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Agenda

l.	What is iVote
п.	What is iVote Architecture & Security Principals
III.	Why use iVote
IV.	Comparative Risks
V.	New Approach to Cyber
VI.	iVote & Strategic Threat Assessment
VII.	Questions & Discussion





What is iVote

- Was used at the Parliamentary election in March 2011 & took votes for 46,864 electors
- Remote electronic Voting system for web or telephone; 2.
 - Web browser over internet (including mobiles)
 - DTMF phone over PSTN
 - Human operator using voice from telephone to web browser
- Registration required with eligibility only; 3.
 - for Blind, Disabled, Remote and Interstate or Overseas
 - during early voting period (two weeks before election day)
- Expect to take votes for 250,000 electors at the Parliamentary election in March 2015 4.
- Not replace paper current ballots for in electorate voting (over 60% of votes) 5.



iVote Design Principles


The following are iVote design principles:

- Balance <u>comparative risks</u> of current paper approach with internet voting
- Mix of <u>People</u>-<u>Process</u>-<u>Technology</u> (not just a technology project)
- Segregation of <u>Duties</u> and <u>Data</u>, <u>Systems</u> and <u>Communication Channels</u>
- Voter can <u>verify vote</u> captured as cast
- Voter has evidence vote decrypted as captured (auditor, receipt number)
- Voter can check vote <u>counted as decrypted (all preferences published</u>)
- Voter <u>coercion not considered</u> a significant issue also voter able to revote (see paper by Prof. Rodney Smith from Sydney Uni. <u>Internet Voting and Voter Coercion</u>)





iVote Architecture





Why use iVote?

- Independent voting for blind and low vision voters (BLV want all electors to use it)
- More accurate result
- Greater electoral Integrity than other declaration votes (see Keelty and ANAO Rpt)
- Postal voting may be problematic in 5 to 10 years (<u>AustPost CEO</u>)
- Postal voting currently failing overseas voters (over 60% not returned)
- Overseas voters able to vote (NSWEC got 20k to 30k extra votes in 2011)
- Used by other jurisdictions <u>Norway</u>, Switzerland, Estonia
- Increase Participation (especially with compulsory voting and dropping youth vote)
- Electors want it (most common question asked, see <u>NSWEC 2011 iVote Report</u>)





Comparative Risks

	MITIGATION	
Risk	PAPER BALLOTS	ELECTRONIC
Impersonation	Using the current paper ballot approach potential voters only require a verbal declaration identifying themselves. The declaration requires them to know a name, DoB and address on the roll.	Similar to current paper ballot appropriate option to provide additional information of passport number or be acknowledgement to their enrolled
Cast as intended	Elector can vote incorrectly causing their vote to be informal. General informality for paper ballots between 3% to 6%	Able to independently verify vote vote complies with formality rules to cast informal vote. Informality ty
Captured* as Cast	Once the ballot paper is placed in the ballot box the voter must trust the Commission. Independent scrutiny is sporadic and mainly focused on polling place votes. The 30% of declaration votes are typically counted without independent scrutiny.	Voter can verify their vote has been checking the vote appears on rece independent auditor will confirm the the votes available for verification
Counted as Captured*	Trust the Commission staff manually counts the ballot papers correctly.	Published preference data which electors can be counted by anyon correct. Compare to paper ballot

* Captured - is for paper ballots when the ballot box is emptied or declaration envelope is opened or for iVote is when the ballots are decrypted.

VOTING

broach requirement but with nation such as drivers sent a registration d address.

as cast. Guided to ensure . Must make active decision ypically about 1%.

en decrypted by personally eipt website. Also he votes decrypted match

is validated by auditors and ne to check the count is results.



Comparative Risks cont.

	MITIGATION	
Risk	PAPER BALLOTS	ELECTRONIC
Tampering	It is difficult to identify evidence of vote tampering with paper ballots. Notwithstanding there is no evidence of this actually occurring in Australian elections.	Vote encrypted by voter's comput Commission or others until decrypt matched to verified votes to ensure compare paper ballot results with should have a very similar proport
Ballot Box "Stuffing"	It is difficult to identify the ballot papers associated with ballot box "stuffing". Notwithstanding there is no evidence of this actually occurring in Australian elections.	Ongoing monitoring of registration identify "stuffing" and potentially a identified and removed.
Integrity	Integrity of paper based elections relies on Commission staff following procedures and being trusted.	Combination of technology and per- that votes have been counted as compare to paper ballot results we should have a very similar proport
Ballot Secrecy	Ballot secrecy is persevered in ordinary polling place voting but secrecy could be breached for declaration votes as the voter's details are available to Commission staff at the time of opening the declaration envelope.	Voter identity is held separately fr voted by a given voter. Voters car their vote without very significant systems.

VOTING

ter are not accessible by the pted. Decrypted votes are re their validity. Electors can electronic results which tion of votes for candidates.

ns against votes would allow these papers to be

rocedures give confidence cast. Also electors can ith electronic results which tion of votes for candidates.

om the actual preferences n not be associated with breaches of multiple



LANDSCAPE STRATEGIC THREAT INTELLIGENCE

Importance of enhancing cyber information sharing and collaborative action.





A New Approach to Cyber

"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles..." - Sun Tzu, the

Art of War







Threats traverse ALL in a global cyber war



Threats to e-voting



eVote Threats or No Strategy?

Washington DC Test e-vote server camera

Anonymous claims to have blocked GOP election thef with Ohio firewall



See also Anonymous / Karl Rove / Hackers / Politics

Ansip: Election Identified

31.05.2013 15:02 Category: Politics

Prime Minister Andrus Ansip said a member of his party has admitted to manipulating e-votes in the Reform Party's leadership election last week and in another election in 2011.



Prime Minister Andrus Ansip Photo: Postimees/Scanpix

Voting Blogs: Hacking the Polls: Vulnerability in Electronic Voting Systems Independent Voter Network





(c) Typical workers, before attack

(d) Workers, after learning of attack

stonian MEP denies involvement in eform Party voting fraud

EP Kristiina Ojuland has denied involvement in voting fraud after finding rself at the center of the scandal in the wake of allegations that e-votes re cast in the Reform Party's internal leadership elections in the name of party without their knowledge.



December 17, 2013

Foreign attackers hacked elections site during government shutdown



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Abhaxas Dumps Details of the Internal Florida Voting Database Online







Strategic Threat Assessment

Strategic Threat Intelligence (attack trees, course of action analysis)

Implement & Manage

Baseline, event monitoring, analysis, threat review, correlation, event management

Incident

Management

Prepare, rehearse and standby to react



REVISE THREAT

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Distributed Security Assessment

ARCHITECTURE Architecture, controls, technical testing, and validation



Strategic Threat Assessment



Research & Analysis



Wargame, Test & Assess




Monitor & Respond



Why?

- Confidence and Assurance beyond compliance
- Drives pragmatic effective security strategy
- Supports Incident Response planning







http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/109517?download=true tp://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KRD/Kampanjer/valgportal/val gobservatorer/2013/Rapport_Cartersenteret2013.pdf

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MORE INFORMATION

General Information on iVote

https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/voting/ivote ections.nsw.gov.au/about_us/plans_and_reports/i vote_reports http://www.ivote.nsw.gov.au/

Norway Parliamentary Election Reports http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/109517?download=true

CSC Cybersecurity site

http://www.csc.com/cybersecurity

Handout CSC Whitepaper – Intelligence Driving Security Governance

Book

Offensive Countermeasures: The Art of Active Defense By: John Strand, Paul Asadoorian, Ethan Robish, Benjamin

