent 8,537,724 and 3GPP TS 36.213 version 8.3.0 Release 8.

632. U.S. Patent No. 8,537,724 issued on September 17, 2013, from an application that was filed on March 17, 2009. Because the effective filing date of this reference predates July 6, 2009, which is the filing date of the earliest application to which the '424 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

633. 3GPP TS 36.213 version 8.3.0 Release 8 ("TS 36.213") was published in November, 2008. Based on on information and belief, TS 36.213 was publicly distributed and accessible before July 6, 2009, which is the filing date of the earliest application to which the '424 patent claims priority, *e.g.*, by and through ETSI, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

634. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '424 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

635. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '424 patent are invalid.

COUNT LIV

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 8,861,424

636. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

637. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '424 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

638. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '424 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

639. To the extent that the '424 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '424 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See CSIRO*, 809 F.3d at 1305; *Ericsson*, 773 F.3d at 1209; *Innovatio IP Ventures*, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; *Microsoft*, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND terms. Counterclaimants

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an
 alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, invalidity, and
 unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a
 FRAND royalty for the '424 patent in this manner.

COUNT LV

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,873,471

640. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

allegations set forth above.

641. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,873,471 (the "'471 patent")

10 reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 1	
[a]	A method for optimizing Radio Link Control (RLC) headers comprising:	
[b]	implementing, by one or more processors, a segment offset (SO) field in a RLC header to designate resegmented packets for lost protocol data units;	
[c]	implementing, by the one or more processors, a length indicator (LSO) for the SO field in the RLC header, to further accommodate a variable size of the SO field in the RLC header; and	
[d]	implementing, by the one or more processors, a Last Segment Flag (LSF) in the RLC header to identify a last segment of a protocol data unit (PDU).	

642. The '471 patent is not essential to the 4G/LTE standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 36.322, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 4G/LTE standard does not require the following claim limitation: 1.[c].

643. No claim of the '471 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[c].

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

644. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '471 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

645. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and has not infringed any claim of the '471 patent.

COUNT LVI

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,873,471

646. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

647. One or more claims of the '471 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '471 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of *RLC AM Re-segmentation mechanism and header structure*, Motorola, 3GPP TSG-RAN WG2#59, Athens, Greece (Aug. 20-24, 2007) and *Comparison of different SN handling at Layer 2*, Alcatel-Lucent, 3GPP TSG RAN WG2 #59, Athens, Greece (Aug. 20-24, 2007).

648. *RLC AM Re-segmentation mechanism and header structure* was published in August 2007. On information and belief, *RLC AM Re-segmentation mechanism and header structure* was publicly distributed and accessible before the October 1, 2007 filing date of the earliest application to which the '471 patent claims priority, *e.g.*, by and through the Third Generation Partnership Project ("3GPP2") organization. Because the reference was described in a publication before the October

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1, 2007 filing date of the earliest application to which the '471 patent claims priority, this reference qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

649. *Comparison of different SN handling at Layer 2* was published in August 2007. On information and belief, *Comparison of different SN handling at Layer 2* was publicly distributed and accessible before the October 1, 2007 filing date of the earliest application to which the '471 patent claims priority, *e.g.*, by and through the Third Generation Partnership Project ("3GPP2") organization. Because the reference was described in a publication before the October 1, 2007 filing date of the earliest application to which the '471 patent claims priority, this reference qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

650. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '471 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

651. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '471 patent are invalid.

COUNT LVII

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 8,873,471

652. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

653. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '471 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

654. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '471 patent

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

To the extent that the '471 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, 3 655. infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a 4 royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '471 patent, 5 and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See CSIRO, 809 7 8 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not 10 complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, invalidity, and 12 unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a FRAND royalty for the '471 patent in this manner. 14

COUNT LVIII

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,989,140

656. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

allegations set forth above.

657. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,989,140 (the "'140 patent")

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

	Claim 1	
[a]	1. A method of wireless communication for a User Equipment (UE) that is configured with a Multi-Point High Speed Data Packet Access (HSDPA) mode utilizing a primary serving cell and a secondary serving cell, the method comprising:	
[b]	receiving Multi-Point HSDPA data from a first cell as the primary serving cell and a second cell as the secondary serving cell;	
[c]	determining that a measurement of the secondary serving cell exceeds a measurement of the primary serving cell;	
[d]	transmitting a request corresponding to the measurement of the secondary serving cell;	
[e]	receiving a Radio Resource Control (RRC) message in response to the	
) EFENI	234 FENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD	
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TRIAL

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Claim 1	
	request, wherein the RRC message includes an information element configured to inform the UE that the secondary serving cell utilizes the same carrier frequency as that of the primary serving cell;
[f]	
[g]	receiving Multi-Point HSDPA data from the second cell as the primary serving cell and the first cell as the secondary serving cell in response to the reconfiguration.

658. The '140 patent is not essential to any 3G/UMTS standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 25.331, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

659. No claim of the '140 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[b].

660. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '140 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

661. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '140 patent.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COUNT LIX

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,989,140

662. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

663. One or more claims of the '140 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '140 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 8,854,976, U.S. Patent No. 8,948,765, U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2008/0261599, and/or U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2009/0052401.

664. U.S. Patent No. 8,854,976 issued on October 7, 2014, from an application that was filed on January 7, 2011, and claims priority to provisional applications filed on June 17, 2010, April 30, 2010, April 2, 2010 and January 8, 2010. Because the effective filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '140 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

665. U.S. Patent No. 8,948,765 issued on February 3, 2015, from an application that was filed on March 25, 2011, and claims priority to a provisional application filed on April 2, 2010. Because the effective filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '140 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

666. U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0261599 published on October 23, 2008, from an application that was filed on April 10, 2008. Because the reference published over one year before June 28, 2010, which is the earliest provisional application date of the '140 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e).

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667. U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2009/0052401 published on February 26, 2009, from an application that was filed on February 1, 2007. Because the reference published over one year before June 28, 2010, which is the earliest provisional application date of the '140 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e).

668. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between
Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '140 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

669. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '140 patent are invalid.

COUNT LX

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 8,989,140

670. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

671. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '140 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

672. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between
Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '140 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

673. To the extent that the '140 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '140 patent,

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1 and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the actual 2 technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See CSIRO, 809 3 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, Qualcomm has not 4 complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND terms. Counterclaimants 5 6 are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, invalidity, and 7 8 unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration that sets a FRAND royalty for the '140 patent in this manner. 9

COUNT LXI

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,007,974

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674. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the

reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

A method for wireless communications comprising:

13 allegations set forth above.

second cell;

pairing:

UE; and

first cell and the second cell;

corresponding timings.

[a]

[b]

[c]

[d]

[e]

[f]

[g]

675. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,007,974 (the "'974 patent")

Claim 1

communicatively connecting with a user equipment (UE), a first cell, and a

determining a timing offset representative of a sub-frame delay between the

selectively updating the sub-frame pairing based on the timing offset by

aligning a first downlink discontinuous reception (DRX) pattern of the first

cell with a second DRX pattern of the second cell based on the sub-frame

transmitting timing information of the first and second DRX patterns to the

signaling the first cell and the second cell of the DRX patterns and

676. The '974 patent is not essential to any 3G/UMTS standard, including, but

determining a sub-frame pairing between the first cell and the second cell;

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not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 25.214, at least because, by way of

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP non-limiting example, the 3G/UMTS standard does not require the following claim limitation: 1.[f].

677. No claim of the '974 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitation: 1.[f].

678. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '974 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

679. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '974 patent.

COUNT LXII

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 9,007,974

680. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

681. One or more claims of the '974 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '974 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 8,867,442 in view of U.S. Patent No. 8,929,301.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

682. U.S. Patent No. 8,867,442 issued on October 21, 2014, from an application that was filed on September 29, 2011, and claims priority to provisional applications filed on October 1, 2010, April 29, 2011 and August 12, 2011. Because the filing date of this reference predates the filing date of the earliest application to which the '974 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

683. U.S. Patent No. 8,929,301 issued on January 6, 2015, from an application that was filed on April 24, 2009, published on December 3, 2009, and claims priority to provisional applications filed on April 25, 2008, July 31, 2008 and November 10, 2008. Because the publication of this reference is more than one year before March 19, 2012, which is the earliest provisional application date of the '974 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e).

684. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '974 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

685. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '974 patent are invalid.

COUNT LXIII

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 9,007,974

686. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

687. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '974 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

688. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '974 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

6 689. To the extent that the '974 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid, and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select 7 8 as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '974 9 patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the 10 actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. See 11 CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305; Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209; Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *13; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above, 12 Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND 13 14 terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement, 15 invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration 16 that sets a FRAND royalty for the '974 patent in this manner. 17

COUNT LXIV

Declaration of Noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,144,071

690. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

691. Representative claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,144,071 (the "'071 patent") reads as follows (claim element enumeration added for convenience):

Claim 1			
[a]	A method for wireless communications, comprising:		
[b]	receiving, at a first base station, resource partitioning information (RPI) from at least one second base station, wherein the RPI comprises a bitmap of almost blank subframes (ABSs);		
[c]	determining one or more resources indicated in the RPI usable by the first base station; and		
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DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

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Claim 1

[d] sending, from the first base station to the at least one second base station, an indication of the usable resources.

692. The '071 patent is not essential to any 4G/LTE standard, including, but not limited to, the standard described in 3GPP TS 36.423, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, no 4G/LTE standard requires the following claim limitations: 1.[b-d].

693. No claim of the '071 patent has been or is infringed, either directly, contributorily, or by inducement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, by Counterclaimants or the purchasers of Counterclaimants' products through the manufacture, use, importation, sale, and/or offer for sale of Counterclaimants' products, at least because, by way of non-limiting example, Counterclaimants' products do not satisfy the following claim limitations: 1.[b-d].

694. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the noninfringement of the '071 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

695. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that Counterclaimants do not infringe and have not infringed any claim of the '071 patent.

COUNT LXV

Declaration of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 9,144,071

696. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

697. One or more claims of the '071 patent fail to meet the conditions of patentability and/or otherwise comply with one or more provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*, including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112. By way of non-limiting DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL example, the representative claim, claim 1, of the '071 patent is anticipated and/or rendered obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 8,537,724 in view of 3GPP R1-105779, Agenda Item 6.8.1.1, presented at TSG-RAN WG1 Meeting #62bis.

698. U.S. Patent No. 8,537,724 issued on September 17, 2013, from an application that was filed on March 17, 2009. Because the effective filing date of this reference predates March 24, 2011, which is the filing date of the earliest application to which the '071 patent claims priority, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

699. 3GPP R1-105779, Agenda Item 6.8.1.1, presented at TSG-RAN WG1 Meeting #62bis, was, on information and belief, published in October 2010. Because the publication date of the reference predates March 24, 2011, which is the filing date of the earliest application date of the '071 patent, it qualifies as prior art under, at least, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

700. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the validity of one or more claims of the '071 patent. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

701. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request the declaration of the Court that one or more claims of the '071 patent are invalid.

COUNT LXVI

Declaration of FRAND Royalties for U.S. Patent No. 9,144,071

702. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

703. Qualcomm has contractually obligated to license the '071 patent on FRAND terms and conditions.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Crutcher LLP

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704. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the FRAND royalty for the '071 patent with respect to Counterclaimants' products. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

705. To the extent that the '071 patent is actually essential to a standard, valid,
and infringed by Counterclaimants, and not exhausted, then Qualcomm must (a) select
as a royalty base, at most, the smallest salable unit substantially embodying the '071
patent, and (b) apply to that royalty base a reasonable royalty rate that reflects the
actual technical contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent. *See CSIRO*, 809 F.3d at 1305; *Ericsson*, 773 F.3d at 1209; *Innovatio IP Ventures*, 2013
WL 5593609, at *13; *Microsoft*, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74. As discussed above,
Qualcomm has not complied with these requirements and has not offered FRAND
terms. Counterclaimants are willing, and have been willing, to license this patent on
FRAND terms. As an alternative to its requests for declarations of noninfringement,
invalidity, and unenforceability, Counterclaimants are entitled to a judicial declaration
that sets a FRAND royalty for the '071 patent in this manner.

COUNT LXVII

Declaration of Unenforceability Due to Exhaustion

706. Counterclaimants restate and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth above.

707. Qualcomm sells baseband processor modem chips to Counterclaimants through its sales subsidiaries or branches, QCT and QCTAP, intending for such modem chips to be incorporated into Counterclaimants products.

708. The sale of Qualcomm modem chips to Counterclaimants through QCT and/or QCTAP is authorized by Qualcomm.

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709. Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, this authorized sale of modem chips by Qualcomm to Counterclaimants exhausts Qualcomm's patent rights with respect to all patents substantially embodied in Qualcomm modem chips. *See Lexmark Int'l*, 137 S. Ct. at 1531–38; *Quanta Computer*, 553 U.S. at 638.

710. As described above, Qualcomm has sought, and continues to seek, both the price of the modem chips themselves, and also separate patent license agreements and royalties from Counterclaimants for the purported right to make, use, and sell products that would allegedly infringe Qualcomm patents that are substantially embodied in the Qualcomm modem chips.

711. Counterclaimants pay the entirety of both the license royalty and the cost of the modem chip itself through the web of agreements described herein.

712. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the rights granted by the Patent Act ensure that Qualcomm "receives one reward" for its alleged invention—either the sale price or the license fee—but not both. *Lexmark Int'l*, 137 S. Ct. at 1537. Qualcomm's decision to sell modem chips in which its patents are substantially embodied and receive whatever fee it decides is appropriate "for the article and the invention which it embodies" triggers exhaustion, prohibiting Qualcomm from seeking license royalties for Counterclaimants products that incorporate those modem chips. *Id. (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co.*, 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942)).

713. Moreover, Qualcomm's refusal to sell modem chips to Counterclaimants unless they also pay for a license to practice the patents substantially embodied in those modem chips is an example of a "conditional sale" prohibited by patent law and the patent exhaustion doctrine. The sale to Counterclaimants is conditioned on Counterclaimants paying a license fee for the same products, even though no license fee is owed. But once "a patentee decides to sell—whether on its own or through a licensee—that sale exhausts its patent rights, regardless of any post-sale restrictions the

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES; Case No. 3:17-CV-01010-GPC-MDD COUNTERCLAIMS; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL patentee purports to impose, either directly or *through a license*." *Lexmark, Int'l*, 137 S. Ct. at 1535 (emphasis added).

714. Qualcomm has attempted to evade the patent exhaustion doctrine by reorganizing its corporate structure to create an artificial division between
(a) Qualcomm Inc., which holds Qualcomm's patents, (b) Qualcomm's wholly owned subsidiary QTI, and (c) Qualcomm's U.S. and Asia-Pacific sales segments QCT and QCTAP, which are operated by QTI and its subsidiaries.

715. As described below, Qualcomm has also restricted Counterclaimants' ability to recover any financial reward from a judicial decision that Qualcomm's patents are exhausted.

716. As a matter of legal and economic reality, Qualcomm is responsible for all licensing and all chip sales by Qualcomm and its subsidiaries. With respect to sales of Qualcomm modem chips to Counterclaimants, Qualcomm intends for such modem chips to be incorporated into Counterclaimants products and uses its contracts with Counterclaimants' clients, described in Apple's Amended Complaint, to further that end.

717. Qualcomm, QTI, QCT, and QCTAP should be treated as a single entity for purposes of the patent exhaustion doctrine. *RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.*, 772 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing *Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.A. de C.V. v. Resnick*, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957)). Qualcomm's parent and subsidiary entities share such a unity of interest that the separate personalities of the corporations no longer exist. The purported division between Qualcomm's parent and subsidiary entities is illusory and an attempt to evade the patent laws. Qualcomm, QTI, QCT, and QCTAP work together and collude in refusing to sell modem chips to manufacturers unless they enter into separate patent license agreements, demonstrating a unity of interest of extracting excess royalties for Qualcomm for patents that are in fact exhausted through sale. Permitting Qualcomm to hide its collusive behavior behind alleged corporate

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walls will lead to an inequitable result, allowing Qualcomm to continue to "doubledip" and collect excess royalties for patents exhausted through the authorized sale of Qualcomm modem chips.

718. As a result of the acts described in the foregoing paragraphs, there exists a definite and concrete, real and substantial, justiciable controversy between
Counterclaimants and Qualcomm regarding the exhaustion of Qualcomm's patent rights with respect to patents substantially embodied in baseband processor modem chips sold by Qualcomm to Counterclaimants. This controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

719. To the extent that that any of the Patents-in-Suit are actually essential to any 3G/UMTS and/or 4G/LTE standard and infringed by Counterclaimants, such patents are substantially embodied in the Qualcomm baseband processor modem chips used in the products manufactured by Counterclaimants and, therefore, exhausted by Qualcomm's authorized sales.

720. Pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, Counterclaimants request a judicial declaration that the sale of Qualcomm's baseband processor modem chips to Counterclaimants exhausts Qualcomm's patent rights for patents substantially embodied in those modem chips, and that any of the Patents-in-Suit, which are actually essential to any 3G/UMTS and/or 4G/LTE standard and infringed by Counterclaimants, are unenforceable as against Counterclaimants due to patent exhaustion.

JURY DEMAND

Counterclaimants demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

PRAYER

Wherefore, Counterclaimants respectfully request that the Court:

A. Decree that Qualcomm engaged in unlawful monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2), and

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1		Counterclaimants were injured in their business and property as a
2		result of those violations;
3	B.	Decree that Qualcomm engaged in an illegal contract, combination,
4		or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in violation of
5		Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), and
6		Counterclaimants were injured in their business and property as a
7		result of those violations;
8	C.	Decree that Qualcomm engaged in unlawful trust activity in
9		violation of the Cartwright Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et
10		seq.), and that Counterclaimants were injured in their business and
11		property as a result of those violations;
12	D.	Decree that Qualcomm engaged in conduct in violation of
13		California's Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
14		17200 et seq.), that Counterclaimants were injured in their business
15		and property, and that Qualcomm was unjustly enriched as a result
16		of those violations;
17	E.	Decree that Qualcomm is liable for breach of its contractual
18		obligation to offer its SEPs at a FRAND rate;
19	F.	Decree that Qualcomm is estopped from seeking royalties in excess
20		of its promised FRAND rate;
21	G.	Decree that Qualcomm did not comply with its FRAND obligation;
22	H.	Decree that Qualcomm waived its right to recover royalties for its
23		SEPs in excess of a FRAND rate;
24	I.	Decree that Qualcomm negligently misrepresented that it would
25		offer licenses on FRAND terms to induce the SSOs to adopt its
26		technology;
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1	J.	Decree that Qualcomm breached the Implied Covenant of Good
2		Faith and Fair Dealing;
3	Κ.	Decree that Qualcomm breached the License Agreements with each
4		of the Counterclaimants;
5	L.	Decree that the the License Agreements are unenforceable under
6		Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1598–99;
7	М.	Decree that Counterclaimants do not infringe any claims of the
8		Patents-in-Suit;
9	N.	Decree that one or more claims of each of the Patents-in-Suit are
10		invalid;
11	О.	If any of the claims of the Patents-in-Suit are found to be not
12		invalid and infringed, decree that the Patents-in-Suit are
13		unenforceable against Counterclaimants due to patent exhaustion;
14	Р.	If any of the claims of the Patents-in-Suit are found to be not
15		invalid, infringed, and not exhausted, decree that Qualcomm has
16		not offered Counterclaimants a non-discriminatory license, with
17		reasonable rates and with reasonable terms and conditions;
18	Q.	If any of the claims of the Patents-in-Suit are found to be not
19		invalid, infringed, and not exhausted, decree a FRAND royalty rate
20		that uses an appropriate royalty base and royalty rate for such
21		patent claim that, at minimum, does not exceed the actual technical
22		contribution to the standard that is attributable to the patent claim;
23	R.	Decree that Qualcomm cannot seek injunctive relief or exclusion
24		orders against Counterclaimants based on the Patents-in-Suit;
25	S.	Find Qualcomm liable for the damages incurred by
26		Counterclaimants;
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1	T. Order Qualcomm to disgorge any non-FRAND royalties and	
2		royalties for exhausted patents that Qualcomm previously extracted
3		from Counterclaimants;
4	U.	Award restitution of all excessive license fees that
5		Counterclaimants paid;
6	V.	Permanently enjoin Qualcomm and its subsidiaries, affiliates,
7		successors, transferees, assignees, and their officers, directors,
8		partners, agents, and employees, and all other persons acting or
9		claiming to act on Qualcomm's behalf, from continuing the
10		wrongful conduct detailed herein;
11	W.	Adjudge and decree that Qualcomm may not interrupt chipset
12		supplies;
13	Х.	Enjoin Qualcomm from taking any adverse action against
14		Counterclaimants related to the allegations in the counterclaims;
15	Υ.	Enjoin Qualcomm from imposing or enforcing any unlawful and/or
16		non-FRAND terms and conditions relating to cellular SEPs;
17	Z.	Enjoin Qualcomm from further unlawful actions;
18	AA.	Award Counterclaimants damages for unlawful overcharges and
19		other injury to their property or business, duly trebled under Section
20		4 of the Clayton Act and under the Cartwright Act;
21	BB.	Award Counterclaimants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs;
22	CC.	Award Counterclaimants' all available pre-judgment and post-
23		judgment interest, to the fullest extent available under law or equity
24		from the date of service of the initial complaint in this action;
25	DD.	Enter judgment awarding Counterclaimants their expenses, costs,
26		and attorneys' fees in accordance with Rule 54(d) of the Federal
27		Rules of Civil Procedure; and
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1	EE. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and
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