HTTP: Encrypted **Information can be** Stolen through **TCP-windows** by

Mathy Vanhoef & Tom Van Goethem



- Technical background
 - Same-Origin Policy
 - Compression-based attacks
 - SSL/TLS & TCP
- Nitty gritty HEIST details
- Demo
- Countermeasures
















Same-Origin Policy











Mr. Sniffles



Same-Origin Policy











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














Mr. Sniffles













JS





Mr. Sniffles





















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

















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





















Mr. Sniffles









Mr. Sniffles















GET /vault



JS



Mr. Sniffles













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Uncompressed

You requested: /vault

vault_secret=carrots4life

 \rightarrow 51 bytes



You requested: /vault _secret=carrots4life

 \rightarrow 47 bytes









/vault?secret=a

You requested: /vault?secret=a carrots4life

\rightarrow 50 bytes



/vault?secret=c

You requested: /vault?secret=c arrots4life

 \rightarrow 49 bytes









/vault?secret=a

\rightarrow 50 bytes



/vault?secret=c

49 bytes < 50 bytes \rightarrow 'c' is a correct guess

\rightarrow 49 bytes







/vault?secret=ca

You requested: /vault?secret=ca rrots4life

\rightarrow 49 bytes



/vault?secret=cb

You requested: /vault?secret=cb arrots4life

\rightarrow 50 bytes









/vault?secret=ca

\rightarrow 49 bytes



/vault?secret=cb

49 bytes < 50 bytes \rightarrow 'ca' is a correct guess

\rightarrow 50 bytes





Compression-based Attacks

- Compression and Information Leakage of Plaintext [FSE'02]
 - Chosen plaintext + compression = plaintext leakage
- Phonotactic Reconstruction of Encrypted VoIP Conversations [S&P'11]
 - Packet length + bitrate encoding
- CRIME [ekoparty'12]
 - Exploits SSL compression
- BREACH [Black Hat USA'13]
 - Exploits HTTP compression










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/vault	
handshake	
SYN	
, ACK	
ACK	
handshake	
nt Hello	
r Hello	
ter Secret	





encrypt(





GET /vault



GET /vault HTTP/1.1 Cookie: user=mr.sniffles Host: bunnehbank.com







encrypt(










) = 19 TCP data packets









) = 19 TCP data packets

initcwnd 10








TCP Slow-start

- Not all TCP packets are sent at once
- TCP packets are sent in congestion windows
 - Congestion windows determine the amount of TCP packets that can be sent
 - Starts with the initial congestion window, initcwnd, typically set to 10
- When the packets of the first congestion window are ACK'd, the next congestion window is sent
 - Size of the next congestion window is doubled













) = 19 TCP data packets

initcwnd 10





- exact size of a network response
- ... purely in the browser
- Leverages browser side-channels
- as CRIME and BREACH, in the browser





A set of techniques that allow attacker to determine the

Can be used to perform compression-based attacks, such





Browser Side-channels

fetch('https://bunnehbank.com/vault',

- Send authenticated request to /vault resource
- Returns a Promise, which resolves as soon as browser receives the first byte of the response


Returns time when response was completely downloaded



{mode: "no-cors", credentials:"include"})

performance.getEntries()[-1].responseEnd









• Step 1: find out if response fits in a single TCP window










TCP handshake complete GET /vault initial TCP fetch('...') window sent SSL handshake Prom complete reso







initial TCP window received	
T2	time
responseEnd	
nise Ives	



TCP handshake complete GET /vault initial TCP fetch('...') window sent **SSL** handshake complete









- Step 2: discover exact response size





Step 1: find out if response fits in a single TCP window








Resource size: ?? bytes



Discover Exact Response Size









Resource size: ?? bytes



Discover Exact Response Size










Resource size: ?? bytes



Discover Exact Response Size










Resource size: ?? bytes



Discover Exact Response Size








After *log(n)* checks, we find: → resource size = initcwnd - y bytes

initcwnd





- y bytes of reflected content = 1 TCP window
- y+1 bytes of reflected content = 2 TCP windows

second TCP window







- Step 2: discover exact response size





Step 1: find out if response fits in a single TCP window

Step 3: do the same for large responses (> initcwnd)






Determine size of large responses

- initcwnd is typically set to 10 TCP packets
 - ~14kB
- TCP windows grow as packets are acknowledged
 - Second TCP window is 20 TCP packets, third is 40, ...
- We can arbitrarily increase window size
 - Send request to resource of known size
 - After response is in, send request to target resource, repeat step 2









CWND = 20

sent in single **TCP window**









- Step 2: discover exact response size
- Step 4: if available, leverage HTTP/2





• Step 3: do the same for large responses (> initcwnd)

Step 1: find out if response fits in a single TCP window





- HTTP/2 is the new HTTP version
 - Preserves the semantics of HTTP
- Main changes are on the network level
 - Only a single TCP connection is used for parallel requests
 - Headers are compressed using HPACK
 - Client and server build same lookup table
 - Header is now just a reference to an entry in the table
 - Mitigates CRIME










Leveraging HTTP/2

- HTTP/2 allows us to determine exact response size without needing reflected content in the same response
 - Only a single TCP connection is used for parallel requests
- Use (reflected) content in other responses on the same server
 - Note that BREACH still requires reflective content in the same resource
 - Response size can still be used to leak sensitive data (see examples later)




























- Step 1: find out if response fits in a single TCP window
- Step 2: discover exact response size
- Step 3: do the same for large responses (> initcwnd)
- Step 4: if available, leverage HTTP/2
- Step 5: exploit & profit









- Use HEIST to exploit BREACH/CRIME
 - Extract CSRF tokens, private message content, ...
 - Only 2 requirements: gzip/SSL compression + reflected content
- Obtain sensitive content from web services
 - Response size is related to user (victim) state

















- Compression-based attacks
 - gzip compression is used by virtually every website
- Size-exposing attacks

 - Uncover victim's demographics from popular social networks Reveal victim's health conditions from online health websites
 - Disclose victim's financial information
- Hard to find sites that are not vulnerable



Other targets





Countermeasures

- Browser layer
 - Prevent side-channel leak (infeasible)
 - Disable third-party cookies (complete)
- HTTP layer
 - Block illicit requests (inadequate)
 - Disable compression *(incomplete)*
- Network layer
 - Randomize TCP congestion window (inadequate)
 - Apply random padding (inadequate)









- Collection of techniques to discover network response size in the browser, for all authenticated cross-origin resources
- Exploits the subtle interplay of browser and network layer
- HTTP/2 makes exploitation easier
- Allows for compression-based and size-exposing attacks
- Many countermeasures, few that actually work



Conclusion







Questions?

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