UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the Western District of Washington In the Matter of the Search of (Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address) The residence located at

39	921 55th Street C ig Harbor, WA 98	t NW	}	
•			OR A SEARCH WAR	RRANT
I, a federa penalty of perjury property to be search	that I have reaso	n to believe that on	ney for the government the following person or	, request a search warrant and state under property (identify the person or describe the
See Attachment	A, which is incorp	porated herein by re	eference.	
located in the	Western e property to be seize		Washington	, there is now concealed (identify the
See Attachment	B, which is incorp	porated herein by re	eference.	
▼ e	vidence of a crim	е;	2.41(c) is (check one or mo	
			ems illegally possessed;	
T p	roperty designed	for use, intended fo	r use, or used in commi	tting a crime;
□ a	person to be arre	sted or a person wh	o is unlawfully restraine	ed.
The searc	h is related to a v	iolation of:		
Code Section		Offense Description		
18 U.S.C. 1	030	Fraud and Rela	ated Activity in Connecti	on with Computers
The appli	cation is based or	n these facts:		•
See attache	ed affidavit of Spe	ecial Agent Scott Lo	ve, attached hereto and	I incorporated herein.
 	nued on the attac	hed sheet.		
			ending date if more that ch is set forth on the atta	
			Son	Applicant's signature
				Scott Love, Affiant Printed name and title
Sworn to before n	ne and signed in i	my presence.		
Date: <u>4/</u>	26/11		Trh	Sudge's signature

City and state: Tacoma, Washington

J. Richard Creatura, United States Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

AFFIDAVIT 2 3 STATE OF WASHINGTON 4 COUNTY OF PIERCE SS AFFIDAVIT

I, Scott A. Love, being first duly sworn on oath, do hereby depose and state:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. I am a Special Agent ("SA") with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and have been so employed since March 2010. I am currently assigned to the Los Angeles Field Division, Cyber Crimes Squad. In that assignment, I am responsible for investigating computer and high-technology crimes, and I am trained and authorized to investigate the offenses alleged herein. While working as a Special Agent of the FBI, I have participated in the service of search warrants involving searches and seizures of computers, computer equipment, software, electronically stored information, and instrumentalities of fraud. In addition to attending the 21-week FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, I have attended FBI training on basic techniques for computer crime investigations, computer technology, computer fraud, intellectual property crimes, and white collar crime. Prior to becoming an FBI agent, I was employed in the private sector for eight years. Additionally, I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Information Technology.

II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT

2. This affidavit is submitted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington in support of an application for a warrant to search the premises of DARRIN M. LANTZ, 3921 55th Street CT NW, Gig Harbor, Washington 98335 ("SUBJECT RESIDENCE"), which is described more specifically in Attachment A, for evidence and/or instrumentalities of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030 (Fraud and Related Activity In Connection With Computers).

1	3. The statements contained in this affidavit are based upon my training and					
2	experience, information provided to me by other investigators, other law enforcement					
3	officers, and witnesses as part of this investigation. Because this affidavit is submitted					
4	for the limited purpose of securing a search warrant, I have not included each and every					
5	fact known to me concerning this investigation. I have only set forth facts that I believe					
6	are necessary to the determination of probable cause to believe that evidence of violations					
7	of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030 is presently located at the SUBJECT					
8	RESIDENCE. Furthermore, unless specifically indicated otherwise, all conversations and					
9	statements described in this affidavit are not related verbatim, but are related in substance					
10	and in part only.					
11	III. RELEVANT LEGAL STATUES					
12	4. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(a)(5) states, in pertinent part,					
13	that					
14	Whoever -					
15 16	(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program. information. code. or command. and as a result of such conduct. intentionally causes damage without					

- authorization, to a protected computer;
 - (B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization. and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or
 - (C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss

shall be punished as provided in this statue.

IV. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION

5. On October 21, 2010, Berry Mallen, attorney for Gene Simmons ("VICTIM"), reported a Distributed Denial of Service attack ("DDoS") which affected his client's websites www.genesimmons.com, www.simmonsrecords.com, and www.kissonline.com. The attacks were launched on October 14, 2010, ten days after the

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VICTIM made comments relating to anti-piracy during an appearance at MIPCOM, a media content-related event held annually in Cannes, France.

- 6. At the time of the attacks, the VICTIM's servers were hosted by BCSWebCo in Florida. BCSWebCo took the websites offline due to the DDoS attacks and prepared to transition the sites to another host server operated by Sheppard Communications Inc., located in California and run by Mark Sheppard. Sheppard was able to get the VICTIM's websites back online within thirty-six (36) hours of the attacks.
- 7. Once the websites were back online, the VICTIM posted a message on his site indicating, to an extent, he and law enforcement would track down the attackers. On or about October 18, 2010, the servers at Sheppard Communications Inc., experienced a DDoS attack, which lasted through October 22, 2010. To date, the attacks on the VICTIM's websites have cost the VICTIM approximately \$20,000 to \$25,000 in downtime and costs associated with changing computer servers and website hosts.
- 8. Both attacks on the VICTIM's websites were claimed by an internet activist group named "Anonymous" (Anonymous), which titled their attacks "Operation Payback." Review of several online news reports and tech sites such as myce.com (http://www.myce.com/news/this-week-operation-payback-targets-gene-simmons-mpaa-3
 5461), dated October 16, 2010; softpedia.com (http://news.softpedia.com/news/gene-simmons-mpaa-3
 6461), dated October 18, 2010; myce.com (http://news.techworld.com/news/gene-simmons-threatens-anonymous-gets-ddosed-again-355
 63), dated October 19, 2010; and techworld.com (http://news.techworld.com/security/3244964/gene-simmons-battles-anonymous-group-after-new-ddos-attacks), dated October 20, 2010, reveal how Anonymous took responsibility for the attacks. Anonymous has also claimed to have launched DDoS attacks on the Motion Picture Association of America, the Recording Industry Association of America, the United States Copyright Office, Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal.

V. BACKGROUND REGARDING COMPUTERS. THE INTERNET, AND INTERNET COMMUNICATION

- 9. <u>Internet</u>. The Internet is a collection of computers and computer networks which are connected to one another via high-speed data links and telephone lines for the purpose of communicating and sharing data and information. Connections between Internet computers exist across state and international borders; therefore, information sent between two computers connected to the Internet frequently crosses state and international borders even when the two computers are located in the same state.
- Internet Service Providers. Individuals and businesses obtain access to the Internet through businesses known as Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"). ISPs provide their customers with access to the Internet using telephone or other telecommunications lines; provide Internet e-mail accounts that allow users to communicate with other Internet users by sending and receiving electronic messages through the ISPs' servers; remotely store electronic files on their customers' behalf; and may provide other services unique to each particular ISP. ISPs maintain records pertaining to the individuals or businesses that have subscriber accounts with them. Those records often include identifying and billing information, account access information in the form of log files, e-mail transaction information, posting information, account application information, and other information both in computer data and written record format.
- 11. <u>IP Addresses</u>. An Internet Protocol address ("IP address") is a unique numeric address used by each computer on the Internet. An IP address is a series of four numbers, each in the range 0-255, separated by periods (e.g., 121.56.97.178). Every computer attached to the Internet must be assigned an IP address so that Internet traffic sent from and directed to that computer may be properly directed from its source to its destination. Most ISPs control a range of IP addresses.
- 12. When a customer logs into the Internet using the service of an ISP, the computer used by the customer is assigned an IP address by the ISP. The customer's

- other devices to locate and communicate with it. An IP address is a unique number that identifies a device on the Internet. Other addresses include Uniform Resource Locator addresses ("URL address"), such as http://www.fbi.gov, which are typically used to access web sites or other services on remote devices. Domain names of Web sites, host names, and machine addresses are other types of addresses associated with Internet use. Domain name registrars contain registration information concerning the identity of the owner of a domain name.
- 14. Internet Relay Chat ("IRC"). A system for Internet-based "chatting" that uses client/server software. Using IRC, one can start a chat group (called a "channel") or join an existing chat group. Generally, a channel is dedicated to a particular topic, which may be reflected by the channel's name. Participants in chat channels commonly use nicknames instead of their real names to identify themselves. In addition, users with privileged access to IRC are called IRC operators, network administrators, or server administrators. These users have the power to forcibly disconnect users from IRC by issuing a "kill" command, the power to ban users, and the power to change network routing by disconnecting or connecting servers.
- 15. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, I know IRC is a common mode of communication used by hackers for discussion of who committed recent computer intrusions and new techniques for computer intrusions.
- 16. Web hosting. This essentially means providing space for a website, or content, on the Internet. This content can include IRC server space. Typically when someone registers a domain, he or she points that domain to the location of the corresponding website or service, whether it is located on a computer or server owned by the end user or one owned by a web hosting service. The owner of a domain is free to

- 17. <u>Domain Name Service ("DNS")</u>. An Internet resource for converting alphanumeric names into IP addresses. DNS provides several features, including the ability to refer to Internet addresses by easy-to-remember names rather than difficult-to-remember numbers. DNS provides other benefits, including the ability to change the underlying IP address while preserving the availability of the resource. Users would still request the resource by name, and DNS would resolve the name to the new IP address. DNS also provides the ability to have a name resolve to multiple IP addresses, for performance and load-balancing reasons or to provide some protection against the failure of a single IP address or computer.
- Organized hierarchically and read right-to-left, the right-most component is the "top level domain." This includes the ".com," ".gov," ".mil," and ".edu" domains as well as many others. Top level domains are owned and managed by the Internet sanctioning organizations. The second part of the domain name is owned by the registrant who first registered the name with the sanctioning organizations. It is common to refer to a registered domain and top-level domain combination as a "domain name". Examples include "google.com" and "cybercrime.gov." Domain name owners can then create sub-domains to provide addresses to resources they own and/or control. For example, the DNS sub-domain "www" ("World Wide Web") is generally used to denote an organization's web server, so "www.google.com" would, and does, point to Google's main website. Domain names are commonly inserted into the URL on a web browser application in order to "point" the computer user to that particular resource or service on the internet. World Wide Web URLs begin with http://.
- 19. <u>Distributed Denial of Service Attack (or "DDoS attack")</u>.

 A DDoS attack is a type of malicious computer activity by which an attacker causes a network of computers to "flood" a victim computer with large amounts of data or specific

- commands. As a result, the victim computer is unable to handle legitimate network traffic and legitimate users are denied the services of the computer. Depending on the type and strength of the DDoS attack, the victim computer and its network may become completely disabled and unable to perform their intended functions without significant repair.
- 20. Access/Error Logs. List of all requests for individual files that people have requested from a Web site. These files could include the HTML files and their imbedded graphic images and any other associated files that get transmitted. In general, an access log can be analyzed to tell you the number of visitors (unique first-time requests) to a home page, the origin of the visitors in terms of their associated server's domain name, how many requests were received for each page at the site (which can be presented with the pages with most requests listed first), and usage patterns in terms of time of day and day of week.
- 21. Packet. The unit of data that is routed between an origin and destination on the Internet or any other packet-switched network. When any file (e.g., e-mail message, Graphics Interchange Format file (*.gif, one of the ways in which pictures or photographs are transmitted via the Internet), Uniform Resource Locator request) is sent from one place to another on the Internet, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) layer divides the file into "chunks" of an efficient size for routing. Each of these packets is separately numbered and includes the Internet address of the destination (i.e., the IP address). The individual packets for a given file may travel different routes through the Internet; when all the packets arrive at the destination, they are reassembled into the original file by the TCP layer at the receiving end.
- 22. Low Orbit Ion Cannon/High Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC/HOIC). LOIC/HOIC are packet flooding tools using User Datagram Protocol ("UDP"), TCP, and Hypertext Transfer Protocol ("HTTP") methods. LOIC/HOIC are open source computer programs that were designed as network stress testing applications. Attackers can use this tool to send extremely large numbers of packets over the network to attempt to overwhelm a

- target. When used collectively from multiple sources, a DDoS can occur against a target site by flooding the site with TCP packets, UDP packets, or HTTP requests with the intention of disrupting the service of the target site. LOIC can be used in two ways, manual or HIVE Mode (Hive Mind). If using manual mode, the user must enter a target, such as an IP address or the http address of the target.
- a. <u>HIVE and/or HIVE Mind</u>. This mode of LOIC/HOIC enables the user to connect LOIC/HOIC to an IRC server, allowing someone else to control which specific target all connected LOIC/HOIC clients are aimed at. The user is basically agreeing to participate in a "voluntary" BotNet.
- 23. BotNet. A term for a collection of computers, sometimes referred to as bots, which run autonomously. While the term "BotNet" can be used to refer to any group of bots, such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC) bots, the word is generally used to refer to a collection of compromised machines running programs, usually referred to as worms, Trojan horses, or backdoors, under a common "command and control" (C&C) infrastructure. A BotNet's originator, referred to as a "botherder" can control the group remotely through communications using a specific protocol, usually IRC, and usually for nefarious purposes. Individual programs manifest as IRC bots. Often the command and control takes place via an IRC server or a specific channel on a public IRC network. A bot typically runs hidden, that is, the user of the infected computer is not aware that it is running the bot program. Generally, the perpetrator of the BotNet has compromised a series of systems using various tools (exploits, buffer overflows, as well as others). BotNets have become a significant part of the Internet, albeit increasingly hidden. Due to the fact that most conventional IRC networks have taken measures to block access to previously hosted BotNets, botherders must now find their own servers. Often, a BotNet will include a variety of connections, ranging from dial-up, DSL, and cable modems, and a variety of network types, including educational, corporate, government and even military networks. Sometimes, a botherder will hide an IRC server installation on an

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- 24. <u>Command and Control ("C&C") node or server</u>. A C&C node/server is a computer managing a particular network of bots. There can be one or many, including a hierarchy, of C&C computers managing a BotNet.
- 25. <u>Twitter</u>. A website owned and operated by Twitter, Inc., which offers social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send and read messages called "tweets." Tweets are publicly visible by default; however, senders can restrict message delivery to their followers. Users may subscribe to other users' tweets.

VI. PROBABLE CAUSE

- 26. On November 5, 2010, the FBI received a call from Mark Sheppard of Sheppard Communications, Inc. Sheppard explained he had captured the DDoS attacks on the VICTIM's websites and was willing to make copies for the FBI to review.
- 27. On November 8, 2010, Mark Sheppard delivered three DVD-R discs containing access and error logs from the VICTIM's websites to the Los Angeles Field Office. The time frame for data contained on the three DVD-R discs was October 18, 2010 to October 22, 2010.
- 28. The data provided by Sheppard was considered to be raw data, meaning a program would have to be used in order to organize and pull out trends. Log parser tools were used to review the access and error logs. These programs and methods were used to determine how many times a specific IP address attacked the websites in the time frame of October 18, 2010 to October 22, 2010, and to record those unique specific IP addresses and their counts.
- 29. Results from these methods and programs provided several unique IP addresses. Each IP address was shown to have attacked the websites at an extremely high rate. One such IP address, 207.118.30.112, attacked the website 48,471 times during the time frame of October 19, 2010, at 21:11:04 MST to October 19, 2010, at 21:58:28 MST, a period of 47 minutes and 24 seconds.

28 | Lantz, the wife of Dar

- 30. On November 30, 2010, an IP address locator was used to determine the ISP for IP address 207.118.30.112. The results returned CenturyLink as the ISP for IP Address 207.118.30.112.
- 31. On December 7, 2010, a Federal Grand Jury subpoena was served on CenturyLink, requesting subscriber information for IP address 207.118.30.112 on October 19, 2010 at 21:11:04 MST.
- 32. On December 9, 2010, a response was received from CenturyLink. A review of the results revealed the subscriber to the IP address as Darrin M. Lantz, with a service location of 3921 55th Street CT NW, Gig Harbor, Washington, 98335, the SUBJECT RESIDENCE. Information provided by Century Link did not state whether the subscriber was utilizing the service through a wired connection, a secured wireless connection, or an unsecured wireless connection. Additional research into the DSL services provided by Century Link reveals that they supply Westell brand modems to their customers.
- 33. On March 2, 2011, FBI Agents verified a wireless connection in the area of the SUBJECT RESIDENCE. One wireless network, named "Westell3428," appeared secured, meaning the wireless network needed a password in order to access it. Another wireless network, "La Casa Sandoval," was also verified in the area of the SUBJECT RESIDENCE. This network was unsecured; after researching the name "Sandoval," no connection between that wireless network name and any residence in the area was found. It cannot be determined with absolute certainty that the secured wireless network "Westell3428" came from the SUBJECT RESIDENCE, however, due to the strength of the signal the Agents picked up directly in front of the residence, and the fact that Westell brand modems were found to be used with the SUBJECT RESIDENCE's ISP for DSL service, there is reason to believe the SUBJECT RESIDENCE is using the secured "Westell3428" wireless network. On March 4, 2011, FBI Agents verified a vehicle parked in the driveway of the SUBJECT RESIDENCE to be registered to Rhoda D. Lantz, the wife of Darrin Lantz.

34. The wireless network appearing in or around the SUBJECT RESIDENCE 1 was secured requiring the use of a password to access and utilize the wireless network. 2 Based on the use of a secured wireless network, in conjunction with the IP address 3 recovered from the logs of the VICTIM'S websites linking back to the SUBJECT 4 5 RESIDENCE, I believe that someone with access to the computer at the SUBJECT RESIDENCE, took part in the DDoS attacks. Alternatively, if the computer at the 6 7 SUBJECT RESIDENCE was compromised prior to the DDos attacks, a forensic examination of the computer would reveal evidence relating to the activities of 8 compromised computer use. 9

VII. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DIGITAL DEVICES

- 35. As used below, the term "digital device" includes any electronic system or device capable of storing and/or processing data in digital form, including: central processing units, laptop and notebook computers, personal digital assistants, wireless communication devices such as mobile telephones (i.e., cell phones); related communications devices such as modems; storage media such as hard disk drives, floppy disks, compact disks, magnetic tapes used to store digital data (excluding analog tapes such as VHS), and memory chips; and security devices. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, as well as information related to me by agents and others involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I know that data in digital form can be stored on a variety of digital devices and that during the search of the premises it is not always possible to search digital devices for digital data for a number of reasons, including the following:
- a. Searching digital devices can be a highly technical process that requires specific expertise and specialized equipment. There are so many types of digital devices and software in use today that it is impossible to bring to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment necessary to conduct a thorough search. In addition, it may also be necessary to consult with specially trained personnel

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who have specific expertise in the type of digital device, software application or operating system that is being searched.

- b. Digital data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction. Searching digital devices can require the use of precise, scientific procedures that are designed to maintain the integrity of digital data and to recover "hidden," erased, compressed, encrypted or password-protected data. As a result, a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory or similar facility, is essential to conducting a complete and accurate analysis of data stored on digital devices.
- c. The volume of data stored on many digital devices will typically be so large that it will be highly impractical to search for data during the execution of the physical search of the premises. A single megabyte of storage space is the equivalent of 500 double-spaced pages of text. A single gigabyte of storage space, or 1,000 megabytes, is the equivalent of 500,000 double-spaced pages of text. Storage devices capable of storing 500 gigabytes (GB) of data are now commonplace in desktop computers. Consequently, each non-networked, desktop computer found during a search can easily contain the equivalent of 240 million pages of data, that, if printed out, would completely fill three 35' x 35' x 10' rooms to the ceiling. Further, a 500 GB drive could contain as many as approximately 450 full-run movies or 450,000 songs.
- d. Electronic files or remnants of such files can be recovered months or even years after they have been downloaded onto a hard drive, deleted, or viewed via the Internet. Electronic files saved to a hard drive can be stored for years with little or no cost. Even when such files have been deleted, they can be recovered months or years later using readily-available forensics tools. Normally, when a person deletes a file on a computer, the data contained in the file does not actually disappear, rather, that data remains on the hard drive until it is overwritten by new data. Therefore, deleted files, or remnants of deleted files, may reside in free space or unallocated/slack space, i.e., space on the hard drive that is not allocated to an active file or that is unused after a file has been allocated to a set block of storage space for long periods of time before they are

overwritten. In addition, a computer's operating system may also keep a record of deleted data in a swap or recovery file. Similarly, files that have been viewed via the Internet are automatically downloaded into a temporary Internet directory or cache. The browser typically maintains a fixed amount of hard drive space devoted to these files, and the files are only overwritten as they are replaced with more recently viewed Internet pages. Thus, the ability to retrieve residue of an electronic file from a hard drive depends less on when the file was downloaded or viewed than on a particular user's operating system, storage capacity, and computer habits. Recovery of residue of electronic files from a hard drive requires specialized tools and a controlled laboratory environment.

Although some of the records called for by this warrant might be e. found in the form of user-generated documents (such as word processor, picture, and movie files), digital devices can contain other forms of electronic evidence as well. In particular, records of how a digital device has been used, what it has been used for, who has used it, and who has been responsible for creating or maintaining records, documents, programs, applications and materials contained on the digital devices, are called for by this warrant. Those records will not always be found in digital data that is neatly segregable from the hard drive image as a whole. Digital data on the hard drive not currently associated with any file can provide evidence of a file that was once on the hard drive but has since been deleted or edited, or of a deleted portion of a file (such as a paragraph that has been deleted from a word processing file). Virtual memory paging systems can leave digital data on the hard drive that show what tasks and processes on the computer were recently used. Web browsers, e-mail programs, and chat programs store configuration data on the hard drive that can reveal information such as online nicknames and passwords. Operating systems can record additional data, such as the attachment of peripherals, the attachment of USB flash storage devices, and the times the computer was in use. Computer file systems can record data about the dates files were created and the sequence in which they were created. This data can be evidence of a crime, indicate the identity of the user of the digital device, or point toward the existence of evidence in other

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locations. Recovery of this data requires specialized tools and a controlled laboratory environment.

f. Further, evidence of how a digital device has been used, what it has been used for, and who has used it, may be found in the absence of particular data on a digital device. For example, to rebut a claim that the owner of a digital device was not responsible for a particular use because the device was being controlled remotely by malicious software, it may be necessary to show that malicious software that allows someone else to control the digital device remotely is not present on the digital device. Evidence of the absence of particular data on a digital device is not segregable from the digital device. Analysis of the digital device as a whole to demonstrate the absence of particular data requires specialized tools and a controlled laboratory environment.

VIII. PRIOR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE

36. Any other means of obtaining the necessary evidence to prove the elements of computer/Internet-related crimes, for example, a consent search, would result in an unacceptable risk of the loss and/or destruction of the evidence sought. At this point in the investigation, given the sophistication of the DDoS attack on the VICTIM's websites, I believe that whoever participated in the DDoS attack, most likely someone within the SUBJECT RESIDENCE, has a high level of computer skill and that there is an actual risk of data loss or destruction. Thus, the only effective means of collecting and preserving the required evidence is through a search warrant.

IX. ITEMS TO BE SEIZED

37. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that the following items, which constitute evidence of violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030 (Fraud and Related Activity In Connection With Computers), will be found at the SUBJECT RESIDENCE:

Physical Items

a. Any physical digital device and/or computer used to commit or store evidence of the offenses listed above;

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- b. Any physical equipment used to facilitate the offenses listed above by the transmission, creation, display, encoding or storage of digital data, including word processing equipment, modems, routers, and encryption devices;
- c. Any physical magnetic, electronic, or optical storage devices used to store data related to the offenses above, such as floppy disks, hard disks, tapes, CD-ROMS, CD-R, CD-RWs, DVDs, optical disks, printer or memory buffers, smart cards, memory sticks, thumb drives, smartphones, electronic tablets;
- d. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device or data stored on the digital device:

Digital / Electronic Items

- e. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to malicious software, code, or other programs associated with Trojans, BotNets, denial of service attacks, to include but not limited to, LOIC and/or HOIC;
- f. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to communications between the seized computer hard drive and other computers involved in the denial of service attack, as well as to any individuals that may be controlling the denial of service attack or participating in the attack, to include IRC chat logs, other online chat logs, personal messages, Twitter tweets, and/or email related to the denial of service attacks;
- g. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to the administration, maintenance, operation, use or propagation of the denial of service tools, to include but not limited to, LOIC/HOIC;
- h. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to the identification and locations of person(s) using or controlling or disseminating denial of service software;

- i. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to the identification and location of other computers comprising part of the denial of service attack and/or BotNet;
- j. Any and all digital data gathered or collected by means of the operation of the denial of service attack and/or BotNet;
- k. Any digital logs and other transactional information, to include but not limited to, internet history, maintained in relation to computer(s) at the SUBJECT RESIDENCE;

Physical or Digital Items

- l. Any physical or digital records, documents, communications, names, handles/monikers, email accounts, IP addresses and materials (i.e., Word documents, Excel spreadsheets, chat logs, e-mails) that relate to the denial of service attack;
- m. Any physical or digital documentation, operating logs, and reference manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or software used in the digital device;
- n. Any physical or digital application, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the digital device; and
- o. Any physical or digital passwords, password files, test key, encryption codes, or other information necessary to access the digital device or data stored on the digital device.
- 38. As used above, the terms records, documents, programs, applications, or materials include records, documents, programs, applications, or materials created, modified, or stored in any form, including in digital form on any digital device, and any forensic copies thereof. The term "digital device" is used as defined above in paragraph 35.

- 39. In accordance with the information in this affidavit, law enforcement personnel will execute the search of digital devices seized pursuant to this warrant as follows:
- a. Upon securing the search site, the search team, comprised of Agents who have undergone computer training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia and a trained Computer Analysis Response Team examiner, will conduct an initial review of any digital devices/systems to determine whether the ESI contained therein can be searched and/or duplicated on site in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to accurately preserve the data.
- b. If, based on their training and experience, and the resources available to them at the search site, the search team determines it is not practicable to make an on-site search, or to make an on-site copy of the ESI within a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to accurately preserve the data, then the digital devices will be seized and transported to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory for review and to be forensically copied ("imaged") as appropriate.
- c. In order to examine the ESI in a forensically sound manner, law enforcement personnel with appropriate expertise will produce a complete forensic image of any digital device that is found to contain data or items that fall within the scope of Attachment B of this Affidavit. In addition, appropriately trained personnel may search for and attempt to recover deleted, hidden, or encrypted data to determine whether the data fall within the list of items to be seized pursuant to the warrant. In order to search fully for the items identified in the warrant, law enforcement personnel may then examine all of the data contained in the forensic image/s and/or on the digital devices, that fall within the time frame of October 4, 2010 to November 5, 2010. I believe this time frame to be the most relevant time frame for purposes of this investigation, because the VICTIM made his public anti-piracy comments on October 4, 2010, as described in paragraph 5 above. These comments were the basis of the first DDoS attack, launched on or about October 14, 2010. The second DDoS attack was launched on or about October 18, 2010,

and I believe it is reasonable to search for data up until November 5, 2010, approximately two weeks after the second attack, because this leaves a window in which there can still be evidence of talk/chatter about the crime.

- d. The search techniques will involve the use of a "hash value" library to exclude normal operating system files, standard software files, and other "known good" files that do not need to be searched. The "hash value" library also contains known software that can be used for malicious purposes, such as computer hacking. The search techniques will also include the use of text searches for known file names, and for files that contain the responsive text identified in this affidavit. The search techniques that will be used will be only those methodologies, techniques and protocols as may reasonably be expected to find, identify, segregate and/or duplicate the items authorized to be seized pursuant to Attachment B to this Affidavit.
- e. If, after conducting its examination, law enforcement personnel determine that any digital device is an instrumentality of the criminal offenses referenced above, the government may retain that device during the pendency of the case as necessary to, among other things, preserve the instrumentality evidence for trial, ensure the chain of custody, and litigate the issue of forfeiture. If law enforcement personnel determine that a device was not an instrumentality of the criminal offenses referenced above, it shall be returned to the person/entity from whom it was seized within 90 days of the issuance of the warrant, unless the government seeks and obtains authorization from the court for its retention.
- f. Unless the government seeks an additional order of authorization from any Magistrate Judge in the District, the government will return any digital device that has been forensically copied, that is not an instrumentality of the crime, and that may be lawfully possessed by the person/entity from whom it was seized, to the person/entity from whom it was seized within 90 days of seizure.
 - g. If, in the course of their efforts to search the subject digital devices,

using the techniques described in paragraph 39(d) above, law enforcement agents or analysts discover items outside of the scope of the warrant that are evidence of other crimes, that data/evidence will not be used in any way unless it is first presented to a Magistrate Judge of this District and a new warrant is obtained to seize that data, and/or to search for other evidence related to it.

- 40. In order to search for data that is capable of being read or interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement personnel are authorized to seize the following items, subject to the procedures set forth above:
- a. Any digital device, as defined above, capable of being used to commit, further, or store evidence of the offense listed above;
- b. Any equipment used to facilitate the transmission, creation, display, encoding, or storage of digital data, including word processing equipment, modems, routers, and encryption devices;
- c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of storing data, such as floppy disks, hard disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-R, CD-RWs, DVDs, optical disks, printer or memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory calculators, electronic dialers, electronic notebooks, cellular telephones, and personal digital assistants;
- d. Any documentation, operating logs, and reference manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or software used in the digital device;
- e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the digital device;
- f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles, and similar physical items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device or data stored on the digital device; and
- g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes, or other information necessary to access the digital device or data stored on the digital device.
 - 41. Based on the information in this Affidavit, I also believe that the digital

device(s) with Internet capability at the SUBJECT RESIDENCE are instrumentalities of crime and constitute the means by which violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030 (Fraud and Related Activity in Connection With Computers) have been committed. Therefore, I believe that in addition to seizing the digital devices to conduct a search of their contents as set forth herein, there is probable cause to seize those digital devices as instrumentalities of the criminal activity.

X. CONCLUSION

42. Based on the foregoing facts, I further respectfully submit that there is probable cause to search the SUBJECT RESIDENCE and to seize evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of crimes, namely, Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030 (Fraud and Related Activity In Connection With Computers).

SCOTT A. LOVE, Special Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to before me this **262** day of April, 2011.

J. RICHARD CREATURA

United States Magistrate Judge

ATTACHMENT A

SUBJECT RESIDENCE

The physical address of the SUBJECT RESIDENCE is 3921 55th Street Ct. NW, Gig Harbor, Washington 98335. The SUBJECT RESIDENCE is on a residential block located one block off 56th Street NW. The residence is a single story home, light green with dark green trim. The front door faces 55th Street Ct. NW and has a white storm door attached. The majority of the storm door is made up of a large screen/glass area. There is a two car garage attached to the right side of the residence. Dark numerals "3921" are affixed to the garage directly above the garage doors. The property does not appear to have any type of fence surrounding it.

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ATTACHMENT B

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED

The following records, documents, files, or materials, in whatever form, including handmade or mechanical form (such as printed, written, handwritten, or typed); photocopies or other photographic form; and electrical, electronic, and magnetic form (such as tapes, cassettes, hard disks, floppy disks, diskettes, compact discs, CD-ROMs, DVDs, optical discs, Zip cartridges, printer buffers, smart cards, or electronic notebooks, or any other storage medium) that constitute evidence, instrumentalities, or fruits of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030 (Fraud and Related Activity in Connection With Computers), which may be found at the SUBJECT RESIDENCE, including but not limited to:

Physical Items

- a. Any physical digital device and/or computer used to commit or store evidence of the offenses listed above;
- b. Any physical equipment used to facilitate the offenses listed above by the transmission, creation, display, encoding or storage of digital data, including word processing equipment, modems, routers, and encryption devices;
- c. Any physical magnetic, electronic, or optical storage devices used to store data related to the offenses above, such as floppy disks, hard disks, tapes, CD-ROMS, CD-R, CD-RWs, DVDs, optical disks, printer or memory buffers, smart cards, memory sticks, thumb drives, smartphones, electronic tablets;
- d. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device or data stored on the digital device;

Digital / Electronic Items

e. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to malicious software, code, or other programs associated with Trojans, BotNets, denial of

service attacks, to include but not limited to, LOIC and/or HOIC;

- f. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to communications between the seized computer hard drive and other computers involved in the denial of service attack, as well as to any individuals that may be controlling the denial of service attack or participating in the attack, to include IRC chat logs, other online chat logs, personal messages, Twitter tweets, and/or email related to the denial of service attacks:
- g. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to the administration, maintenance, operation, use or propagation of the denial of service tools, to include but not limited to, LOIC/HOIC;
- h. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to the identification and locations of person(s) using or controlling or disseminating denial of service software;
- i. Any and all digital records, documents, and materials that relate to the identification and location of other computers comprising part of the denial of service attack and/or BotNet;
- j. Any and all digital data gathered or collected by means of the operation of the denial of service attack and/or BotNet;
- k. Any digital logs and other transactional information, to include but not limited to, internet history, maintained in relation to computer(s) at the SUBJECT RESIDENCE;

Physical or Digital

- l. Any physical or digital records, documents, and materials (i.e., Word documents, Excel spreadsheets, chat logs, e-mails) that relate to communications, names, handles/monikers, email accounts, or IP addresses of those either at the SUBJECT RESIDENCE or those participants in the denial of service attack;
 - m. Any physical or digital documentation, operating logs, and reference

manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or software used in the digital device;

- n. Any physical or digital application, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the digital device; and
- o. Any physical or digital passwords, password files, test key, encryption codes, or other information necessary to access the digital device or data stored on the digital device.
- 2. With respect to any digital devices falling within the scope of the foregoing search categories, or any digital devices containing evidence falling within the scope of the foregoing search categories, records, documents, programs, applications or materials, or evidence of the absence of same, sufficient to show the actual user(s) of the digital device during the time period between October 4, 2010 to November 5, 2010.
- 3. Any other evidence from the digital device(s) necessary to understand how the digital device was used during the time period between October 4, 2010 to November 5, 2010, the purpose of its use, and who used it during the time period between October 4, 2010 to November 5, 2010.

THE SEIZURE OF DIGITAL DEVICES AND/OR THEIR COMPONENTS AS SET FORTH HEREIN IS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THIS SEARCH WARRANT, NOT ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH DIGITAL DEVICES CONSTITUTE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY DESCRIBED ABOVE, BUT ALSO FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING OFF-SITE EXAMINATIONS OF THEIR CONTENTS FOR EVIDENCE, INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR FRUITS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED CRIMES.