
EXHIBIT 2 (Part 1)



HP: Bd Comms Relevant to Acquisition

- Two Bd Committees played role in M&A process (cont.)
 - Finance and Investment Committee

HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY BOARD OF DIRECTORS FINANCE AND INVESTMENT COMMITTEE CHARTER

- Purpose
 - Pursuant to HP's M&A approval policies, to assist the Board in evaluating investment, acquisition, enterprise services, joint venture and divestiture transactions in which HP engages as part of its business strategy from time to time; and

Background: Autonomy Analyst/Media Reports

- Following 1998 IPO, Autonomy was subject of many analyst/media reports
 - Focusing on period starting in late 2000s, complaint cites reports criticizing various aspects of Co.
 - But, not surprisingly, both negative/positive reports existed
 - > Of 229 reports reviewed for period 2/2006 through 8/2011
 - 53 were principally positive
 - · 35 were principally negative
 - · 141 were essentially neutral
 - > Some reports contained both positive/negative comments
 - > Reports issued in same period sometimes contradicted each other on relevant points

 For example, complaint cites statements by CFRA's Dan Mahoney purportedly made in 2007

128. In 2007, Dan Mahoney of the accounting research firm CFRA, who covered Autonomy until it was acquired by HP, described Autonomy as having all the hallmarks of a company that recognized revenue too aggressively. According to Mahoney, the reason for

Appears statement actually made in late 2012 – though
 CFRA did issue negative reports starting in 2007, including



 However, CFRA reports were 3½ years before HP's Autonomy due diligence and were contradicted by intervening positive reports, incl. by Credit Suisse

CREDIT SUISSE

09 November 2009 Europe/United Kingdom Equity Research Software (Software & Services) / OVERWEIGHT

Attractive long-term strategic story. We are positive on Autonomy as a leading vendor in the high-growth markets of Enterprise Search, eDiscovery, Content Management and Archiving (we expect a 7–12% CAGR through 2013). The company's strong IDOL technology, coupled with an extensive catalogue of data repository connectors, provides high barriers to entry and should allow the company to sustain strong growth for the foreseeable future.

Accounting review

Revenue recognition

Autonomy's revenue recognition practices are very similar to other companies in the software space. Autonomy has three primary sources of revenue: software licenses, maintenance and professional services. New software revenues are recognised when a licensing contract has been signed with a customer, the products are delivered, and payment is fixed and free of contingencies. The company also recognises software license revenues for hosting contracts (often recognised in arrears) and OEM royalties. Maintenance revenues are recognised rateably over the duration of the contract, which is normally one year in length. Professional services revenues are typically recognised as the services are performed.

- Complaint citation to 6/10 Deutsche Bank report by former Autonomy employee (¶ 132) focuses on negative
- 132. In June of 2010, Deutsche Bank analyst Marc Geall wrote a detailed report on the problems at Autonomy. Geall had formerly worked at Autonomy, where he ran a software division and also served as head of investor relations and corporate strategy. Geall was highly critical of Autonomy's management and business model, stating that the management structure, controls and systems at Autonomy were "more representative of a start-up than a major global player." According to Geall, Autonomy's service business was "too lean" and "risk[ed] falling short of standards demanded by customers." HP was well aware that Autonomy was not investing in its own technology and that its technology was outdated and not competitive.
 - But no suggestion of fraud/misconduct in report
 - And complaint fails to note positive statements in report, including setting out following strengths



Strengths

- Technology leadership: IDOL is a unique product that can solve many challenging issues for corporates, especially in their need to understand, manage, and process unstructured information.
- Entrepreneurial culture: there is drive and commitment to get things done. The business
 can adapt quickly and there is laser focus on quarterly targets.
- Evolving OEM business: IDOL is a product that can be embedded in other software products and has been designed to be "plug and playable". This is a Trojan horse that virally places IDOL at a critical point in the fabric of enterprise IT systems.
- High degree of operating leverage: the business model is pure (95% product sales) and thus the business has generated best-in-class margins.

 Numerous positive reports were published – including in months leading up to HP due diligence



19 October 2010 Europe/United Kingdom Equity Research Software (Software & Services) / OVERWEIGHT

Chandramouti Sriffeman 44 20 7883 4705 chandramouti stiraman@credit-suisse.com

Bullish commentary should assuage demand environment concerns and help support shares: Going into this report, management needed to assuage growing investors fears regarding the demand for Autonomy solutions, particularly in the "Protect" market. We believe the management commentary in the release has accomplished this as the company states that i) demand has increased since Q3 closed, iii) Autonomy has already closed some of these slipped "Protect" deals at an extended scope, and iii) the company concedes the conservatism of its outlook, leaving room for upside to current estimates. Given our recent checks regarding a more backend loaded 2010 in terms of license sales, we believe Autonomy has the potential to outperform current Q4'10 estimates, returning to strong double digit license growth and justifying a premium multiple.

Investment thesis: Strong, defensible franchise with recent sell-off providing entry point

Autonomy is a leading vendor in the high-growth markets of Enterprise Search, eDiscovery and Content Management. The company's strong IDOL technology, coupled with an extensive catalogue of data repository connectors, provides high barriers to entry, which we believe should allow the company to sustain its profitable growth for the foreseeable future. In addition, management has a strong track record of value creation through the continued signing of OEM relationships and strategic acquisitions. We believe

Numerous positive reports were published – including in months leading up to HP due diligence (cont.)

	GORDON		
17 December 2010 Equity Research			MORNING NOTE
Buy (Remains Unchang	ed) (Priced at clo	1465p se 16/12/10)	Autonomy
Target Price:		1726p	Glass half empty? - it overfloweth
Stock Codes:	(1693p) odes: AUTN.L / AU/ LN		A blistering night on Wall St saw tech companies Oracle, Accenture and RIM all come in ahead of expectations and raise guidance. Taken together the results point to a strengthening of the corporate B2B IT market. The most
Panmure Gordon EPS Estimates			obvious beneficiary on LSE is Autonomy. We caution that Oracle, Accenture
		88.44¢	and RIM are each leaders in their particular segments - so we are cautious
Dec 2009 A	(113.4¢)	113.84¢	about reading across to the entire LSE sector - but this undoubtedly bodes
Dec 2009 A Dec 2010 E		119.37¢	well. To reflect the improving operational outlook we lift Autonomy Q4
			estimates - a move which raises our FY Autonomy EPS from US113.4¢ to US113.8¢ - a move which increases our target price from 1,693 to 1,726p. We

 Numerous positive reports were published – including in months leading up to HP due diligence (cont.)




¾ UBS	Global Equity Research	
Ψ	United Kingdom	
UBS Investment Research	Software	
ODS Investment Research	12-month rating	Buy Linchanged
Autonomy Corporation Plc		
	#2m price target	

Investment Thesis

The opportunity facing Autonomy is substantial and we think the shares are very attractively priced. The regulatory push for organisations to better manage and monitor unstructured data, the continuing aggressive growth of that data, and the commercial benefits companies can gain from harnessing their knowledge resources are strong long-term growth drivers. The unstructured data management market today feels a lot like the business intelligence market 4-5 years ago, being on the cusp of going "mainstream". Despite a challenging economic environment and difficult comparatives, Autonomy preannounced in-line Q4 09 results, giving it 18-19% organic sales growth for the year and over 40% earnings growth having successfully assimilated Interwoven during the period. Despite the prospect of better economic activity translating into higher demand in 2010, consensus today is for just 13% organic sales growth. While we expect the "usual" guidance range of 10-15%, we are modelling 17% growth. Taken with the natural operating leverage in the model, this means we are 8% ahead of consensus at the earnings level for 2010E.

 Numerous positive reports were published – including in months leading up to HP due diligence (cont.)



Autonomy Corporation Plc

Autonomy's software automates the analysis of unstructured data, whether in the form of text, audio, images or video. It is the market leader in enterprise search, and is almost unique in establishing an end-to-end e-discovery solution with the acquisitions of ZANTAZ (2007), Meridio (2007) and Intervoven (2009). The US\$10bn markets it addresses are growing at an estimated blended 10%. It employs a largely indirect sales approach, including selling (10-15%) through other software companies, which embed Autonomy's technology in their own products (OEM sales). This makes it a lean organisation with premium margins.

Complaint emphasizes 2009 Chanos criticism

In July of 2009, James Chanos of Kynikos Associates LP, an investment firm, criticized Autonomy's accounting. Software companies typically rely heavily on service contracts in which revenue is earned over the life of the contract and thus a large portion of revenue is deferred. According to Kynikos, Autonomy's deferred revenues were suspiciously low for a software company. The low deferred revenue was an indicator that the revenue being reported was not good revenue linked to the sale of a strong, in-demand product. Kynikos believed that Autonomy might have hidden its underperformance with acquisitions. This was known to HP during its review of Autonomy prior to HP's acquisition. The fact that Autonomy's growth was driven by acquisition was not a secret. HP knew that there was little organic growth at Autonomy. Autonomy was the same company that Mark Hurd had rejected in 2010 and before, and it was the same company that Apotheker pushed to acquire for a whopping \$11.7 billion in 2011.

- Complaint emphasizes 2009 Chanos criticism (cont.)
 - And his after-the-fact comments
 - 130. According to James Chanos, in describing HP's acquisition of Autonomy, "[t]his whole thing is a debacle and probably should have never happened." Chanos added that "[w]e had been short Autonomy in our European fund in 2010 and 2011, and watched in horror as it was taken out at a big premium by Hewlett-Packard. It was one of our absolute favorite shorts at the time." Chanos stated that the accounting problems were hard to miss and characterized HP's decision to ignore the warning signs as constituting "willful blindness." Chanos added that "[i]t was pretty clear if you look at Autonomy's books over time that it was a very, very aggressive roll-up." HP knew that Autonomy was buying other companies, writing them down and putting the goodwill on its books. HP's own internal review showed all of this information. Chanos recognized this type of accounting scheme as what "most accounting mavens know is a real way to play earnings games if you want to."
- But Chanos was well known for short selling, which must be considered in evaluating his comments

- Class action securities complaint emphasizes criticism in reports by analyst Paul Morland of Peel Hunt
- 19. Khan's concerns about Autonomy were echoed by Autonomy analyst Morland who published a highly critical research note about Autonomy in June 2009. The note, entitled "Accounting Red Flags," explained that "[a]lthough investors do not have access to the same detailed information as auditors, there are plenty of analytical techniques that can be used to help identify when a company's performance might not be quite as good as it seems." Similarly, in
- 20. On September 18, 2009, Morland published another negative research report about Autonomy entitled, "Getting Worse Before It Gets Better." In the report, Morland queried whether it was "[t]ime to call a hearse [for Autonomy]" adding that: (i) Autonomy's "track record over the last few years has been evaggerated;" and (ii) Autonomy had been "[m]assaging [its] growth rate" by recognizing revenue improperly. The report also specifically described how Autonomy:

 Class action securities complaint emphasizes criticism in reports by analyst Paul Morland of Peel Hunt (cont.)

22. By summer 2010, analysts were still aggressively questioning whether Autonomy was misrepresenting its organic growth rate through an aggressive roll-up acquisition strategy. On July 2, 2010, Morland, in a research report entitled "More Questions than Answers," presciently noted:

Our thesis is that Autonomy needs to make acquisitions to sustain high rates of growth and poor cash conversion is caused by working capital rising faster than growth should dictate. There is also evidence to suggest the early recognition of revenues, particularly with reference to acquired deferred income. Given our concerns and uncertainty around the next acquisition, we believe Autonomy is a stock to avoid.


Organic growth rates appear to be overstated: When Autonomy adjusts reported sales to calculate organic growth rates, the amounts added back for acquired companies are consistently below our own estimates. We have observed this with most of the acquisitions made in the last three years.

0 0 0


Unusual balance sheet movements around acquisitions: A detailed balance sheet analysis has revealed some unusual movements. We remain unconvinced by explanations received from the company and concerned that Autonomy needs to make acquisitions to sustain high growth rates.

 State court derivative plaintiffs also rely on Morland, noting he called AU's financial statements "wrong and misleading"

- · At least one of cited Morland reports was not focused on AU
 - 2009 report addresses general red flags in technology sector
 - > While report cites generally to AU few times also cites to many other large tech companies



 Class action securities complaint allegation that "Morland queried [in Sept. 2009 report] whether it was '[t]ime to call a hearse [for Autonomy]" fails to note that Morland answered his own question in negative



 While Morland published negative reports on AU prior to acquisition, such reports did not alter information mix in market – were (as noted above) also many positive reports published

HP's M&A Policies and Procedures: Overview of Process (At Time of Autonomy Acquisition)*

* In some instances, only documentary evidence of process is found in documents generated since 2011. In including post-2011-generated documents, we have done our best to confirm that policies set out in such documents are consistent with policies in place at time of the Autonomy transaction, whether or not such policies were documented in 2011. We have not always been able to obtain absolute confirmation on this point, but we are reasonably sure that policies were not significantly different at the time of the Autonomy transaction (we note, however, that individuals identified as contact points in 2013 were not necessarily contact points in 2011).

> Transaction Team: Creation/Composition

 CD and relevant business unit representatives assemble Transaction Team led by sponsor



HP's M&A Policies and Procedures: Preliminary Due Diligence/Business Case

HP's M&A Policies and Procedures: IRB (Investment Review Board)

HP's M&A Policies and Procedures: Professional Advisors

HP's M&A Policies and Procedures: Full Diligence

Due Diligence: Post-ATN → Pre-ATS

Goals

- Verify interest in target
- Evaluate acquisition risks/liabilities
- Mitigate items of concern by adding closing conditions, reducing price or (if severe) stopping pursuit of target
- Responsible parties
 - Sponsor
 - Transaction Team
 - MADO functions
 - General Counsel's Office
 - Outside Advisors
 - > Financial
 - > Accounting
 - > Legal